(HC) Glass v. Hill

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYMOND GEORGE GLASS, No. 2:24-cv-3020 DC CSK P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 JAMES HILL, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. On October 30, 2024, petitioner filed a 18 petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) On December 17, 2024, 19 petitioner paid the filing fee. On March 20, 2025, petitioner was ordered to show cause why this 20 action should not be dismissed as untimely. Following an extension of time, petitioner filed his 21 response on May 27, 2025. As discussed below, the Court finds that the petition is untimely, and 22 recommends that this action be dismissed. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner was convicted in Stanislaus County Superior Court, No. 1027257. See People 25 v. Raymond George Glass, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1032 (5th Dist. Jan. 6, 2004). On appeal, the 26 California Court of Appeal dismissed certain enhancements, affirmed the conviction in all other 27 respects, and remanded petitioner’s case to the trial court for resentencing. Id. at 1038. 28 /// 1 Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on February 6, 2004. 2 People v. Glass, No. S122396.1 The California Supreme Court denied review on March 24, 2004. 3 Id. 4 Following resentencing, petitioner filed an appeal from the sentence imposed on remand, 5 which the California Court of Appeal described as follows: 6 [the trial judge] sentenced Glass to consecutive terms of 30 years to life on counts I and II (15 years to life on each count, doubled 7 pursuant to section 667, subd. (e)(1)), a consecutive term of six years for dissuading a witness from testifying (midterm of three years, 8 doubled), enhanced by five years for previously having been convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)), and an additional five 9 years for having inflicted serious bodily injury during the commission of the aggravated rape in count II (§ 12022.8), for a total 10 sentence of 76 years to life. The remaining counts were either stayed pursuant to section 654 or imposed concurrently. 11 12 People v. Glass, 2005 WL 3275796, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2005). In evaluating petitioner’s 13 claim that his sentence of 76 years to life is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 14 Amendment, the California Court of Appeal found that petitioner’s case was not one of the 15 exceedingly rare cases in which the gross disproportionality principle applies: 16 Glass received a sentence of 76 years to life for his convictions of two counts of sexually abusing a child under the age of 14 years, 17 enhanced because he inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of one of the assaults. The Legislature reasonably could 18 have concluded that these crimes deserved greater punishment than the crimes in the cited cases. His criminal background also increased 19 his sentence because (1) he had a previous conviction that constituted a serious felony, and (2) he had served a prior prison term. His 20 sentence also included six years for dissuading a witness from testifying. These factors convince us this case is not one in which 21 the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed. 22 Id. at *14. The California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s sentence and conviction on 23 December 5, 2005. Id. at *1, 15. 24 ///

25 1 The court may take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 26 reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), including undisputed information posted on official websites. Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 27 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the docket sheet of a California court. White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010). The address of the official website of the California 28 state courts is www.courts.ca.gov. 1 On January 5, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 2 People v. Glass, No. S140170. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review 3 without comment on March 1, 2006. Id. 4 Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. 5 See S. Ct. Docket Search, https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docket.aspx (last visited Nov. 6 14, 2024). 7 On July 24, 2013, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 8 Supreme Court. Glass (Raymond George) on H.C., No. S212285. The California Supreme Court 9 denied the petition on October 16, 2013, without comment. Id. 10 On December 10, 2013, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 11 California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District. In re Raymond George Glass on 12 Habeas Corpus, No. 068482. On January 31, 2014, the California Court of Appeal denied the 13 petition without comment. Id. 14 On February 20, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 15 Supreme Court. Glass (Raymond George) on H.C., No. S216640. On April 30, 2014, the 16 California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment. Id. 17 On October 6, 2014, petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari to the United States 18 Supreme Court was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Glass v. California, 135 S. Ct. 19 230 (2014). 20 On November 20, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 21 California Supreme Court. Glass (Raymond George) on H.C., No. S230725. The California 22 Supreme Court denied the petition, citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995); In re 23 Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921, 925-26 (1979).2 Id. 24 On November 5, 2020, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate/prohibition against 25 California. Glass v. California, No. S265415. On December 9, 2020, the California Supreme 26

27 2 In Duvall, the state court found that a habeas petition must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474. In Dexter, the state court found that 28 prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies. Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921, 925-26. 1 Court denied the petition without comment. Id. 2 On April 8, 2024, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 3 Supreme Court. Glass (Raymond George) on H.C., No. S284569 (see ECF Nos. 1-2 at 7-70, 1-3 4 at 1-36). On August 14, 2024, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without 5 comment. Glass (Raymond George) on H.C., No. S284569. 6 Petitioner constructively filed this action on October 7, 2024. (ECF No. 1 at 54.) 7 II. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS 8 Petitioner raises six claims for relief in his petition: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction; 9 (2) the trial court, no longer a constitutional court, was not competent to try petitioner and denied 10 petitioner due process; (3) the trial court intentionally misrepresented petitioner as a corporation 11 rather than a human being; (4) the trial court subjected petitioner “to constitutional impermissible 12 application of statutes” because the court did not provide petitioner proof or evidence that his true 13 and proper name was used; (5) petitioner was subjected to double jeopardy because both a term of 14 imprisonment and a monetary penalty were imposed; and (6) the trial court subjected petitioner to 15 “forced liability for surety bond under acts of fraud.” (ECF No. 1 at 11-23.) 16 As relief, in addition to immediate release from state custody, petitioner seeks money 17 damages. (Id. at 26-27.) 18 III. GOVERNING STANDARDS 19 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 20 state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 21 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 22 application of state law. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 23 62, 67-68 (1991). Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standards for granting federal 24 habeas corpus relief. 25 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 26 petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the 27 petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. . . .” Rule 4, R. Gov. § 2254 Cases. This 28 rule allows courts to screen and dismiss petitions that are patently frivolous, vague, conclusory, 1 palpably incredible, false, or plagued by procedural defects. Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 2 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). 3 Further, district courts may consider sua sponte whether a state habeas petition is untimely and 4 may dismiss a petition that is untimely on its face after providing the petitioner with an 5 opportunity to respond. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006); Wentzell v. Neven, 6 674 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012). 7 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposed a statute 8 of limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. This statute of 9 limitations provides that: 10 A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody, pursuant to the judgment of 11 a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of – 12 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 13 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 14 by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 15 State action; 16 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 17 recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 18 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 19 presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 20 21 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 22 IV. DISCUSSION 23 A. Date Petitioner’s Conviction Became Final 24 The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on March 1, 2006. People v. 25 Glass, No. S140170. As noted above, petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in 26 the United States Supreme Court. Thus, petitioner’s conviction became final on May 30, 2006, 27 ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. See 28 U.S.C. 28 § 2244(d)(1)(A); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 1 The AEDPA statute of limitations period expired one year later, on May 30, 2007. 2 Petitioner constructively filed this petition on October 7, 2024, over seventeen years after the 3 statute of limitations had run. Absent a showing that the accrual date was delayed, or the 4 limitations period was tolled, the petition is untimely. 5 B. Delayed Accrual 6 Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the limitations period starts running on “the date on which the 7 factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the 8 exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The “due diligence clock starts ticking 9 when a person knows or through diligence could discover the vital facts, regardless of when their 10 legal significance is actually discovered.” Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 2012) 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The record does not contain any basis for 12 delayed accrual on a date after May 30, 2006, the date petitioner’s conviction and sentence 13 became final. Petitioner’s response to the order to show cause does not argue that he is entitled to 14 a delayed accrual of the limitations period. (ECF No. 21, passim.) Thus, the petition remains 15 untimely. 16 C. Statutory Tolling 17 Generally, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time “a properly filed application 18 for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 19 is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 However, once the limitation period has expired, later-filed state habeas petitions do not revive 21 the limitation period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). The burden of 22 demonstrating that the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period was sufficiently tolled rests with the 23 petitioner. See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 24 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009). 25 Here, following the denial of the petition for review by the California Supreme Court on 26 March 1, 2006, petitioner did not file his first petition for collateral review until July 24, 2013, 27 when he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. Glass 28 (Raymond George) on H.C., No. S212285. By then, the statute of limitations had expired, and 1 the state court petition could not revive the limitations period. Petitioner does not challenge the 2 calculation of the statutory tolling period in his response to the order to show cause. (ECF No. 3 21, passim.) The Court finds that petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling because the 4 limitations period had expired before petitioner filed his collateral challenges in state court. 5 D. Equitable Tolling 6 A petitioner who files a federal habeas petition after expiration of the one-year statute of 7 limitations may be entitled to equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 8 The petitioner must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 9 extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. (internal quotation 10 marks and citation omitted). The diligence required for equitable tolling is “reasonable diligence” 11 and not maximum feasible diligence. Id. at 653 (citation omitted). The extraordinary 12 circumstances must be the cause of the untimeliness. Bryant v. Ariz. Att’y Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 13 1061 (9th Cir. 2010). The “threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is 14 very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 15 2010) (citation omitted). “[Petitioner] bears the burden of showing that this extraordinary 16 exclusion should apply to him.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). 17 The record does not disclose any basis for equitable tolling. In his response to the order to 18 show cause, petitioner did not provide any evidence, new or otherwise, to provide a basis for 19 equitably tolling the statute of limitations period, which petitioner exceeded by over seventeen 20 years. (ECF No. 21, passim.) Absent a basis for equitable tolling, the petition remains untimely. 21 E. Void Judgment/ Lack of Jurisdiction 22 The petition does not identify any new evidence, or point to any evidence that casts 23 serious doubt about the Stanislaus County conviction and that would permit the Court to consider 24 petitioner’s otherwise time-barred claims. Rather, petitioner argues that there “is no statute of 25 limitations for attacking a void judgment or when a court lacked/lacks jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 1 26 at 5.) Petitioner cites several cases for the theory that a court may set aside a “void” judgment at 27 any time. (Id. at 11-12.) However, similar efforts to avoid application of the AEDPA’s limitation 28 period have been routinely rejected by other district courts. See King v. Neuschmid, 2020 WL 1 1452478, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2020) (rejecting argument that underlying state court judgment 2 was “void” based on the use of an “illegal charging instrument”), report and recommendation 3 adopted, 2020 WL 1445705 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2020); Cavanagh v. Dir., Ventura Cty. Prob., 4 2011 WL 1344546, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011) (rejecting argument that AEPDA’s statute 5 of limitations did not apply because state court judgment was “void ab initio”); Applegate v. 6 Bunting, 2016 WL 4034984, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 28, 2016) (same holding and collecting cases 7 in support). In his petition, petitioner does not cite any cases holding that either §§ 2244(d) or 8 2254(b) do not apply to a petitioner who challenges his state court conviction on jurisdictional 9 grounds. (ECF No. 1, passim.) 10 F. Response to Order to Show Cause 11 In his response to the order to show cause, petitioner argues that “the Court should reverse 12 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)] at its earliest opportunity” because its interpretation of 13 AEDPA violates Article III of the U.S. Constitution. (ECF No. 21 at 2, 4.) In the alternative, the 14 Court should “begin granting certiorari petitions of state prisoners seeking review of state court 15 convictions alleged to rest on wrong but reasonable applications of federal law.” (Id. at 7.) 16 The Court in Williams acknowledged that “§ 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the 17 power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus 18 with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.”3 529 U.S. at 412. But the Court 19 later explained that “§ 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal-court 20 relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. It preserves authority to issue the writ 21 in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s 22 decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents. It goes no further.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 23 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)); see Rice v. White, 660 24 F.3d 242, 251 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Federal courts retain statutory and constitutional authority . . . to 25 remedy detentions by state authorities that violate federal law, so long as the procedural demands 26 3 Despite such new constraint, the Court in Williams granted habeas relief, finding that the 27 Virginia Supreme Court’s denial of Williams’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 529 U.S. at 399, 28 413-16. 1 of AEDPA are satisfied.”); Mitchell v. Maclaren, 2017 WL 4819104, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 2 2017), aff’d, 933 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Although the standard is difficult to meet, it is not 3 impossible and therefore does not amount to a suspension of the writ.”) (citing Crater v. Galaza, 4 491 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2007)); Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060, 1077 (9th Cir. 2016) 5 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (“‘Difficult’ is the term chosen by the Supreme Court to characterize the 6 process of a federal court reviewing a state criminal conviction under AEDPA. ‘Difficult’ is not 7 the same as ‘impossible.’ The Supreme Court has not cut off our review of state criminal 8 convictions. Nor has Congress eliminated our review.”) The difficult standard imposed by 9 § 2254(d)(1) “reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the 10 state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” 11 Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n.5 (1979) (Stevens, 12 J., concurring in judgment)). 13 Importantly, the AEDPA has survived every challenge raised against it. See Ulrey v. 14 Zavaras, 483 F. App’x 536, 543 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The statute is applied daily by federal 15 courts across the country; it is routinely applied by the Supreme Court; and no court has yet held 16 it unconstitutional. . . .”); Cobb v. Thaler, 682 F.3d 364, 374 (5th Cir. 2012) (“§ 2254(d)(1) does 17 not intrude on the independent adjudicative authority of the federal courts,” but “limits the 18 grounds on which federal courts may grant the habeas remedy to upset a state conviction”); Evans 19 v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[W]hile AEDPA does restrict a remedy, it does not 20 interfere with Article III powers, nor does it prescribe a rule of decision.”); Crater, 491 F.3d at 21 1125 (finding § 2254(d)(1)’s restriction of habeas relief to state court decisions that are contrary 22 to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law is not an unconstitutional 23 suspension of the writ, because it modifies preconditions for relief rather than foreclosing all 24 jurisdiction to review claims); Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 960-61 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2006) 25 (noting § 2254(d)(1)’s restriction “merely limits the source of clearly established law that the 26 Article III court may consider” and does not impermissibly alter content of that law in violation 27 of Article III or separation of power principles); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 601 (9th 28 Cir. 2000) (“Section 2254(d) merely limits the source of clearly established law that the Article 1 III court may consider, and that limitation served to govern prospectively classes of habeas cases 2 rather than offend the court’s authority to interpret the governing law and to determine the 3 outcome in any pending case.”). 4 Thus, in light of the above authorities, petitioner’s argument that Williams’ interpretation 5 of AEDPA is unconstitutional is unavailing. The Ninth Circuit has stated generally that “[t]he 6 constitutional foundation of § 2254(d)(1) is solidified by the Supreme Court’s repeated 7 application of the statute.” Crater, 491 F.3d at 1129. This Court is bound by the precedent of the 8 Ninth Circuit, which has rejected the arguments raised by petitioner. See id. (rejecting challenges 9 to the “contrary to or unreasonable application” language in § 2254(d)(1) under both the 10 Suspension Clause and separation of powers); Duhaime, 200 F.3d at 601 (finding AEDPA 11 modifies preconditions for habeas relief but does not remove the courts’ jurisdiction over habeas 12 petitions). 13 Finally, to the extent that petitioner argues that the applicable statute of limitations 14 imposed by the AEDPA is unconstitutional, that argument has also been rejected by the Ninth 15 Circuit. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 16 G. Conclusion 17 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that this action be denied as barred by the 18 statute of limitations. 19 V. REQUEST FOR MONEY DAMAGES 20 In addition to release from custody, petitioner seeks money damages. For the following 21 reasons, this Court declines to offer petitioner the option to convert his claim for money damages 22 into a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 936 23 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (district court may construe a petition for writ of habeas corpus to plead 24 a cause of action under Section 1983). A habeas corpus action and a prisoner civil rights suit 25 differ in a variety of respects, such as the proper defendants, type of relief available, filing fees 26 and the means of collecting them, and restrictions on future filings. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936 27 (quoting Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 2011)). For example, unlike in a 28 habeas action, a civil rights action would require petitioner to pay the full amount of the $350.00 1 filing fee, even if he is given leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In a 2 Section 1983 civil rights action, petitioner would be responsible for an initial partial filing fee and 3 thereafter payments from his trust account would be forwarded to the clerk of court any time the 4 amount in the account exceeded $10.00 until the filing fee was paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)- 5 (2). Moreover, the exhaustion requirements for a Section 1983 civil rights action also differ from 6 those required in a habeas action, and dismissal of a Section 1983 complaint as frivolous or 7 malicious or for failure to state a claim can have adverse effects on petitioner’s ability to proceed 8 in forma pauperis in future civil actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (limiting ability to proceed in 9 forma pauperis after three or more civil actions are dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for 10 failure to state a claim); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (exhaustion requirement for Section 1983 cases). 11 Due to these differences, the Court declines to provide the option to re-characterize the portion of 12 the petition seeking money damages as a civil rights complaint. See Bennett v. Biden, 2023 WL 13 8438454, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2023) (recommending that court decline to provide option to 14 re-characterize habeas corpus petition as civil rights complaint), findings and recommendations 15 adopted, 2024 WL 1803509 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2024). 16 VI. MOTION FOR RELEASE 17 On March 11, 2025, petitioner filed a motion for release pending review of decision 18 ordering release. (ECF No. 17.) In light of this Court’s finding that the petition is barred by the 19 statute of limitations, the Court recommends that petitioner’s motion for release be denied. 20 VII. REQUEST TO EXPEDITE 21 On May 27, 2025, petitioner wrote the Clerk of the Court, claiming petitioner did not 22 receive the order to show cause until seven days after it was issued, but that his response 23 remained timely under the mailbox rule, but asked the Clerk to expedite “this matter.” (ECF No. 24 22.) Petitioner is correct that his response was timely-filed. Therefore, there is no need to 25 expedite his filing, and his request is denied as moot. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 | VII. ORDERS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: Petitioner’s May 27, 2025 3 || request (ECF No. 22) is denied as moot. 4 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 5 1. Petitioner’s motion for release (ECF No. 17) be denied; and 6 2. This action be dismissed with prejudice as barred by the statute of limitations. 7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 8 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I). Within fourteen days 9 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 10 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 11 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Petitioner is advised that 12 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 13 || Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 14 15 | Dated: June 4, 2025 A aA 6 Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 jvglas3020.t8e.sol 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12