(HC) Godfrey v. Warden PVSP

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJune 30, 2020
Docket5:20-cv-01381
StatusUnknown

This text of (HC) Godfrey v. Warden PVSP ((HC) Godfrey v. Warden PVSP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(HC) Godfrey v. Warden PVSP, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JM GODFREY, 11 Case No. 20-01381 BLF (PR) Petitioner, 12 ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING v. PENDING MOTIONS AS MOOT; 13 DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 14 WARDEN PVSP,

15 Respondent. (Docket Nos. 11, 17) 16

17 18 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas 19 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the denial of resentencing under “SB 20 620.”1 Dkt. No. 1. Petitioner has paid the filing fee. Dkt. No. 16. 21 22 I. DISCUSSION 23 I. Standard of Review 24 This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person 25 in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 26 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 27 1 § 2254(a). It shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause 2 why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant 3 or person detained is not entitled thereto.” Id. § 2243. 4 Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An application for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed 5 by a prisoner who is in state custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court must “specify 6 all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner ... [and] state the facts supporting each 7 ground.” Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 8 “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to 9 a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting 10 Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 11 Section 2254 Cases also provides: “If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached 12 exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must 13 dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 14 II. Analysis 15 According to the petition, Petitioner was convicted in San Mateo County Superior 16 Court of several counts, including felony-carjacking, second degree robbery, and two 17 counts of felony-assault with a semiautomatic firearm, as well as enhancements for 18 personal use of a firearm, commission of violent felony while on parole, and a prior felony 19 conviction. Dkt. No. 1 at 22-23. Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere on March 10, 20 2010. Id. at 23. He was likely sentenced shortly after April 30, 2010, which is the date of 21 the probation officer’s report and recommendation to the sentencing court. Id. at 22. 22 Petitioner did not appeal. Id. at 2. The petition does not clearly state the terms of his 23 sentence. Still serving his sentence, Petitioner filed state habeas petitions in 2019, with the 24 state high court denying the petition on January 22, 2020. Id. 25 Attached to the federal petition, Petitioner includes a copy of the state superior 26 court’s decision denying his first state habeas petition. Dkt. No. 1 at 21. In denying relief, 27 the state court stated, “Senate Bill 620 does not apply retroactively to final judgments.” Id. 1 The state appellate and high courts summarily denied Petitioner’s subsequent petitions. Id. 2 at 16, 18. The instant petition indicates that Petitioner was sentenced sometime in 2010, 3 and that he did not appeal the matter. See supra at 2. Therefore, Petitioner had 60 days 4 after judgment to file a direct appeal, Cal. Rule of Court 8.308(a), and then another 90 days 5 to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, see Miranda 6 v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002); Petitioner did neither. Accordingly, 7 Petitioner’s judgment became final 150 days after judgment was entered, which is 8 sometime at the end of 2010. 9 Well after Petitioner’s sentence became final, the California Governor approved 10 Senate Bill 620 on October 11, 2017, amended Penal Code sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 11 and allowed trial courts at the time of sentencing to strike or dismiss a firearms 12 enhancement “in the interest of justice.” Senate Bill No. 620; see Cal. Pen. Code §§ 13 12022.5(c), 12022.53(h). The law became effective on January 1, 2018. Id. 14 Petitioner seeks “extraordinary relief” and claims that “SB 620,” i.e., Senate Bill 15 No. 620, should be applied retroactively.2 Id. at 5. He also asserts that SB 620 is deficient 16 because it has no provision for resentencing youth offenders, it violates the Eighth 17 Amendment, and that the “Slack Rule”3 applies. Id. at 7-10. It does not appear that 18 Petitioner raised the claims involving the Eighth Amendment and the “Slack Rule” in his 19 state habeas petitions, and therefore these claims are unexhausted.4 Dkt. No. 1 at 21. 20 2 Petitioner claims that that a “definition of use of firearm” needs to be made on a “case by 21 case” basis under “US v. Willis (2015).” Dkt. No. 1 at 6. However, he only provides the name and year for this case, and without a legal citation, the Court is unable to ascertain 22 the actual case law on which Petitioner relies.

23 3 By the “Slack Rule,” Petitioner appears to be referring to the rule set forth in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 482 (2000), which involves the right to appeal from a denial of 24 the writ of habeas corpus as being governed by the Certificate of Appealability requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 25

4 Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas 26 proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting 27 the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and 1 Petitioner’s attack of SB 620 essentially involves the interpretation and application 2 of state sentencing laws and does not give rise to a federal question cognizable on federal 3 habeas review. See Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Absent a 4 showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing 5 laws does not justify federal habeas relief.”). The fact that Petitioner attempts to 6 characterize his claim as a violation of his federal constitutional rights, without more, is 7 not sufficient. See, e.g., Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (litigant 8 cannot “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of 9 due process”). Furthermore, he has not exhausted his Eighth Amendment claim, and 10 asserting the “Slack Rule” is premature. See supra at 3, fn. 3. 11 This court is bound by the state court’s interpretation of state sentencing laws. The 12 state superior court clearly stated that Senate Bill 620 does not apply retroactively to final 13 judgments. Nowhere in the petition does Petitioner allege that his judgment is not final.

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(HC) Godfrey v. Warden PVSP, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hc-godfrey-v-warden-pvsp-cand-2020.