1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYMOND ALAN GRIFFIN, Case No. 1:25-cv-00015-HBK (HC) 12 Petitioner, ORDER TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PETITION1 14 DOERER, et al. (Doc. No. 1) 15 Respondent. FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 16
17 18 Petitioner Raymond Alan Griffin is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se on his petition for 19 writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), which was transferred by the Central 20 District of California to this Court on January 6, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 1, 6). On January 27, 2025, 21 the Court conducted a preliminary review of the Petition and determined that the Petition failed to 22 comply with Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254Cases. 2 (Doc. No. 11). Specifically, 23 Petitioner appears to assert he is actually innocent of his career offender status because the 24 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 25 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 2 The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases may be applied to petitions for writ of habeas corpus other than 26 those brought under § 2254 at the Court’s discretion. See Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Civil Rule 81(a)(2) provides that the rules are “applicable to proceedings for . . . habeas corpus . . . 27 to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice of civil actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P 81(a)(2). 28 1 convictions on his predicate offenses were “unconstitutional and toxic negotiable instruments,” 2 but the Petition failed to include any facts or additional information supporting his ground(s) for 3 relief as required under Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. (Id. at 2-3). The 4 Court afforded Petitioner an opportunity to file an amended petition within thirty days and 5 provided him with the proper form. (Id.). On March 6, 2025, upon receiving Petitioner’s notice 6 of change of address, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to remail a copy of the January 27, 7 2025 Order, and sua sponte granted an extension of time for Petitioner to file his First Amended 8 Petition to April 4, 2025. (Doc. No. 14). 9 Petitioner has not filed a First Amended Petition, and the deadline to do so has passed. 10 The Court duly warned Petitioner that if he failed to file an amended petition, the undersigned 11 would recommend that the Petition be dismissed for the above reasons and/or for his failure to 12 prosecute this action. Therefore, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss this 13 action without prejudice. 14 I. APPPLICABLE LAW 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 16 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 17 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 18 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Local Rule 110 similarly permits the court to impose 19 sanctions on a party who fails to comply with the court’s Rules or any order of the court. 20 Before dismissing an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, the court must consider: (1) the 21 public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage a docket; (3) 22 the risk of prejudice to defendant; (4) public policy favoring disposition on the merits; and (5) the 23 availability of less drastic sanctions. See Applied Underwriters, 913 F.3d at 889 (noting that 24 these five factors “must” be analyzed before a Rule 41 involuntarily dismissal) (emphasis added); 25 Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (reviewing five factors and 26 independently reviewing the record because district court did not make finding as to each); but 27 see Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing the same, but 28 noting the court need not make explicit findings as to each) (emphasis added); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 1 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of pro se § 1983 action when plaintiff 2 did not amend caption to remove “et al” as the court directed and reiterating that an explicit 3 finding of each factor is not required by the district court). 4 II. ANALYSIS 5 The undersigned considers the above-stated factors and concludes the majority of the 6 above factors favor dismissal in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 7 litigation is deemed to be in the public interest. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.2d 983, 8 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). Turning to the second factor, the court’s need to efficiently manage its 9 docket cannot be overstated. This court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and due 10 to the delay in filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the Covid-19 11 pandemic, it operated under a declared judicial emergency through May 2, 2021. See In re 12 Approval of the Judicial Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of California, 956 F.3d 13 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). This Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly 14 consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot effectively manage its 15 docket when a litigant ceases to litigate his/her case or respond to a court order. Thus, the Court 16 finds that the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 17 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ 18 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a respondent. See Sibron v. New York, 19 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor – risk of prejudice to respondent – weighs in favor 20 of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the unreasonable delay in prosecuting an 21 action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). Because Petitioner’s inaction 22 amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action, the third factor weighs in favor of 23 dismissal. 24 As to the fourth factor, a preference to rule on the merits usually weighs against dismissal 25 because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 26 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the Petition is facially deficient. As noted in the Court’s previous Order, 27 the Petition fails to identify all the ground(s) for relief and state facts to support those ground(s) 28 for relief as required under Rule 2(c). (See generally Doc. No. 1; Doc. No. 11). Thus, Petitioner 1 has not presented a matter on the merits for the Court to consider.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYMOND ALAN GRIFFIN, Case No. 1:25-cv-00015-HBK (HC) 12 Petitioner, ORDER TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PETITION1 14 DOERER, et al. (Doc. No. 1) 15 Respondent. FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 16
17 18 Petitioner Raymond Alan Griffin is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se on his petition for 19 writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), which was transferred by the Central 20 District of California to this Court on January 6, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 1, 6). On January 27, 2025, 21 the Court conducted a preliminary review of the Petition and determined that the Petition failed to 22 comply with Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254Cases. 2 (Doc. No. 11). Specifically, 23 Petitioner appears to assert he is actually innocent of his career offender status because the 24 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 25 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 2 The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases may be applied to petitions for writ of habeas corpus other than 26 those brought under § 2254 at the Court’s discretion. See Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Civil Rule 81(a)(2) provides that the rules are “applicable to proceedings for . . . habeas corpus . . . 27 to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice of civil actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P 81(a)(2). 28 1 convictions on his predicate offenses were “unconstitutional and toxic negotiable instruments,” 2 but the Petition failed to include any facts or additional information supporting his ground(s) for 3 relief as required under Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. (Id. at 2-3). The 4 Court afforded Petitioner an opportunity to file an amended petition within thirty days and 5 provided him with the proper form. (Id.). On March 6, 2025, upon receiving Petitioner’s notice 6 of change of address, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to remail a copy of the January 27, 7 2025 Order, and sua sponte granted an extension of time for Petitioner to file his First Amended 8 Petition to April 4, 2025. (Doc. No. 14). 9 Petitioner has not filed a First Amended Petition, and the deadline to do so has passed. 10 The Court duly warned Petitioner that if he failed to file an amended petition, the undersigned 11 would recommend that the Petition be dismissed for the above reasons and/or for his failure to 12 prosecute this action. Therefore, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss this 13 action without prejudice. 14 I. APPPLICABLE LAW 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 16 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 17 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 18 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Local Rule 110 similarly permits the court to impose 19 sanctions on a party who fails to comply with the court’s Rules or any order of the court. 20 Before dismissing an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, the court must consider: (1) the 21 public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage a docket; (3) 22 the risk of prejudice to defendant; (4) public policy favoring disposition on the merits; and (5) the 23 availability of less drastic sanctions. See Applied Underwriters, 913 F.3d at 889 (noting that 24 these five factors “must” be analyzed before a Rule 41 involuntarily dismissal) (emphasis added); 25 Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (reviewing five factors and 26 independently reviewing the record because district court did not make finding as to each); but 27 see Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing the same, but 28 noting the court need not make explicit findings as to each) (emphasis added); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 1 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of pro se § 1983 action when plaintiff 2 did not amend caption to remove “et al” as the court directed and reiterating that an explicit 3 finding of each factor is not required by the district court). 4 II. ANALYSIS 5 The undersigned considers the above-stated factors and concludes the majority of the 6 above factors favor dismissal in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 7 litigation is deemed to be in the public interest. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.2d 983, 8 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). Turning to the second factor, the court’s need to efficiently manage its 9 docket cannot be overstated. This court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and due 10 to the delay in filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the Covid-19 11 pandemic, it operated under a declared judicial emergency through May 2, 2021. See In re 12 Approval of the Judicial Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of California, 956 F.3d 13 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). This Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly 14 consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot effectively manage its 15 docket when a litigant ceases to litigate his/her case or respond to a court order. Thus, the Court 16 finds that the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 17 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ 18 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a respondent. See Sibron v. New York, 19 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor – risk of prejudice to respondent – weighs in favor 20 of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the unreasonable delay in prosecuting an 21 action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). Because Petitioner’s inaction 22 amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action, the third factor weighs in favor of 23 dismissal. 24 As to the fourth factor, a preference to rule on the merits usually weighs against dismissal 25 because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 26 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the Petition is facially deficient. As noted in the Court’s previous Order, 27 the Petition fails to identify all the ground(s) for relief and state facts to support those ground(s) 28 for relief as required under Rule 2(c). (See generally Doc. No. 1; Doc. No. 11). Thus, Petitioner 1 has not presented a matter on the merits for the Court to consider. Additionally, the instant 2 dismissal is a dismissal without prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with 3 prejudice. And finally, a court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will 4 result in dismissal satisfies the “consideration of alternative” requirement. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d 5 at 1262. The Court’s previous Order expressly warned Petitioner that if he failed to respond, the 6 undersigned would recommend the district court dismiss the Petition. (Doc. No. 11 at 4, ¶4). 7 Thus, Petitioner had adequate warning that dismissal would result from his noncompliance with 8 the Court’s order. 9 After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, the undersigned 10 recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and Local Rule 110. 11 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 12 The Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this case. 13 It is further RECOMMENDED: 14 This case be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or comply with a 15 court order. 16 //// 17 //// 18 //// 19 NOTICE TO PARTIES 20 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 21 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 22 after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 23 objections with the Court. Id.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, 24 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen 25 (15) pages. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party 26 wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its 27 CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with 28 specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by 1 | the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 2 | 636(b)U)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the 3 | waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 4 > | Dated: __April 22, 2025 Mile. □□□ foareA Zacks 6 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28