(HC) Meraz v. Bird

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: July 29, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00910
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ISACC BROOKS MERAZ, ) Case No.: 1:25-cv-00910-SKO (HC) ) 12 Petitioner, ) ORDER TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO CASE ) 13 v. ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 14 L. BIRD, ) DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS ) CORPUS 15 Respondent. ) ) [21-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD] 16 )

17 18 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for writ of 19 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 20 Petitioner filed the instant petition in the Sacramento Division of this Court on July 14, 2025.1 21 (Doc. 1.) On July 25, 2025, the case was transferred to this Court. Upon review of the petition, the 22 Court finds it violates the statute of limitations, is unexhausted, and fails to state a claim. The Court 23 will therefore recommend that the petition be dismissed with prejudice. 24 //// 25 26 1 Although the petition was filed in this Court on July 21, 2025, the proof of service was dated July 14, 2025. 27 Pursuant to the mailbox rule, a pro se habeas petition is deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 28 276 (1988). Therefore, under the mailbox rule, the Court deems the petition filed on July 14, 2025, the date 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Preliminary Review of Petition 3 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary review 4 of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears 5 from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 6 Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). A petition for habeas corpus 7 should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can 8 be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971). 9 II. Limitations Period for Filing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 10 On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 11 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 12 filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 13 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was 14 filed on July 14, 2025, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 15 The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal 16 petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In most cases, the limitations period 17 begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct review became final. In this case, Petitioner was 18 sentenced in Tulare County Superior Court on May 27, 2010. (Doc. 1 at 28.2) Petitioner appealed the 19 conviction. On June 30, 2011, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the restitution order but 20 affirmed the judgment in all other respects. People v. Meraz, No. F060411, 2011 WL 2575003, at *18 21 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2011). Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme 22 Court. On October 4, 2011, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. Id. Therefore, direct 23 review concluded on January 2, 2012, when the 90-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari 24 expired. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.1999). The statute of limitations commenced on the 25 following day – January 3, 2012. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Absent 26 27 28 2 1 applicable tolling, the last day to file a federal habeas petition was January 2, 2013. The instant 2 petition is therefore untimely by over 12 years. 3 A. Statutory Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) 4 Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 5 application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 6 2244(d)(2). A “properly filed” application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules 7 governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 8 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California petitioner completes a 9 full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable delay in the intervals 10 between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. Delhomme v. Ramirez, 11 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 12 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194 (2006); Carey v. 13 Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226 (2002); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 14 In this case, Petitioner filed three collateral petitions in the state courts as follows: 15 First Petition Tulare County Superior Court; 16 Filed: November 21, 2023; Denied: December 12, 2023; 17 Second Petition 18 California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District; Filed: January 12, 2024; 19 Denied: May 9, 2024;

20 Third Petition California Supreme Court; 21 Filed: June 26, 2024; Denied: September 18, 2024. 22

23 (Doc. 1 at 31-60.) 24 Petitioner delayed filing his first post-conviction collateral challenge for over 10 years after the 25 limitations period expired. Tolling is unavailable for these untimely petitions. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 26 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (untimely petition is not considered “properly filed” for purposes of § 27 2244(d)(2)). Therefore, the federal petition is untimely. 28 1 To the extent that Petitioner may argue that the state court’s denial of his petition for 2 resentencing restarts the statute of limitations, the argument is without merit. A state court’s denial of 3 a petition for resentencing does not constitute a new judgment for purposes of § 2254. Brown v. 4 Atchley, 76 F.4th 862, 874 (9th Cir. 2023). Petitioner was not resentenced, nor was the judgment 5 amended. “[T]he statute of limitations must run from the judgment pursuant to which the petitioner is 6 being held.” Smith v. Williams, 871 F.3d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 2017); see, e.g., Ware v. Shinn, 2023 WL 7 3631648 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2023), report and recommendation adopted in part sub nom, Ware v. 8 Thornell, 2023 WL 3627451 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2023). In this case, as previously noted, judgment 9 became final on January 2, 2012. 10 III. Exhaustion 11 A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a 12 petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The 13 exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial 14 opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 15 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). 16 A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a 17 full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 18 Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full 19 and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the 20 claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 21 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 22 In this case, Petitioner presents two claims for relief: 1) He claims counsel provided ineffective 23 assistance on appeal; and 2) He claims the sentencing court failed to address changes in the law and 24 properly evaluate his petition for resentencing under California’s Racial Justice Act. Neither claim was 25 presented on direct appeal. 26 Petitioner’s first claim was presented in his state habeas petitions, and his second claim was 27 presented in his state habeas petitions to the extent it was grounded in state law. However, the state 28 habeas petitions were dismissed on procedural grounds. The Tulare County Superior Court rejected 1 the petition for failing to provide proof of service on the necessary parties, failure to submit claims on 2 the proper judicial council form, and failure to identify his claims with sufficient particularity. (Doc. 1 3 at 31.) Petitioner did not properly refile his petition in the sentencing court. The petition filed in the 4 Fifth District Court of Appeal was denied without prejudice for failure to cure the deficiencies and 5 exhaust his claims in the superior court prior to filing in the appellate court. The California Supreme 6 Court summarily denied the claim without comment. The summary denial may be viewed as limited to 7 the procedural grounds identified by the appellate court, and it cannot be assumed that the California 8 Supreme Court’s summary denial for discretionary review was on the merits. McQuown v. 9 McCartney, 795 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1986). Because both claims were rejected on procedural 10 grounds and not on the merits, they are unexhausted, in addition to being untimely. 11 IV. Failure to State a Claim 12 In addition to the foregoing, the second ground for relief does not present a cognizable habeas 13 claim. Petitioner alleges the sentencing court failed to properly review his petition for resentencing 14 under Cal. Penal Code § 1473, California Assembly Bills 256 and 1308, and Senate Bill 261. (Doc. 1 15 at 21.) Petitioners seeking federal habeas relief must allege that they are in custody “pursuant to the 16 judgment of a State court . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 17 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. 18 McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (citations omitted). “[E]rrors of state law do not concern us unless 19 they rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th 20 Cir. 1989). 21 The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 22 custody upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). To succeed 23 in a petition pursuant to Section 2254, a petitioner must demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim 24 in state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 25 clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted 26 in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 27 presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2). Petitioner may only seek 28 habeas relief if the nature or duration of his imprisonment violates federal constitutional provisions. 1 Here, Petitioner alleges the sentencing court erred in evaluating his petition for resentencing 2 pursuant to recent changes in California law. Petitioner is challenging the state court’s application of 3 state sentencing laws. Such a claim does not give rise to a federal question cognizable on federal 4 habeas review. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990); Sturm v. California Youth Authority, 395 F.2d 5 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1967) (“a state court's interpretation of its [sentencing] statute does not raise a 6 federal question.”) Insofar as Petitioner seeks to challenge the California state courts’ interpretation 7 and application of California state law, this Court has no authority in habeas to address such a 8 challenge. 9 ORDER 10 The Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this case. 11 RECOMMENDATION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the habeas corpus 13 petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. 14 § 2244(d)’s one-year limitations period, failure to exhaust state remedies, and failure to state a claim. 15 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 16 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 17 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within twenty- 18 one (21) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a party may file 19 written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Id. The document should be 20 captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall not exceed 21 fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not consider 22 exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party 23 should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, 24 or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page 25 limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and 26 Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 27 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 28 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This recommendation is not an order that is 1 immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 2 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's 3 judgment. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 Dated: July 28, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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