(HC) Martinez Santoyo v. Boyden

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 27, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00447
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE TRINIDAD MARTINEZ No. 2:23-cv-00447 DJC JDP SANTOYO, 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER v. 14 LASHA BOYDEN, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner is represented by counsel and has filed this Petition for Writ of 18 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United 19 States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 20 On September 9, 2023, the Magistrate Judge issued Findings and 21 Recommendations herein which were served on both parties and which contained 22 notice that any objections to the Findings and Recommendations were to be filed 23 within fourteen days. (ECF No. 16.) Petitioner has filed objections to the Findings and 24 Recommendations (ECF No. 17) and Respondents have filed a response (ECF No. 18). 25 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 26 304, this Court has conducted a de novo review. Having carefully reviewed the entire 27 file, the Court finds the Findings and Recommendations to be supported by the 28 record and by proper analysis. 1 BACKGROUND 2 A complaint for Petitioner’s arrest and extradition to Mexico was originally filed 3 on August 1, 2021. (Compl. (United States v. Martinez Santoyo, 2:22-cr-00141-TLN- 4 KJN, ECF No. 1); see In re Extradition of Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo, 2:21-mj- 5 00125-KJN, ECF No. 1.) The complaint sought Petitioner’s arrest pending possible 6 extradition based on a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest issued in Colotlan, Jalisco, 7 Mexico for a charge of “Aggravated Intention Homicide with Advantage”. (Id. at 2.) 8 Mexican officials allege that Petitioner shot and killed the Decedent, Vela Miranda, on 9 December 20, 2013, “outside of a pool hall called ‘Billar Tenzompa,’ located in the 10 community of Tenzompa, Huejuquilla el Alto, Jalisco, Mexico.” (Id.) 11 Following Petitioner’s arrest, Petitioner was ordered detained pending trial by 12 Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman but was subsequently ordered released on bail 13 by District Judge Troy L. Nunley pending extradition proceedings. (Order Granting 14 Mot. for Bail (United States v. Martinez Santoyo, 2:22-cr-00141-TLN-KJN, ECF No. 37).) 15 During extradition proceedings, Petitioner sought to compel production of evidence 16 related to the Decedent. (Mot. to Compel (In re Extradition of Jose Trinidad Martinez 17 Santoyo, 2:21-mj-00125-KJN, ECF No. 37).) Judge Newman, as the extradition court, 18 granted that request for evidence “regarding whether the witness statements were 19 obtained by coercion, duress, or torture” but denied the motion as it related to 20 evidence of the Decedent’s alleged ties to drug trafficking and the Los Zetas cartel. 21 (Order Granting in Part Mot. to Compel (In re Extradition of Jose Trinidad Martinez 22 Santoyo, 2:21-mj-00125-KJN, ECF No. 49).) 23 On February 22, 2023, Judge Newman held an extradition hearing. (Minutes of 24 2/22/23 Hr’g (In re Extradition of Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo, 2:21-mj-00125-KJN, 25 ECF No. 54).) At that hearing, Judge Newman found the Government had met its 26 burden of proof and subsequently issued an order certifying the extradition of 27 Petitioner. (Id.; Order Granting Mot. for Certification of Extradition (In re Extradition of 28 Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo, 2:21-mj-00125-KJN, ECF No. 54).) Judge Newman 1 also denied the Government’s request for Petitioner to be remanded into custody. 2 (Minutes of 2/22/23 Hr’g; see Order Denying Mot. for Recons. of Pre-Extradition 3 Release (In re Extradition of Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo, 2:21-mj-00125-KJN, ECF 4 No. 58).) 5 Petitioner brought the present Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to challenge 6 Magistrate Judge Newman’s February 24, 2023 Order finding that Petitioner could be 7 extradited to Mexico to be prosecuted for aggravated homicide as well as Judge 8 Newman’s partial denial of Petitioner’s Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner 9 subsequently filed a First Amended Petition that challenges these orders on five 10 grounds: (1) the extradition court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion to compel; (2) 11 there is insufficient and competent reliable evidence to support probable cause; (3) 12 there is insufficient evidence supporting probably cause for the element of “undue 13 advantage”; (4) the extradition court erred in excluding Petitioner’s explanatory 14 evidence; and (5) Petitioner’s extradition was time-barred under the relevant treaty. 15 (First Amended Petition (ECF No. 11).) On September 28, 2023, Magistrate Judge 16 Jeremy D. Peterson, as the referral judge in the present habeas action, issued 17 Findings and Recommendations recommending that the habeas petition be denied. 18 (Findings and Recommendations (“F. & R.”) (ECF No. 16).) Petitioner has objected to 19 portions of those Findings and Recommendations. (Pet’r’s Obj. (ECF No. 17).) 20 PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS 21 Petitioner objects to the Findings and Recommendation on five bases: (1) the 22 Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the United States does not hold exculpatory 23 evidence arising from its own investigation of the decedent; (2) the Magistrate Judge 24 erred in holding that it was Petitioner’s burden to enforce the extradition court’s clear 25 order; (3) exclusion of the gunshot residue report from Mexican authorities denied 26 due process; (4) the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the decedent was not 27 armed; and (5) the Magistrate Judge erred in holding that the Sixth Amendment 28 1 speedy trial right does not apply in this case.1 (See Pet’r’s Obj.) 2 The Court reviews de novo “those portions of the report or specified proposed 3 findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 4 On a habeas petition from extradition proceedings, habeas review is limited to 5 whether “(1) the extradition magistrate had jurisdiction over the individual sought, (2) 6 the treaty was in force and the accused's alleged offense fell within the treaty's terms, 7 and (3) there is ‘any competent evidence’ supporting the probable cause 8 determination of the magistrate.” Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2006). 9 I. Exculpatory Evidence Regarding the Decedent 10 The Magistrate Judge in the habeas action, Judge Peterson, correctly found 11 that the Magistrate Judge in the extradition action, Judge Newman, did not abuse his 12 discretion in ruling that evidence regarding the decedent’s alleged connections to 13 drug dealing and the Los Zetas cartel was not explanatory for purposes of probable 14 cause. 15 The decision of an extradition court to deny discovery can be reviewed by a 16 habeas court. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 n.41 (9th Cir. 1986). 17 However, such a review only examines whether “the magistrate’s decision to deny 18 discovery constituted an abuse of discretion that deprived the accused of due 19 process.” Id. 20 During extradition proceedings “neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the 21 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply” and the accused may only admit evidence 22 that “explain[s] matters referred to by the witnesses for the government[.]” Santos v. 23

24 1 The phrasing of Petitioner’s objections can lead to confusion as they often do not specify whether the Magistrate Judge being referenced is Judge Peterson, the Magistrate Judge to whom the present 25 Habeas Petition was referred, or Judge Newman, the Magistrate Judge who presided over the extradition proceedings. Where possible, the Court will specify the court or judge in question to avoid 26 this issue. The Court also notes that the titles of Petitioner’s objections do not always accurately reflect the actual order of the extradition court. For example, one of Petitioner’s objections is that “the 27 Magistrate Judge erred in holding that it was Petitioner’s burden to enforce the extradition court’s clear order” despite the Findings and Recommendations making no such holding. (See F. & R. at 3 n.1.) This 28 order addresses the actual substance of Petitioner’s objection. 1 Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2016). Such “explanatory” evidence, evidence 2 that “’might [explain] ambiguities or doubtful elements’ in the government's case[,]” 3 differs from “contradictory” evidence, which is evidence that simply contradicts the 4 evidence of probable cause presented by the government. Id. at 993 (citing Collins v. 5 Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315–16 (1922) and Carlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461 (1913)). 6 Here, the extradition court ruled that while evidence related to the use of 7 torture, duress, or coercion in collecting witness statements needed to be disclosed as 8 it could potentially be explanatory, evidence related to the decedent’s alleged 9 involvement in drug trafficking and the Los Zetas drug cartel was, at best, 10 contradictory and thus not admissible. (Order Granting in Part Mot. to Compel at 7–8.) 11 Judge Newman reasoned that involvement with the cartel could not negate probable 12 cause for the incident in question as, unlike the usage of torture or coercion in 13 obtaining witness statements, the decedent’s involvement in the drug trade did not 14 have any bearing on “the manner of collection of the witness statements.” (Id.) 15 Further, Judge Newman found that any argument by Petitioner that the evidence must 16 be disclosed as it could indicate the corruption of Mexican officials would violate “the 17 diplomatic principle of non-inquiry . . . .” (Id. at 8.) 18 Judge Newman did not abuse his discretion in reaching this conclusion and 19 thus Judge Peterson’s finding to that effect was correct. Unlike concerns about the 20 manner and method of statement collection, information about a decedent’s cartel 21 ties cannot properly be considered explanatory as it does not seek to resolve 22 ambiguities or doubtful elements of the government’s case establishing probable 23 cause. As suggested by the extradition court, it is not even clear that such evidence 24 could even be considered contradictory evidence absent some indication of the 25 relevance of the decedent’s alleged cartel ties. 26 In Petitioner’s original motion to compel as well as in subsequent motions, he 27 does not provide a clear statement of how such evidence will be relevant, instead 28 asserting that Brady is applicable in extradition actions and arguing the evidence may 1 be relevant by broadly suggesting the evidence could go to the general credibility of 2 witnesses and the possibility for corruption of Mexican officials. (Motion to Compel at 3 9–12.) For purposes of extradition proceedings, Petitioner was not permitted to 4 “impeach government witnesses or produce witnesses whose testimony contradicts 5 evidence already offered by the government.” Santos, 830 F.3d at 993. As such, 6 Judge Newman made an appropriate determination that this evidence was not 7 relevant as even if it went to credibility, it would not be explanatory. The possibility 8 that the evidence might provide some indication of corruption is also similarly not 9 relevant or explanatory as they have no direct bearing on the existence of probable 10 cause. See Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2005). 11 Judge Newman also correctly found (and Judge Peterson correctly confirmed) 12 that Petitioner was incorrect in contending that the requested evidence must be 13 provided as Brady material. The Ninth Circuit has previously expressly stated that due 14 process does not require that principles set forth in Brady apply to the determination 15 of probable cause during extradition proceedings. Merino v. United States Marshal, 16 326 F.2d 5, 13 (9th Cir. 1963). Though Petitioner indicates there is a Sixth Circuit case, 17 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993), which suggests Brady applies in 18 situations where the government has conducted its own investigation, the Ninth 19 Circuit’s decision in Merino is binding on this Court where the Sixth Circuit’s in 20 Demjanjuk is not. 21 Accordingly, on de novo review, the reasoning in the Findings and 22 Recommendations on this point is correct and the Court will adopt them over 23 Petitioner’s objections. 24 II. Exculpatory Evidence in the Possession of Other Agencies 25 The Magistrate Judge correctly decided that the Petitioner had not provided 26 any legal basis for the argument that the extradition court’s order compelling 27 discovery should apply to the entire United States Government. Just as in the First 28 Amended Petition, Petitioner’s objections fail to cite any authority for this position. 1 In the extradition proceedings, Judge Newman originally ordered the 2 production of evidence in the position of “the U.S.” (Order Granting in Part Mot. to 3 Compel at 8.) In a later filing confirming that the “United States” was “not in 4 possession of any evidence regarding whether the witness statements were obtained 5 by coercion, duress, or torture, and is mindful of its continuing duty to report”, the 6 United States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) included the following footnote: 7 Like the definition of the term “government” used in the 8 United States’ Opposition to the Motion to Compel (ECF 9 46 at n. 1) and at oral argument on the Motion to Compel, 10 this memo uses “United States” to refer to the United States 11 Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of California 12 (“USAO E.D. Cal.”) and the Department of Justice’s Office 13 of International Affairs (“OIA”). The United States 14 understands that this too is the definition of “U.S.” as used 15 in the Court’s Order (ECF 49, at 8), and that the Court’s 16 Order is limited to documents and materials in the 17 possession of the USAO E.D. Cal. and OIA, with no 18 obligation to request information from Mexico or seek out 19 new material not within the USAO E.D. Cal.’s or OIA’s 20 possession from other U.S. agencies or offices. See, e.g., 21 Order at 7 (“As a reminder, the U.S. is under no obligation 22 to request evidence from Mexico or seek out new material 23 not within its possession.”) (citation omitted). 24 (Suppl. Mem. Regarding Evid. of Coercion, Duress, or Torture (In re Extradition of Jose 25 Trinidad Martinez Santoyo, 2:21-mj-00125-KJN, ECF No. 50) at 1–2 & n.1.) 26 The choice to define the “U.S.” to mean only the USAO for the Eastern District 27 of California and the Department of Justice’s Office of Internal Affairs was seemingly a 28 unilateral decision of the USAO as to the proper interpretation of the extradition 1 court’s order. Given that the Motion to Compel specifically discussed material related 2 to a proceeding in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 3 Magistrate Judge Newman’s order granting that motion in part would seem unlikely 4 to have been limited to information in possession and control of the United States 5 Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of California and the Department of Justice’s 6 Office of International Affairs. The USAO elected not to file a motion for clarification 7 or otherwise seek approval to limit the scope of the court’s order and instead made 8 this decision without the court’s input. In apparent recognition by the USAO that this 9 was not an action approved by the extradition court, the USAO included the above 10 disclosure as a footnote in a supplemental memorandum. (Id.) 11 While the USAO’s actions appear to be improper, this issue is ultimately outside 12 of the bounds of what Magistrate Judge Peterson or this Court can consider on 13 extradition habeas review. As noted above, the habeas court for extradition 14 proceedings is limited to reviewing “(1) the extradition magistrate had jurisdiction 15 over the individual sought, (2) the treaty was in force and the accused's alleged 16 offense fell within the treaty's terms, and (3) there is ‘any competent evidence’ 17 supporting the probable cause determination of the magistrate.” Vo, 447 F.3d at 18 1240. Though the habeas court can review the decision of an extradition court to 19 deny discovery, see Quinn, 783 F.2d at 817 n.41, here, the extradition court made no 20 such decision. Despite Petitioner being aware that the USAO had limited the scope of 21 the discovery provided (see Opp’n to Gov’t Req. for Extradition (In re Extradition of 22 Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo, 2:21-mj-00125-KJN, ECF No. 51) at 4 (acknowledging 23 the USAO’s interpretation of the Court’s order)), Petitioner did not raise an objection 24 or make a motion to the court. As a result, the extradition was never presented to the 25 extradition court and no decision on this discovery issue was rendered. Thus, it is 26 outside the scope of extradition habeas review as the extradition court did not “deny 27 discovery”. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 817 n.41. 28 //// 1 Given the above, a de novo review shows the reasoning in Judge Peterson’s 2 Findings and Recommendations is well founded on this point and shall be adopted. 3 III. Exclusion of Gunshot Residue 4 Judge Peterson was correct in finding that the extradition court did not abuse 5 its discretion in excluding evidence related to the possible presence of gunshot 6 residue on the decedent’s hand. Petitioner argues that excluding this evidence was 7 improper as it was explanatory. The extradition court found that the only apparent 8 reason for including this evidence would be to establish that the decedent was also 9 armed but that this could only go to the “unfair advantage” (also referred to as “undue 10 advantage”) element of the aggravated homicide charge and was not relevant for any 11 other purpose. (Order Granting U.S.’s Mot. for Certification of Extradition (In re 12 Extradition of Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo, 2:21-mj-00125-KJN, ECF No. 55) at 12– 13 13.) The court excluded this evidence as not relevant to the existence of probable 14 cause and ruled that whether there was ultimately undue advantage is an issue for a 15 jury to decide. (Id.) 16 The magistrate judge in extradition proceedings is granted substantial 17 deference in the determination of the admissibility of evidence. Collins v. Loisel, 259 18 U.S. 309, 317 (1922) (“Whether evidence offered on an issue before the committing 19 magistrate is relevant is a matter which the law leaves to his determination, unless his 20 action is so clearly unjustified as to amount to a denial of the hearing prescribed by 21 law.”). While an accused party may present explanatory evidence related to probable 22 cause at extradition proceedings, evidence not related to probable cause is not 23 admissible. Id. at 315–16. 24 Judge Newman’s decision to not admit evidence related to the gunshot residue 25 as it only went to the unfair advantage element was not an abuse of discretion. Judge 26 Newman reasoned that the gunshot residue evidence could serve as the basis from 27 which a jury could find that the decedent was armed and that the unfair advantage 28 element was thus unsatisfied, but that “[a] jury could just as easily believe [the 1 Decedent] had residue on his hand because he reached for [Petitioner]’s gun just 2 before Petitioner pulled the trigger.” (Order Granting U.S.’s Mot. for Certification of 3 Extradition at 12–13.) Given this, Judge Newman found that this evidence was not 4 admissible as it did not go to probable cause. (Id.) This is a reasonable and justified 5 determination of the relevance of the gunshot residue evidence and not an abuse of 6 discretion. See Collins, 259 U.S. at 317. 7 As such, Judge Peterson’s finding in the Findings and Recommendations that 8 Judge Newman did not abuse his discretion is correct and the Court will adopt the 9 Findings and Recommendations on this point. 10 IV. Unfair Advantage 11 Judge Peterson also accurately determined that the extradition court had 12 properly found that there was evidence of undue advantage sufficient to support 13 probable cause. 14 During extradition proceedings, the magistrate judge’s limited purpose is “to 15 determine whether there is any evidence sufficient to establish reasonable or 16 probable cause.” United States ex rel. Sakaguchi v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 730–31 17 (9th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted). On habeas review, a probable cause determination 18 “must be upheld if there is any competent evidence in the record to support it.” 19 Sainez v. Venables, 588 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Quinn v. Robinson, 783 20 F.2d 776, 791 (9th Cir. 1986)). 21 Here, the extradition court based its determination of unfair advantage on the 22 eyewitness statements from Baudelio Oronia Conchas, Pedro Oronia Conchas, and 23 Manuel Miranda Miranda, all of whom stated that Petitioner was armed and none of 24 whom stated that the Decedent was armed. (See Order Granting U.S.’s Motion for 25 Certification of Extradition at 6–8.) While Judge Newman recognized that there were 26 theoretically “multiple ways to treat the witnesses’ statements” and that other contrary 27 evidence might exist (such as the possible gunshot residue evidence addressed 28 above), he found that these issues went to the credibility of the eyewitness’s 1 statements and thus was suited for presentation to a jury, not the extradition court, 2 who has no role in determining guilt or innocence and only determines whether 3 probable cause exists. (Id. at 12–13.) 4 The statements of the three eyewitnesses are sufficient competent evidence to 5 support Judge Newman’s finding of probable cause. While it is possible that 6 Petitioner will successfully argue at trial that the undue advantage element was not 7 satisfied (whether based on the credibility of witnesses, the presence of contradictory 8 evidence such as the gunshot residue discussed previously, or some other argument), 9 the Magistrate Judge’s determination of probable cause related to the undue 10 advantage element shall be upheld as there is competent evidence that supports a 11 reasonable inference that Petitioner had undue advantage when he allegedly shot the 12 decedent. See Sainez, 588 F.3d at 717. 13 Accordingly, Judge Peterson’s Findings and Recommendations are correctly 14 reasoned and shall be adopted despite Petitioner’s objections. 15 V. Speedy Trial Rights 16 Finally, the Findings and Recommendations are correct in finding that 17 Petitioner was not entitled to speedy trial rights during the extradition proceedings. 18 Petitioner argues that he was entitled to speedy trial rights under the relevant treaty 19 and that those rights were violated as Mexico did not request Petitioner’s extradition 20 until 2022 despite the Mexican warrant for Petitioner’s arrest being issued in 2014. 21 Magistrate Judge Peterson found that speedy trial rights do not apply to extradition 22 proceedings. (F. & R. at 6–7.) In doing so, Judge Peterson cited cases from the First, 23 Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit that explicitly found that the speedy trial right 24 guarantees of the Sixth Amendment did not apply to extradition proceedings. (Id.) 25 He also noted that the Ninth Circuit has previously stated that “[w]hen the United 26 States is the requested country, delay in seeking extradition may be relevant to the 27 Secretary of State’s final determination as to whether extradition may go forward. . . . 28 //// 1 The delay may not, however, serve as a defense to judicial extradition proceedings.” 2 (Id. at 6 n.2 (citing Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1984)).) 3 In his objection to the Findings and Recommendations, Petitioner argues that 4 even if the Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights do not generally apply to extradition 5 proceedings, the treaty between Mexico and the United States effectively re-applies 6 speedy trial rights by stating that “[e]xtradition shall not be granted when the 7 prosecution or the enforcement of the penalty for the offense for which extradition has 8 been sought has become barred by lapse of time according to the laws of the 9 requesting or requested Party.” (Pet’r’s Obj. at 4–5.) Petitioner argues that the “lapse 10 of time” language must include speedy trial rights. (Id. (citing Extradition Treaty art. 7, 11 U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059).) 12 This same argument has been expressly rejected by numerous other courts, 13 including other courts in this district and the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of 14 Appeals. See Martinez v. United States, 828 F.3d 451, 457–58 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding 15 that the “lapse of time” language in the US-Mexico treaty did not apply to Sixth 16 Amendment speedy trial rights as those rights do not create a fixed time bar); Yapp v. 17 Reno, 26 F.3d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding similar “lapse of time” language in 18 a treaty with the Bahamas was a reference to the statute of limitation, not to speedy 19 trial rights); see also Gonzalez v. O’Keefe, No. 12-cv-2681-LHK, 2014 WL 6065880, at 20 *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) (finding a “lapse of time” provision refers to statutes of 21 limitations and did not include speedy trial rights); Cerda v. Jenkins, 2023 WL 22 8845145 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2023) (same). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has previously 23 interpreted this “lapse” language as an incorporation of the applicable statute of 24 limitations. Causbie Gullers v. Bejarano, 293 Fed. Appx. 488, 489 (9th Cir. 2008). It 25 has also rejected an argument that a treaty containing a provision providing for “the 26 right to use such remedies and recourses as are provided by the law of the requested 27 Party,” entitled the accused to speedy trial rights the treaty. In re Extradition of 28 Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986). That treaty, which also included a 1 “lapse of time” provision similar to the one at issue here, only required that the country 2 requesting extradition “comply with the applicable statute of limitations” and the 3 accused was not entitled to “constitutional protections that the United States 4 Constitution affords defendants in American criminal prosecutions.” Id. 5 In support of his position, Petitioner only cites a single case from the District 6 Court for the Northern District of Alabama where that court found that speedy trial 7 rights should apply based on the “lapse of time” language. (Pet’r’s Obj. at 4 (citing In 8 re Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D. Ala. 1960)).) However, as the Sixth Circuit 9 noted while addressing that same district court case in deciding Martinez, that case 10 “was hardly a landmark extradition decision” and contains no actual analysis of the 11 issue. Martinez, 828 F.3d at 465. Further, the Eleventh Circuit has since expressly 12 adopted a different position on this same issue and, in doing so, noted that it had 13 “expressly disapproved of Mylonas.”2 Yapp, 26 F.3d at 1566–67. 14 Petitioner’s main argument appears to be that the “lapse of time” language, as 15 it is contained in a treaty, should be considered under a plain language analysis and 16 that under such analysis, speedy trial rights should have been extended to Petitioner’s 17 extradition proceedings. (Pet’r’s Obj. at 3–4.) Even applying such an analysis, 18 Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. Petitioner is correct that “[t]he interpretation of 19 a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 20 U.S. 491, 506–07 (2008) (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396–397 (1985)). 21 However, interpretation of the plain text of Article 7 from the treaty does not support 22 Petitioner’s position. The treaty bars extradition where “prosecution or the 23 enforcement of the penalty” for the charged offense “become barred by a lapse of 24 2 In his objections, Petitioner says that the Eleventh Circuit disapproved of Mylonas on the basis that the 25 Sixth Amendment generally does not apply to extradition proceedings and “said nothing about the Mylonas court’s holding that the ‘lapse of time’ language in the United States-Greece treaty 26 includes the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause.” (Pet’r’s Obj. at 5 n.1.) To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit’s discussion of Mylonas in Yapp appears to expressly recognize this distinction and 27 reject both the general Sixth Amendment and the treaty-based arguments. Yapp, 26 F.3d at 1566–67 (“Whether the holding in Mylonas is construed as interpretation of the Constitution or interpretation of 28 a treaty, we do not find it persuasive.”) 1 | time according to the laws of the requesting or requested Party.” Extradition Treaty 2 | art. 7, U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059. The plain text of this treaty, with its 3 | references to “prosecution or... enforcement” as well as to “bars” that result from a 4 | lapse of time seems to only incorporate statutes of limitations. Id. Petitioner seeks to 5 | look outside the text of the treaty himself, arguing that at the time the treaty was 6 | ratified “a federal court had interpreted the ‘lapse of time’ phrase in a different treaty 7 | to include the Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights[]” and that the treaty’s drafters 8 | would be aware of that fact. (Pet’r’s Obj. at 5.) Such evidence is far outside the scope 9 | of the text of the treaty and Petitioner does not provide citations to any “aids” for 10 | interpretation that might support such a reading, such as “the negotiation and drafting 11 | history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory 12 | nations.” Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506-07. 13 Given the above, the Findings and Recommendations issued by Judge 14 | Peterson are well reasoned and will be adopted by this Court. 15 CONCLUSION 16 In accordance with the above, IT |S HEREBY ORDERED that: 17 1. The Findings and Recommendations signed September 28, 2023 (ECF No. 16) 18 are ADOPTED IN FULL; 19 2. The First Amended Petition (ECF No. 11) is DENIED; 20 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. 21 99 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 | Dated: _March 27, 2024 Donel J bynetto— Hon. Daniel alabretta 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 | DJC1 - MartinezSantoyo23cv00447.JO 27 28 14