(HC) Viera v. Peery

Opinion

----oo0oo---- DANIEL HECTOR VIERA, No. 2:19-cv-1573 WBS DMC Petitioner, v. ORDER Respondent. ----oo0oo---- Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States magistrate judge pursuant to Eastern District of California local rules. On July 23, 2020, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations herein which were served on the parties and which contained notice that the parties may file objections within the time specified therein. (See Magistrate’s Findings and Recommendations (“Magistrate’s F&R”) (Docket No. 17).) Timely objections to the findings and recommendations have been filed. Specifically, petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was procedurally defective because it was not timely filed under the applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). (See Pet’r’s Objs. at 4-6 (Docket No. 18).) Petitioner argues that his petition was timely filed because (1) neither he nor any other defendant in his position could reasonably have known that he was ineligible for half-time credits, and (2) the magistrate judge erred in determining that May 16, 2018 was the latest possible date upon which the limitations period could expire. (See id.) In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304(f), this court has conducted a de novo review of this matter. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court finds the magistrate’s findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis. First, the court agrees with the magistrate judge’s determination that petitioner should reasonably have known he was not entitled to half-time credits by May 16, 2017. (See Magistrate’s F&R at 6.) The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that the limitations period “begins when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, the evidence here shows that petitioner’s 2010 plea agreement included an enhancement that made him ineligible for half-time credits, and that petitioner was repeatedly asked during his 2013 sentencing in state court if he understood the terms of forms he had signed waiving his entitlement to half-time credits. (See Magistrate’s F&R at 6.) Petitioner therefore could have discovered, through reasonable diligence, that he was not eligible for half-time credits, even if he did not understand the legal significance of each term in his sentence when he received it. See Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154 n.3. Moreover, petitioner appeared to admit in the declaration he attached to his state habeas petition that he had actual knowledge of his ineligibility for half-time credits during or immediately after his March 16, 2017 sentencing. (Id.) The court therefore agrees with the magistrate judge’s finding that a reasonable defendant in petitioner’s position could have discovered his ineligibility for half-time credits before his sentencing became final on May 16, 2017. Second, the court agrees with the magistrate judge’s finding that May 16, 2018, was the last date for petitioner to file a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). (See Magistrate’s F&R at 7.) 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) requires a petitioner to file a writ of habeas corpus within one year of his sentence becoming final or within one year of the date on which the factual predicate of his claim could have been discovered by exercising due diligence, whichever is later. Here, there was ample evidence showing that petitioner could have discovered the factual predicate of his claim prior to or, at the latest, immediately after his sentencing on March 16, 2017. (See Magistrate’s F&R at 6-7.) The magistrate judge therefore wASS Ct UV VEY POV DOMINO OI ee AY ST Ut

correctly found that the latest date upon which the limitations period could have expired was when petitioner’s sentencing became final, on May 16, 2017. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1) (A). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. The findings and recommendations filed July 23, 2020, are adopted in full; 2, Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) is granted; and 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file. Dated: September 25, 2020 □□ tteom. Ad. bt—~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE