(HC) Jackson v. Horn

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 15, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00257
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 JACOBY T. JACKSON, Case No. 1:25-cv-00257-JLT-SAB-HC

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS AND DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT 14 PATWIN HORN,1 PREJUDICE

15 Respondent. (ECF No. 11)

16 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO SUBSTITUTE PATWIN HORN AS 17 RESPONDENT

18 19 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 21 I. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner was convicted in the Tulare County Superior Court of first-degree murder, 24 arson of an inhabited structure, and driving or taking a vehicle. On August 30, 2023, Petitioner 25 was sentenced to an imprisonment term of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-two 26 years and four months. (LD2 1.) On November 14, 2024, the California Court of Appeals, Fifth

27 1 Patwin Horn is the Warden of Kern Valley State Prison, where Petitioner is currently housed. Accordingly, Patwin Horn is substituted as Respondent in this matter. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996). 1 Appellate District affirmed the judgment. (LD 2.) On January 22, 2025, the California Supreme 2 Court denied the petition for review. (LDs 3, 4.) Petitioner did not file any state habeas petitions 3 challenging the judgment. 4 On February 28, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF 5 No. 1.) On May 9, 2025, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to Younger 6 v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), or in the alternative, for nonexhaustion. (ECF No. 11.) To date, no 7 opposition or statement of nonopposition has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed. 8 II. 9 DISCUSSION 10 A. Abstention 11 “Younger abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of 12 equity, comity, and federalism.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action 13 Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). In Younger, the Supreme Court 14 held that when there is a pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from 15 enjoining the state prosecution. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41; Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 16 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). See also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004) (“The doctrine of 17 Younger v. Harris . . . reinforces our federal scheme by preventing a state criminal defendant 18 from asserting ancillary challenges to ongoing state criminal procedures in federal court.”). 19 The Ninth Circuit has “articulated a four-part test” and held that: 20 Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an 21 adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining 22 the ongoing state judicial proceeding. 23 Duke v. Gastelo, 64 F.4th 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks and brackets omitted) 24 (quoting Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018)). “Abstention is only 25 appropriate when all four requirements are met.” Id. (citing AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 26 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)). “However, even if Younger abstention is appropriate, 27 federal courts do not invoke it if there is a ‘showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other 1 765–66 (quoting Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 2 (1982)). 3 Respondent asserts that “Petitioner’s judgment of conviction was not yet final because 4 the state criminal proceedings were ongoing—Petitioner’s time to file a petition for writ of 5 certiorari had not yet expired when he filed his federal petition.” (ECF No. 11 at 3.) Respondent 6 argues that “because Petitioner’s state criminal conviction was not final at the time he filed his 7 federal petition, dismissal is required (even though the state judicial proceedings have 8 concluded).” (Id. at 4–5.) 9 Here, the Younger requirements are met. First, Petitioner’s criminal judgment was not 10 final at the time he filed his federal habeas petition. This Court “must conduct the Younger 11 analysis in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the federal action was filed.” 12 Duke, 64 F.4th at 1093 (emphasis added) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Finality is a 13 concept that has been ‘variously defined; like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on 14 context.’ But here, the finality of a state-court judgment is expressly defined by statute as ‘the 15 conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.’” Jimenez v. 16 Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009) (first quoting Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 17 (2003); then quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)). “[D]irect review cannot conclude for purposes 18 of § 2244(d)(1)(A) until the ‘availability of direct appeal to the state courts,’ and to th[e 19 Supreme] Court, has been exhausted. Until that time, the ‘process of direct review’ has not 20 ‘com[e] to an end’ and ‘a presumption of finality and legality’ cannot yet have ‘attache[d] to the 21 conviction and sentence[.]’” Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 119–20 (first and second alteration added) 22 (citations omitted). The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on January 22, 23 2025, and the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court 24 expired on April 22, 2025. Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on February 28, 25 2025, before the judgment became final. 26 Second, the Supreme Court “has recognized that the States’ interest in administering their 27 criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the 1 Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44–45). Third, there is an 2 adequate opportunity in the California state courts and the United States Supreme Court to raise 3 constitutional challenges. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (“[A] federal 4 court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of 5 unambiguous authority to the contrary.”). Fourth, the petition challenges a criminal judgment 6 that was not final at the time the petition was filed, and thus, the requested relief sought to enjoin 7 or had the practical effect of enjoining the process of direct review of Petitioner’s state 8 conviction. 9 “Where Younger abstention is appropriate, a district court cannot refuse to abstain, retain 10 jurisdiction over the action, and render a decision on the merits after the state proceedings have 11 ended. To the contrary, Younger abstention requires dismissal of the federal action.” Beltran v. 12 California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original). “Although the state court 13 proceedings [a]re completed . . . and an abstention order in this case may result simply in the 14 [petitioner] refiling their federal [habeas petition], this outcome is required by Younger.” Id. 15 Accordingly, the Court finds the petition should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 16 Younger given that the federal petition was filed before the state judgment was final. See Perez 17 v. Phillips, No. 1:24-cv-00554-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 51212 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2025) 18 (dismissing federal habeas petition based on Younger because it was filed before the time to file 19 a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired). Petitioner does not 20 establish any extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate. Accordingly, 21 dismissal is warranted on abstention grounds. 22 B. Exhaustion 23 A petitioner in state custody who is proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 24 must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based 25 on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state’s 26 alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. 27 Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by 1 presenting it to the federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Duncan v. 2 Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). 3 “[F]or purposes of exhausting state remedies, a claim for relief in habeas corpus must 4 include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts 5 that entitle the petitioner to relief.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1996). Accord 6 Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Fair presentation requires that the 7 petitioner ‘describe in the state proceedings both the operative facts and the federal legal theory 8 on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a “fair opportunity” to apply controlling 9 legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.’” (citations omitted)). “Mere 10 ‘general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the 11 right to a fair trial,’ do not establish exhaustion.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th 12 Cir. 2005) (quoting Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)). 13 In the petition, Petitioner raises four grounds for relief. (ECF No. 1 at 5–10.3) Grounds 14 Two, Three, Four, and a portion of Ground One assert ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). 15 (Id.) Respondent argues that Petitioner did not exhaust his IAC claims by making a cursory 16 reference to IAC in the last sentence of Petitioner’s sole filing in the California Supreme Court, a 17 petition for review. 18 Here, the heading for the argument section in Petitioner’s petition for review filed in the 19 California Supreme Court reads: “Review should be granted to determine whether Appellant’s 20 conviction for first degree murder and the felony-murder special circumstance violate due 21 process because they were not based on substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation or 22 that the murder was motivated by a pre-existing intent to steal.” (LD 3 at 5 (capitalization and 23 emphasis omitted).) The last sentence of the petition for review states: “The court of appeal’s 24 contrary conclusion is based on an unreasonable interpretation of the undisputed evidence in the 25 case and an unreasonable application of established United States Supreme Court precedent 26 establishing the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel.” (LD 3 at 8.) 27 1 The Court finds Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2000), instructive. In Solis, the 2 petitioner wrote in the penultimate paragraph of his twenty-one-page brief in the California 3 Supreme Court: 4 If review is granted, appellant wishes to brief the issues raised below and asserted here, 1) that important admissible and trustworthy defense evidence was kept 5 from the jury which evidence also showed that 2) a consciousness of guilt instruction based on hiding of the gun should never have been given; 3) A valid 6 defense instruction pinpointing appellant’s theory of the case was refused; 4) A defective reasonable doubt instruction, CALJIC 2.90, was used and that issue is 7 presently before the Supreme Court of the United States in Sandoval v. California, (1993) 509 U.S. 954, [114 S.Ct. 40], 125 L.Ed.2d 788 [789]; 5) 8 Finally, the errors complained of above, individually and cumulatively denied appellant Due Process and a fair trial under federal and state constitutions. 9 10 Solis, 219 F.3d at 930 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit found that the 11 petitioner did not fairly present his cumulative error claim to the California Supreme Court, 12 noting that “Solis’ petition did not label his cumulative error claim as an ‘issue’ in the contents 13 section of his brief, nor did he argue the claim or cite authority for it.” Id. Similarly, here, 14 Petitioner’s petition for review did not label his ineffective assistance of counsel claim as an 15 issue in the contents section nor did the petition argue the claim or cite authority for it. 16 In Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit held “that a 17 petitioner has ‘fairly presented’ a claim not named in a petition if it is ‘sufficiently related’ to an 18 exhausted claim. Claims are ‘sufficiently related’ or ‘intertwined’ for exhaustion purposes when, 19 by raising one claim, the petition clearly implies another error.” 540 F.3d at 1025 (citing 20 Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2004)). Here, the sole exhausted claim 21 raised in the petition is insufficiency of the evidence. (ECF No. 1 at 5; LD 3.) To the extent 22 Petitioner asserts an IAC claim based on counsel’s failure to competently litigate the 23 insufficiency of the evidence issue, “[w]hile admittedly related, they are distinct claims with 24 separate elements of proof, and each claim should have been separately and specifically 25 presented to the state courts.” Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005). 26 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Grounds Two, Three, Four, and the portion 27 of Ground One asserting ineffective assistance of counsel are not exhausted. “Federal courts may 1 claims.” Henderson v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court must dismiss 2 without prejudice a mixed petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims to give a 3 petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the claims if he can do so. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 522. However, 4 generally a petitioner may, at his option, withdraw the unexhausted claims and go forward with 5 the exhausted claims. See Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict 6 courts must provide habeas litigants with the opportunity to amend their mixed petitions by 7 striking unexhausted claims as an alternative to suffering dismissal.”). Additionally, a petitioner 8 may move to withdraw the entire petition and return to federal court when he has finally 9 exhausted his state court remedies or move to stay and hold in abeyance the petition while he 10 exhausts his claims in state court. However, given the Court’s conclusion that dismissal is 11 warranted based on Younger, the Court will recommend that the mixed petition be dismissed 12 without prejudice. 13 III. 14 RECOMMENDATION & ORDER 15 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 16 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) be GRANTED; and 17 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED without prejudice based on 18 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and for failure to exhaust state judicial remedies. 19 Further, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SUBSTITUTE Patwin Horn as Respondent 20 in the instant matter. 21 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 22 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 23 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 24 THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 25 written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any 26 exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 27 Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days 1 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 2 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 3 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 4 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. ee 7 | Dated: _ August 15, 2025 ; STANLEY A. BOONE 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28