(HC) Lawrie v. People of the State of California

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 23, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-03803
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MATTHEW ALAN LAWRIE, Case No. 2:24-cv-3803-JDP (P) 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER; FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 15 Respondent. 16

17 18 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 19 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 2. He also moves to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 7. The 20 petition raises claims related to a conviction for first degree murder from May 2006. ECF No. 2 21 at 2. Petitioner seems to acknowledge that his petition is untimely and argues that the petition 22 should be considered because he is actually innocent under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S 298 (1995). 23 However, petitioner’s actual innocence arguments do not save his untimely petition, and I 24 recommend that it be dismissed as time-barred. I will grant petitioner’s motion to proceed in 25 forma pauperis. 26 The matter is before the court for preliminary review under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 27 Section 2254 Cases. Under Rule 4, the judge assigned to a habeas proceeding must examine the 28 habeas petition and order a response unless it “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not entitled 1 to relief. See Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019); Boyd v. Thompson, 147 2 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, it plainly appears that petitioner is not entitled to relief. 3 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one- 4 year statute of limitations on claims challenging a state conviction or sentence. 28 U.S.C. 5 § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations runs from either the date on which the state court 6 judgment became final by direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review, or “the 7 date on which any impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the 8 Constitution or law of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by 9 such State action,” whichever is later. Id. The limitations period is tolled while a properly filed 10 application for post-conviction relief is pending in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An 11 application for such relief is only “properly filed” if it is authorized by and in compliance with 12 state law. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (“[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when 13 its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing 14 filings.”). There is no tolling for periods of unreasonable delay between state court applications. 15 See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225 (2002). 16 Here, petitioner’s conviction was, at the time he filed his initial petition, more than 17 eighteen years old. I have reviewed the amended petition and see that petitioner filed his initial 18 state habeas petition in 2009; the California Supreme Court denied it that same year. ECF No. 2 19 at 52. Between 2009 and 2023, petitioner filed twelve more state habeas petitions, all of which 20 were denied. Id. I have identified nothing within the current petition suggesting that petitioner is 21 entitled to the extraordinary degree of tolling needed to make his petition timely. 22 I recognize that petitioner is arguing that he is actually innocent, as established by “new” 23 evidence, but this argument is unpersuasive. First, the evidence he references is not new. In his 24 petition, he argues that his conviction is based on unreliable hearsay testimony, which he 25 challenged at trial. See ECF No. 2 at 3 (noting that unreliable hearsay was challenged during a 26 closed hearing at petitioner’s trial). He also challenges the jury instructions, arguing that they 27 improperly included lesser included offenses. Id. at 4. However, this challenge is insufficient to 28 1 establish “actual innocence.” See Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 89 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The 2 mere fact of an improper instruction is not sufficient to meet the test for actual innocence.”). 3 It is true that the Supreme Court has held that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a 4 gateway through which a petitioner may pass to overcome the expiration of the statute of 5 limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). To meet the threshold for such a 6 “gateway” claim, however, the petitioner must persuade the court that, based on the newly 7 presented evidence, no reasonable juror would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable 8 doubt. Schlup, 513 U.S at 329. This “actual innocence” exception is limited to “certain 9 exceptional cases involving a compelling claim of actual innocence.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 10 518, 521 (2006); see also McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386 (noting that “tenable actual-innocence 11 gateway pleas are rare”). Importantly, the “new reliable evidence” necessary to support an actual 12 innocence claim should be “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or 13 critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 14 Petitioner has not presented evidence of this kind; there is no actual evidence presented in 15 the petition. Instead, petitioner’s claim amounts to nothing more than conclusory arguments that 16 he was convicted based on unreliable hearsay and “confusing” jury instructions, which he 17 attempts to support by including certain former state court filings and excerpts of trial testimony 18 that do not actually help the court better understand his position. See ECF No. 2 at 7-54. 19 Given the defects identified above, petitioner’s claims are time-barred and cannot proceed 20 beyond screening. I recommend that the court dismiss the petition. 21 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 22 1. The Clerk of Court shall assign a district judge to this action. 23 2. Petitioner’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 7, is GRANTED. 24 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition, ECF No. 2, be DISMISSED without 25 leave to amend as untimely. 26 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 27 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of 28 service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 1 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 2 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 3 | within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 4 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 5 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 6 | 1991). 7 g IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ May 22, 2025 a_—— 10 JEREMY D. PETERSON i UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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