(HC) Stewart v. Borla

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 15, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-03199
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NATHAN STEWART, No. 2:24-cv-3199 DJC AC P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 BORLA, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this habeas corpus action. Respondent 18 has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. ECF No. 11. Petitioner filed an opposition, ECF 19 No. 17, and respondent has replied, ECF No. 18. Having reviewed the briefs, the court has 20 determined that an evidentiary hearing is appropriate to develop the factual record related to 21 statutory and equitable tolling. Accordingly, counsel will be appointed to represent petitioner for 22 the limited purposes of litigating the motion to dismiss. See Rule 8(c), Rules Governing Section 23 2254 Casses; 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. 24 I. Overview 25 Federal habeas actions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations which generally runs 26 from the date a conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In this case, that date 27 appears to be May 30, 2023, when the period to seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court expired 28 after the California Supreme Court denied review of petitioner’s conviction. Accordingly, the 1 federal limitations period began to run on May 31, 2023, and—absent tolling—the federal 2 petition was due on or before May 30, 2024. 3 The statute of limitations is subject to statutory tolling during the time that a “properly 4 filed” application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is “pending” in state court. 5 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the superior court on September 4, 6 2023, which was denied twelve days later. ECF Nos. 10-5, 10-6. The limitations period was 7 statutorily tolled during that time. 8 Petitioner’s next filing in state court came 209 days after the superior court’s adverse 9 ruling. ECF No. 10-7 (petition filed in California Court of Appeal on April 12, 2024). That 10 petition stated specific reasons for its delayed submission. Id. at 6. The petition was denied on 11 the merits, without comment or citation, on May 24, 2024. ECF No. 10-8. Respondent contends 12 that this petition was untimely as a matter of California law, thus not “properly filed” as a matter 13 of federal law, and that petitioner is therefore not entitled to statutory tolling for any period of 14 time following the superior court’s denial of relief.1 ECF No. 11. If respondent is correct, the 15 federal petition would be untimely. 16 Petitioner contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations based 17 on circumstances beyond his control including abandonment by post-conviction counsel, the need 18 to investigate and locate videotape evidence, and a prison lockdown. ECF No. 17. Petitioner also 19 argues that he was diligent in investigating and preparing the petition he submitted to the 20 California Court of Appeal. Id.; see Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (court may 21 equitably toll statute of limitations if petitioner demonstrates (1) that he has been pursuing his 22 rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented 23 timely filing). 24 //// 25 //// 26 1 Petitioner also filed a petition for relief in the California Supreme Court on May 29, 2024, 27 which was denied on October 30, 2024. ECF Nos. 10-9, 10-10. If the petition in the intermediate appellate court was untimely and had no tolling effect, the same is necessarily true of this 28 petition. 1 II. Issues Requiring Further Factual Development 2 A. Statutory Tolling 3 If petitioner’s April 2024 petition was filed without “unreasonable delay” as a matter of 4 state law, then he is entitled to statutory tolling not only for the period of its pendency but also 5 during the “gap” between proceedings in the superior court and the appellate court. See Carey v. 6 Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-23 (2002); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Such tolling would 7 render the federal petition timely. 8 Because the California Court of Appeal did not deny the April 2024 petition as untimely, 9 this court must independently determine whether it was timely filed. Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 10 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010).2 Under California law, a habeas petition is timely if filed without 11 “substantial delay.” Robinson v. Lewis, 9 Cal. 5th 883, 898 (2020); see also In re Robbins, 18 12 Cal. 4th 770 (1998). Gaps of 120 days or less between the denial of relief in one court and filing 13 in the next “would never be considered substantial delay” by a state habeas court, and gaps 14 beyond that are not automatically deemed substantial. Robinson, 9 Cal. 5th at 902. Rather, the 15 length of a gap longer than 120 days is simply a relevant factor for the court to consider. Id. 16 Without substantial delay means “as promptly as the circumstances allow.” Id. at 898 n.7. Delay 17 is measured from the time petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information 18 offered in support of the claims and their legal bases. Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 780. A 19 substantially delayed claim may nonetheless be considered on the merits if petitioner establishes 20 good cause for the delay. Robinson, 9 Cal. 5th at 898. 21 The questions whether the April 2024 petition was filed “as promptly as the circumstances 22 allowed” and whether any substantial delay was excusable for good cause are both highly fact- 23 intensive. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the court requires additional factual 24 development on these issues. 25 //// 26 //// 27 2 While a state court ruling of untimeliness is binding on this court, a summary denial does not 28 establish timeliness. See Robinson v. Lewis, 9 Cal. 5th 883, 892 (2020). 1 B. Equitable Tolling 2 Petitioner alleges that between September 16, 2023, and April 11, 2024, he acted with 3 diligence but faced extraordinary circumstances including obstacles in typing his petition, 4 abandonment by counsel, his lack of legal knowledge, the need to investigate and locate crucial 5 videotape evidence, and a prison lockdown. ECF No. 18 at 3; see Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 6 408, 418 (2005) (court may equitably toll statute of limitations where petitioner demonstrates that 7 (1) he pursued his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and 8 prevented timely filing). The lack of legal knowledge is a circumstance common to most 9 prisoners and hence not extraordinary, and obstacles to typing cannot have prevented filing of the 10 petition because a hand-written petition could have been submitted. However, under some 11 circumstances the conduct of counsel and prison limitations including lockdowns can support 12 equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rudin v. Myles, 781 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015) (abandonment 13 by counsel); Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1236 (9th Cir. 2013) (circumstances including prison 14 lockdown and lack of access to law library and related resources). Having reviewed the pro se 15 petitioner’s submissions, the court concludes that appointment of counsel is appropriate in order 16 to develop the factual bases for his equitable tolling theory. 17 III. Conclusion 18 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 19 1. The Federal Defender is appointed to represent petitioner for the limited purpose of an 20 evidentiary hearing and any related briefing on the issues of statutory and equitable tolling 21 presented by respondent’s pending motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) and petitioner’s opposition 22 thereto (ECF No. 17). 23 2. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this order on the Federal Defender, 24 Attention: Habeas Appointment. 25 3. A status conference is set for October 1, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 26. 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// ] 4. All parties shall appear at the status conference by counsel. 2 | DATED: August 14, 2025 . ~ 3 Bettie Clare 4 ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 5 6 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28