(HC)West v. Attorney General of the State of California

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 21, 2023·No. 1:22-cv-00172·Unknown

Opinion

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH JAMES WEST, Case No. 1:22-cv-00172-ADA-CDB (HC)

Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT PETITIONER’S UNOPPOSED MOTION v. FOR STAY

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF (Doc. 30) CALIFORNIA, FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE Respondent.

Background Petitioner Kenneth James West (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On March 15, 2022, Petitioner filed a first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 14). Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on July 22, 2022. (Doc. 19). Petitioner filed a response on August 11, 2022. (Doc. 22). On November 30, 2022, the Court issued findings and recommendations to grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 27). The Court found Petitioner had failed to exhaust several of his ineffective assistance of counsel and Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Id. at 4-5. The Court found Petitioner did exhaust an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his trial counsel’s failure to object to and argue for concurrent sentencing terms. Id. at 5. However, the Court held Petitioner’s first amended petition only contained a generalized claim that counsel “refused to object to the sentence” and failed to state a cognizable claim. Id. The Court recommended the petition should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to show exhaustion of state remedies and failure to state a cognizable federal claim. Id. at 6. On December 19, 2022, Petitioner filed objections to the Court’s findings and recommendations. (Doc. 28). On March 7, 2023, the Honorable District Judge Ana de Alba issued an order adopting in full the November 30, 2022, findings and recommendations. (Doc. 29). District Judge de Alba held “the [magistrate judge] has appropriately suggested dismissing the petition without prejudice so that Petitioner can amend the petition, and, if desired, request a stay of the petition in this court in order to exhaust claims in state court.” Id. at 2. Petitioner was provided 30 days from the date of service of the order to file a second amended petition. Id. at 3. Before the 30-day period ran, on March 31, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion to stay. (Doc. 30). Petitioner requests a stay “so as to comply with the Court’s direction to raise the unexhausted claims in the proper venue.” Id. Respondent did not file an opposition to Petitioner’s motion to stay, and the time to do so has passed.1 Legal Standard A stay and abeyance of a federal habeas petition that includes both exhausted and unexhausted claims is appropriate in “limited circumstances” where (i) “the petitioner has good cause for his failure to exhaust,” (ii) “his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious,” and (iii) “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). See Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that a district court has the discretion to stay and hold in abeyance both partially and fully unexhausted petitions under the circumstances set forth in Rhines). Such a stay allows state courts the first opportunity to consider and address a state prisoner’s habeas corpus claims. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 273-74 (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982)). 1 Respondent’s failure to file an opposition to Petitioner’s motion is construed as a non- opposition. See Local Rule 230(c) (“A failure to file a timely opposition may also be construed by the Court as a non-opposition to the motion.”). The decision of whether to grant a Rhines stay is subject to the discretion of the district court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276; contra Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005) (when the three Rhines factors are satisfied however, “it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a stay[.]”). Discussion Petitioner moves the Court to stay this federal habeas proceeding so that he may present the state courts with the unexhausted claims in his mixed federal petition. (Doc. 30). A. Good Cause for Failure to Exhaust “Good cause” in the context of a Rhines stay turns on whether the petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient evidence, to justify the failure to exhaust. Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661-62 (the “good cause” requirement does not require a showing of "extraordinary circumstances"). See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2005) (reasonable confusion regarding the timeliness of a state filing ordinarily constitutes good cause). Here, Petitioner’s motion to stay does not demonstrate good cause. Petitioner requests a stay “so as to comply with the court’s direction to raise the unexhausted claims in the proper venue.” (Doc. 30). Petitioner’s one-page motion for stay does not provide any facts and/or evidence of good cause for his failure to previously exhaust the claims in state court. Petitioner’s previous pleadings assert he failed to exhaust because of ineffective assistance of counsel. See (Doc. 22 p. 1) (“I had a state appointed attorney and he instructed me that all state remedies were exhausted and he mailed me the [California] Supreme Court[s] denial…and a federal writ to file the appeal.”); (Doc. 28 p. 1) (same). However, Petitioner has not submitted to this Court any evidence in support of his contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal in state court. See Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014) (“While a bald assertion cannot amount to a showing of good cause, a reasonable excuse, supported by evidence to justify a petitioner’s failure to exhaust”.). Accordingly, the Court concludes Petitioner’s failure to show good cause under Rhines weighs against his motion for a stay. / / / B. The Unexhausted Claims are Potentially Meritorious The merit inquiry under Rhines turns on whether the petitioner has presented a colorable claim, not whether he is likely to prevail. Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2011). A federal habeas petitioner needs only show that one of his unexhausted claims is not “plainly meritless” to obtain a stay under Rhines. 544 U.S. at 277. In determining whether a claim is "plainly meritless," principles of comity and federalism demand that the federal court refrains from ruling on the merits of the claim unless “it is perfectly clear that the petitioner has no hope of prevailing.” Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 722 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005)). “A contrary rule would deprive state courts of the opportunity to address a colorable federal claim in the first instance and grant relief if they believe it is warranted.” Id. (quoting Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624) (citing Lundy, 455 U.S. at 515). Here, the Court finds that Petitioner’s unexhausted ineffective assistance of counsel claims potentially could be meritorious and cannot be said to be “hopeless.” See Cruz v. Mitchell, No. 13-cv- 02792-JST, 2015 WL 78779, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015) (“[P]etitioner’s unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious where they are not “vague, conclusory, or patently frivolous.”). Petitioner has advanc

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