1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Juan Ortega Morales, III, No. 2:24-cv-01647-KJM-CSK. 12 Petitioner, ORDER 13 v. M. McVay, et al., 1S Respondents. 16 17 Juan Ortega Morales, III, is serving a sentence in a state prison after pleading “no contest” 18 | to second degree murder. He has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court. 19 | He contends in his petition that he received ineffective assistance from the attorney who 20 | represented him in the state court in violation of the U.S. Constitution. See Pet. at 5, ECF No. 1.! 21 | He also contends he was deprived of due process, and he appears to assert that his decision to 22 | plead no contest was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, also both claims of federal 23 | constitutional errors. See id. 24 The case was referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge under this district’s local rules. 25 | The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing the petition because Morales did not seek relief 26 | within the California court system before he filed his petition in this court. See generally F&Rs,
' For clarity, the page numbers cited in this order are those applied by the CM/ECF system at the top right of all filed documents.
1 ECF No. 8. The Magistrate Judge also recommends not to stay and abey this case while Morales 2 pursues his claims in state court. See id. at 11. Morales objects to the Magistrate Judge’s 3 findings and recommendations. See generally Objs., ECF No. 9. This court has reviewed his 4 objections and the record and adopts the findings and recommendations in part. 5 As the Magistrate Judge correctly summarized, a federal court cannot grant an application 6 for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of a state prisoner “unless it appears that . . . the 7 applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,” or unless there is no 8 “available State corrective process,” or the circumstances “render such process ineffective to 9 protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). For Morales, the California court 10 system offered a “corrective process,” and the record does not show that process was 11 “ineffective” in his circumstances. In short, this court cannot grant Morales’s application unless 12 he “exhausted the remedies” available to him in the California courts. 13 Morales did file two appeals in state court. In the first appeal, he made different 14 arguments than those he now pursues, so that appeal does not show he exhausted the remedies 15 that were available to him for purposes of § 2254(b)(1). See F&Rs at 3–4. In the second appeal, 16 he did not pursue the appellate process through to its completion, so by definition he did not 17 “exhaust” the remedies available to him in that appeal, either. See id. at 4–5. 18 Morales also filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California 19 Supreme Court. See id. at 5–6. The California Supreme Court did not actually address his 20 constitutional arguments or decide whether his conviction was constitutional. See id. at 6–7. 21 Instead, the state supreme court dismissed his petition because he did not “allege sufficient facts 22 with particularity,” citing its decisions in People v. Duvall and In re Swain See Pet. Exhibits at 44 23 (citing 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995) and 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949)). This was not a final rejection 24 of Morales’s arguments or claims. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, when the California 25 Supreme Court dismisses a petition for a lack of “sufficient facts” and “particularity,” citing 26 Duvall and Swain, the petitioner can return to the state supreme court after adding information to 27 his petition. See Curiel v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 1 Morales did not attempt to file an amended petition. See F&Rs at 6–7. His failure to do 2 so does not necessarily demonstrate in and of itself that he has not exhausted all available state 3 court remedies. If, for example, the request he sent to the state supreme court had actually spelled 4 out his allegations in particularized detail—contrary to the state court’s order—then that order 5 would amount to a final rejection of his arguments on their merits, and thus could show Morales 6 had in fact met the exhaustion requirements of § 2254(b). See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 7 1319–20 (9th Cir. 1986). But as the Magistrate Judge persuasively explains in her findings and 8 recommendations, Morales’s state court filing was sparse on details. It offered very little 9 information about what had happened and why those events supported his claims. See F&Rs at 10 8–9. Even now, Morales’s filings in this court sketch only the outlines of a theory why his 11 attorney and the state court system failed to live up to the guarantees provided by the federal 12 Constitution. Because he did not pursue his claims further in state court, he did not exhaust his 13 state court remedies and cannot pursue his claims in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See id. 14 The court understands that Morales may have read the state supreme court’s order and 15 understood it as voicing a final rejection of his constitutional arguments. Even trained 16 attorneys—and judges, for that matter—have struggled to understand terse orders like the one the 17 California Supreme Court issued in Morales’s case. See, e.g., Curiel, 830 F.3d at 877–81 (Bybee, 18 J., concurring) (explaining “frustration” with the meaning of similar California Supreme Court 19 orders citing Duvall and Swain and noting the Ninth Circuit “has been making its concerns with 20 California’s habeas practice known for the better part of half a century”). But federal and state 21 courts alike are “bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.” Rose v. Lundy, 22 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 740 (1886)). This court must 23 follow the Supreme Court’s warning that “it would be unseemly in our dual system of 24 government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to 25 the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Id. at 518 (quoting verbatim Darr v. 26 Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)). This court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Morales has 27 not given the California Supreme Court that opportunity. 1 Under Rhines v. Weber, federal courts can stay a federal habeas corpus action like the one 2 in this case so the petitioner can return to state court, exhaust the remedies available to him there, 3 “and then return to federal court.” 544 U.S. 269, 271–72 (2005). A district court also may “stay 4 a petition that raises only unexhausted claims.” Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 908 (9th Cir. 2016) 5 (emphasis omitted). A stay “is only appropriate when the district court determines there was 6 good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court,” and the claims 7 must not be “plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. “And if a petitioner engages in abusive 8 litigation tactics or intentional delay, the district court should not grant him a stay at all.” Id. 9 at 278.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Juan Ortega Morales, III, No. 2:24-cv-01647-KJM-CSK. 12 Petitioner, ORDER 13 v. M. McVay, et al., 1S Respondents. 16 17 Juan Ortega Morales, III, is serving a sentence in a state prison after pleading “no contest” 18 | to second degree murder. He has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court. 19 | He contends in his petition that he received ineffective assistance from the attorney who 20 | represented him in the state court in violation of the U.S. Constitution. See Pet. at 5, ECF No. 1.! 21 | He also contends he was deprived of due process, and he appears to assert that his decision to 22 | plead no contest was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, also both claims of federal 23 | constitutional errors. See id. 24 The case was referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge under this district’s local rules. 25 | The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing the petition because Morales did not seek relief 26 | within the California court system before he filed his petition in this court. See generally F&Rs,
' For clarity, the page numbers cited in this order are those applied by the CM/ECF system at the top right of all filed documents.
1 ECF No. 8. The Magistrate Judge also recommends not to stay and abey this case while Morales 2 pursues his claims in state court. See id. at 11. Morales objects to the Magistrate Judge’s 3 findings and recommendations. See generally Objs., ECF No. 9. This court has reviewed his 4 objections and the record and adopts the findings and recommendations in part. 5 As the Magistrate Judge correctly summarized, a federal court cannot grant an application 6 for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of a state prisoner “unless it appears that . . . the 7 applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,” or unless there is no 8 “available State corrective process,” or the circumstances “render such process ineffective to 9 protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). For Morales, the California court 10 system offered a “corrective process,” and the record does not show that process was 11 “ineffective” in his circumstances. In short, this court cannot grant Morales’s application unless 12 he “exhausted the remedies” available to him in the California courts. 13 Morales did file two appeals in state court. In the first appeal, he made different 14 arguments than those he now pursues, so that appeal does not show he exhausted the remedies 15 that were available to him for purposes of § 2254(b)(1). See F&Rs at 3–4. In the second appeal, 16 he did not pursue the appellate process through to its completion, so by definition he did not 17 “exhaust” the remedies available to him in that appeal, either. See id. at 4–5. 18 Morales also filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California 19 Supreme Court. See id. at 5–6. The California Supreme Court did not actually address his 20 constitutional arguments or decide whether his conviction was constitutional. See id. at 6–7. 21 Instead, the state supreme court dismissed his petition because he did not “allege sufficient facts 22 with particularity,” citing its decisions in People v. Duvall and In re Swain See Pet. Exhibits at 44 23 (citing 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995) and 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949)). This was not a final rejection 24 of Morales’s arguments or claims. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, when the California 25 Supreme Court dismisses a petition for a lack of “sufficient facts” and “particularity,” citing 26 Duvall and Swain, the petitioner can return to the state supreme court after adding information to 27 his petition. See Curiel v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 1 Morales did not attempt to file an amended petition. See F&Rs at 6–7. His failure to do 2 so does not necessarily demonstrate in and of itself that he has not exhausted all available state 3 court remedies. If, for example, the request he sent to the state supreme court had actually spelled 4 out his allegations in particularized detail—contrary to the state court’s order—then that order 5 would amount to a final rejection of his arguments on their merits, and thus could show Morales 6 had in fact met the exhaustion requirements of § 2254(b). See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 7 1319–20 (9th Cir. 1986). But as the Magistrate Judge persuasively explains in her findings and 8 recommendations, Morales’s state court filing was sparse on details. It offered very little 9 information about what had happened and why those events supported his claims. See F&Rs at 10 8–9. Even now, Morales’s filings in this court sketch only the outlines of a theory why his 11 attorney and the state court system failed to live up to the guarantees provided by the federal 12 Constitution. Because he did not pursue his claims further in state court, he did not exhaust his 13 state court remedies and cannot pursue his claims in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See id. 14 The court understands that Morales may have read the state supreme court’s order and 15 understood it as voicing a final rejection of his constitutional arguments. Even trained 16 attorneys—and judges, for that matter—have struggled to understand terse orders like the one the 17 California Supreme Court issued in Morales’s case. See, e.g., Curiel, 830 F.3d at 877–81 (Bybee, 18 J., concurring) (explaining “frustration” with the meaning of similar California Supreme Court 19 orders citing Duvall and Swain and noting the Ninth Circuit “has been making its concerns with 20 California’s habeas practice known for the better part of half a century”). But federal and state 21 courts alike are “bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.” Rose v. Lundy, 22 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 740 (1886)). This court must 23 follow the Supreme Court’s warning that “it would be unseemly in our dual system of 24 government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to 25 the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Id. at 518 (quoting verbatim Darr v. 26 Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)). This court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Morales has 27 not given the California Supreme Court that opportunity. 1 Under Rhines v. Weber, federal courts can stay a federal habeas corpus action like the one 2 in this case so the petitioner can return to state court, exhaust the remedies available to him there, 3 “and then return to federal court.” 544 U.S. 269, 271–72 (2005). A district court also may “stay 4 a petition that raises only unexhausted claims.” Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 908 (9th Cir. 2016) 5 (emphasis omitted). A stay “is only appropriate when the district court determines there was 6 good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court,” and the claims 7 must not be “plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. “And if a petitioner engages in abusive 8 litigation tactics or intentional delay, the district court should not grant him a stay at all.” Id. 9 at 278. 10 In this case, the Magistrate Judge explained these requirements in a written order, cited 11 Rhines, and gave Morales an opportunity to show a stay would be appropriate. See Order 12 (Sept. 9, 2024), ECF No. 6. Morales responded by arguing the state court should have an 13 opportunity to consider his claims again after he filed an amended petition with more 14 particularized allegations. See Mot. Stay at 1–2, ECF No. 7. The Magistrate Judge recommends 15 against a stay because Morales did not specifically “address whether he has good cause for his 16 failure to exhaust his claims, whether his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and 17 whether he did not engage in intentionally dilatory tactics.” F&Rs at 11. 18 Morales was not represented by counsel while he was pursuing his habeas petition in the 19 state supreme court. “[M]any state post-conviction proceedings are conducted pro se. For this 20 group of federal habeas petitioners, the first element of the Rhines test can easily be established to 21 the extent that they were without counsel.” Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 722 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 As explained above, moreover, the state supreme court’s order may not clearly have 23 communicated to Morales, an incarcerated pro se litigant, that he could amend his petition. 24 Morales thus has demonstrated “good cause” for a stay. The court also finds at least one of his 25 claims is not “plainly meritless” under the second part of the Rhines test. Morales was seventeen 26 at the time of his plea, and he argues his attorney believed he was guilty, took advantage of his 27 youth, and manipulated him into accepting an unfavorable resolution of the charges against him. 28 See, e.g., Pet. at 5; Obj. at 4. Morales attaches a transcript of his sentencing hearing to his 1 | objections, and that transcript suggests his attorney believed Morales was suffering from an 2 | unspecified mental health condition that impaired his judgment. See Obj. at 8. A claim about the 3 | effectiveness of his attorney’s representation in these circumstances may not ultimately succeed, 4 | but itis not plainly meritless. See Dixon, 847 F.3d at 722-23 (reasoning similarly). Finally, 5 | under the third part of the Rhines test, the record does not show Morales has engaged in 6 | “intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Jd. at 723 (quoting Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278). 7 The findings and recommendations are adopted in part as explained above. The motion 8 | fora stay and abeyance (ECF No. 7) is granted. This case is stayed pending resolution of related 9 | state proceedings and until further order of this court. Petitioner must file a status report every 10 | sixty days after this order issues informing the court of the status of his state habeas proceedings. 11 | Petitioner must also file a motion to lift the stay within thirty days of final action by the state 12 | courts. This matter is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for further proceedings 13 | consistent with this order. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 | DATED: August 5, 2025. oUt 16 a STATES DISTRICT JUDGE