HCC Specialty Underwriters v. Woodbury, et al.

2017 DNH 245

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: December 4, 2017
• Docket: Civil No. 16–cv–501–LM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

HCC Specialty Underwriters, Inc.

v. Civil No. 16-cv-501-LM Opinion No. 2017 DNH 245 John Woodbury, et al.

O R D E R

Before the court is a motion to amend the complaint filed

by plaintiff HCC Specialty Underwriters, Inc. (“HCC”). See doc.

no. 46. In the original complaint, HCC alleges that defendant

John Woodbury, a former employee of HCC, violated his 1996 non-

compete agreement and misused confidential information while

working for defendant Buttine Underwriters Agency, LLC d/b/a

Prize and Promotion Insurance Services (“Buttine”), a competitor

of HCC. Based upon information it claims to have learned during

discovery, HCC seeks to amend the complaint to allege that

Woodbury also violated a 2001 release and misappropriated trade

secrets. Defendants object and argue that HCC’s motion is

untimely. For the following reasons, HCC’s motion is granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because HCC moves to amend the complaint after the deadline

set out in the scheduling order, “the court evaluates [HCC’s]

request . . . under the Rule 16 ‘good cause’ standard.” Ashley v. Spaulding Youth Ctr., No. 16-cv-37-JL, 2016 WL 5477574, at *5

(D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2016) (emphasis omitted); see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good

cause and with the judge's consent.”). The purpose of this

standard is to “preserve[] the integrity and effectiveness of

Rule 16(b) scheduling orders.” O’Connell v. Hyatt Hotels of

P.R., 357 F.3d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Cruz v.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., PR, Inc., 699 F.3d 563, 570 (1st Cir.

2012) (“A scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper,

idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel

without peril.” (quotation omitted)).

“Rule 16(b)'s ‘good cause’ standard emphasizes the

diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” O’Connell, 357

F.3d at 155. The question is whether the deadline could not

have been reasonably met “despite the diligence of the party

seeking the extension.” Id. at 154 (quotation omitted).

“Prejudice to the opposing party remains relevant but is not the

dominant criterion.” Id. at 155. As the party seeking leave to

amend, HCC bears the burden of establishing good cause. See

Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., No.

10-cv-154-JL, 2012 WL 928080, at *2 (D.N.H. Mar. 19, 2012).

2 BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the original complaint,

unless otherwise noted. HCC is a provider of specialized

insurance products, including insurance related to “event

cancellation, weather, travel, event liability, prize indemnity,

contractual bonus and over-redemption insurance.” Doc. no. 1 at

¶ 13. Prior to his resignation in 2016, Woodbury was employed

for more than two decades by HCC, or one of its predecessors.

Woodbury’s work appears to have involved developing and managing

client relationships.

The present litigation arises from an employment agreement

between Woodbury and a predecessor of HCC, American Specialty

Underwriters, Inc. The agreement was executed in 1996 and is

titled “Employment, Incentive Compensation, Confidentiality and

Non-Competition Agreement” (hereinafter the “1996 Agreement”).

Woodbury agreed that, during his employment and for a period of

two years following his termination, he would not divert

business from his employer, would not “interfere in any material

respect with any business relationship between [the employer]

and any other person,” and would not render services to another

whose activities would violate the agreement if performed by

Woodbury. Id. at ¶ 16. Woodbury also agreed that he would not

3 use confidential company information on behalf of any future

employer.

Woodbury resigned from HCC in June 2016. Shortly

thereafter, he began working for Buttine, which soon launched a

new set of insurance products. HCC alleges that these insurance

products are “direct competitive offerings to that of HCC,” and

that Woodbury was hired to develop this area of Buttine’s

business. Id. at ¶ 25. HCC asserts that, since Woodbury’s

resignation, defendants have met with reinsurers and clients

that have business relationships with HCC. HCC thus alleges

that Woodbury is violating the 1996 Agreement by helping Buttine

compete against HCC in this niche insurance market.

HCC further alleges that defendants have used or will use

HCC’s confidential information to compete against HCC. HCC

bases this allegation on the fact that Woodbury engaged in

unusual activity on his work computer shortly before, and

directly after, he tendered his resignation. Specifically,

Woodbury accessed information that he had no need to access,

including contracts for prior clients, HCC’s budget information,

and a spreadsheet containing HCC’s rates for a certain insurance

product. Although HCC did not allege a claim for misappropri-

ation of trade secrets in the original complaint, it did allege

4 that some of the information Woodbury accessed would constitute

trade secrets under state law.

Based on defendants’ alleged conduct, HCC brought the

present action. In the original complaint, HCC raises claims

for specific performance of the 1996 Agreement (Count I); breach

of the 1996 Agreement by Woodbury (Count II); tortious

interference with the 1996 Agreement by Buttine (Count III); a

declaratory judgment that the 1996 Agreement is valid and

enforceable (Count IV); and a claim against both defendants

under the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (Count V).

DISCUSSION

HCC moves to amend its complaint to add two new claims, as

well as additional factual allegations relevant to those claims.

HCC asserts that it only recently discovered the information

supporting these claims.

The first new claim is for breach of contract. HCC alleges

that Woodbury breached a release executed by Woodbury and ASU

International, Inc.—another of HCC’s predecessors—in 2001

(hereinafter “the 2001 Release”). The 2001 Release was executed

as part of a security purchase agreement between ASU

International and HCC’s parent company, under which HCC’s parent

company would acquire ASU International’s stock. HCC alleges

that the 2001 Release reaffirms Woodbury’s obligations under the

5 1996 Agreement not to compete or to use HCC’s confidential

information, and that Woodbury violated those obligations.1

The second new claim is for misappropriation of trade

secrets under RSA 350-B, the New Hampshire Uniform Trade Secrets

Act (“UTSA”). HCC alleges that, after his resignation, Woodbury

retained confidential company information on his personal

computer, his wife’s computer, his personal email, and his

personal cell phone. As HCC details in its motion, this

information includes, among other things, a list of HCC client

email addresses. HCC contends that its confidential information

constitutes trade secrets and that defendants have

misappropriated HCC’s trade secrets in order to identify

potential customers and develop competing insurance products.

Although the deadline for amendments to pleadings was July

31, 2017, HCC did not file its motion until September 26. Thus,

Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard applies. See Ashley, 2016 WL

5477574, at *5.

HCC argues that, under these circumstances, there is good

cause justifying the late amendments. The court considers HCC’s

two proposed claims below.

1 To account for the alleged breach of the 2001 Release, HCC also moves to expand the facts underlying its original claims for specific performance, declaratory judgment, tortious interference with contract, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act.

6 I. Breach of 2001 Release

HCC asserts that it discovered the 2001 Release after

defendants served their first request for production on July 18.

In compiling documents responsive to defendants’ request, HCC

collected files related to the 2001 security purchase agreement

noted above. HCC discovered the 2001 Release attached to that

agreement, which HCC produced to defendants on August 8.

cause to justify the late amendment adding the claim and

allegations relating to the 2001 Release. Although HCC

acknowledges that the 2001 Release was in its possession, HCC

asserts that its counsel did not discover the Release earlier

because the Release was contained in the files of the otherwise

unrelated 2001 security purchase agreement. HCC argues that it

acted diligently in moving to amend the complaint once it

discovered the 2001 Release, and that permitting the amendment

will cause no prejudice to defendants.

Defendants disagree. They argue that HCC was not diligent

because the 2001 Release has been in HCC’s possession long

before HCC filed suit. They further claim that they will suffer

prejudice if the motion is granted. They assert that in

deciding to resign from HCC, Woodbury reviewed and relied on the

7 contents of his personnel file—which did not include the 2001

Release. Defendants do not dispute that Woodbury signed the

Release, but they state that, at the time he resigned, Woodbury

had no memory of executing the document.

After weighing the arguments on both sides, the court

concludes that, although a close call, HCC has shown sufficient

good cause to permit the late amendments relating to the 2001

Release. As set forth above, the predominant factor in the

court’s analysis is the diligence of the moving party. See

O’Connell, 357 F.3d at 154-55. Here, the court is satisfied

that HCC acted with diligence. To be sure, the court recognizes

that the Release has been in HCC’s possession since 2001.

Still, the court finds HCC’s explanation for its late discovery

reasonable. There appears to be no dispute that the late

discovery was a good faith oversight on the part of HCC—indeed,

defendants acknowledge that Woodbury too did not recall the

execution of the Release. More importantly, once the Release

was discovered, HCC did not delay in producing the Release to

defendants or in seeking the proposed amendments. In short, in

finding that HCC acted diligently, the court accords significant

weight both to the unusual circumstances presented here—that

both parties to the Release had no memory of its execution—as

well as to HCC’s conduct upon discovery of the Release.

8 Moreover, the court finds defendants’ prejudice argument

unpersuasive. Defendants’ primary prejudice argument appears to

be related to the potential damage this evidence may do to their

case and their litigation strategy.2 However, the harm to

defendants’ case is caused by the mere existence of this

evidence rather than HCC’s belated discovery of it. In the

context of Rule 16(b), prejudice occurs “when amendments would

delay trial, restart a case at an earlier stage, or otherwise

unfairly limit a parties [sic] ability to present their case at

trial.” Robles v. Archer W. Contractors, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-1306-

M, 2015 WL 4979020, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2015). Defendants

do not allege this sort of prejudice.

Defendants’ argument that the recent discovery of this

evidence may alter their trial strategy is not sufficiently

persuasive to prohibit HCC’s amendment. Such an event is common

to any case where a significant evidentiary discovery causes a

litigant to chart a different course. The claimed prejudice is

2 Defendants also claim that HCC’s failure to include a copy of the 2001 Release in Woodbury’s personnel file constitutes a violation of Massachusetts state law. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 52C (2017) (requiring employers to keep complete personnel records of employees). Even if defendants are correct, defendants have not persuaded the court that such a violation bears on whether there is good cause for the late amendment.

9 especially weak here because Woodbury does not dispute that he

executed the 2001 Release.

For these reasons, the court concludes that there is good

cause to allow the late amendments relating to the 2001 Release.

II. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

With respect to the UTSA claim, HCC argues that it has

demonstrated good cause because it acted diligently in filing

the motion to amend. Specifically, HCC states that it first

learned through discovery propounded on August 18 that Woodbury

retained confidential HCC information on his personal devices

after his resignation.

Defendants argue that HCC did not act with diligence

because it had a factual basis to raise a UTSA claim when it

filed the original complaint, but failed to do so. As support,

defendants point to the factual allegations in the original

complaint concerning Woodbury’s “abnormal” computer activity, as

well as the allegations relating to defendants’ use of HCC’s

confidential information to compete against HCC.

Like defendants’ prejudice argument concerning the 2001

Release, defendants also contend that they have made strategic

decisions in defending the case based on the claims in the

original complaint. Additionally, defendants argue that the

addition of a UTSA claim will prolong the litigation.

10 The court finds that there is good cause to allow HCC’s

UTSA claim. With respect to diligence, defendants are correct

that there are some factual allegations in the original

complaint that could have arguably supported a UTSA claim.

Still, in the original complaint, the principal allegation

suggesting that Woodbury had taken and used HCC’s confidential

information was HCC’s claim that Woodbury had engaged in

“abnormal activity” on his work computer shortly before and

directly after his resignation. Doc. no. 1 at ¶ 38. This

provides a weaker inference of misappropriation than the

information recently disclosed by defendants—that Woodbury

continued to maintain confidential HCC information on his

personal devices at the time he was developing Buttine’s

business. Given that difference, the court cannot fault HCC for

initially foregoing a less robust claim and waiting until it

discovered more plausible evidence suggestive of

misappropriation. Further, the court is not inclined to fault

HCC where defendants did not produce the new discovery until

after the amendment deadline. See Mudge v. Bank of America,

N.A., No. 13-cv-421-JD, 2014 WL 2196899, at *3 n.4 (stating that

“delay may be justified when it was caused by the opposing

party's production of critical information through discovery

11 after the scheduling deadline”). Looking at HCC’s actions as a

whole, the court finds that HCC acted diligently.

Nor can the court agree with defendants that the late

amendment will cause them prejudice. The UTSA claim arises out

of the same operative facts as HCC’s original claims. And while

the proposed amendment does introduce a new cause of action, the

facts and legal issues underlying the UTSA claim are, at bottom,

consistent with HCC’s original theory of the case—that

defendants have used HCC’s confidential information to unfairly

compete against HCC. In short, the court is not convinced that

the current course of the proceedings will be so altered by the

proposed amendment that it will prolong the litigation. See

White v. One World Techs., Inc., No. 09-10011-NMG, 2011 WL

5513192, at *2 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2011) (finding that prejudice

resulting from amendment would be “slight,” where proposed claim

was “fundamentally similar” to current claim and defendants

would not need to alter preparation to account for additional

claim).

Therefore, as to the amendments relating to the UTSA claim,

HCC’s motion is granted.

12 CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, HCC’s motion to amend the

complaint (doc. no. 46) is granted. HCC shall file the first

amended complaint as allowed by this order on or before December

6, 2017.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge

December 4, 2017

cc: All Counsel of Record