(HC) Dehart v. Eastern District Federal Court

District Court, E.D. California·Decided August 27, 2025·No. 1:24-cv-00617·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMY COLE DEHART, Case No. 1:24-cv-00617-CDB (HC)

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR PETITIONER’S 14 EASTERN DISTRICT FEDERAL FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND TO COURT, OBEY COURT ORDERS 15 Respondent. (Doc. 1) 16 14-DAY DEADLINE 17 Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge 18 19 Petitioner Jeremy Cole Dehart (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, proceeds pro se and in 20 forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). 21 Background 22 On July 22, 2025, following a preliminary screening of the petition, the undersigned 23 concluded Petitioner failed to name a proper respondent. (Doc. 9). Accordingly, Petitioner was 24 ordered to file a motion to amend the petition to name a proper respondent within 30 days of 25 issuance of the screening order. (Id. at 3). Petitioner was cautioned that any failure to comply 26 would result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed. (Id. at 2-3) (citing Sky v. Stolc, 27 497 F. App’x 696, 696 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of petition with prejudice for failure to name proper respondent; “Failure to name the proper respondent strips the district court of 1 personal jurisdiction.”) (citing Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996)). More 2 than 30 days have elapsed, and Petitioner has failed to file a motion to name the proper 3 respondent. 4 Governing Legal Standards 5 Local Rule 110, corresponding with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provides that 6 “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court may 7 be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . within the inherent power of 8 the Court.” E.D. Cal. Local Rule 110. The Court has the inherent power to control its docket and 9 may, in the exercise of that power, impose sanctions where appropriate, including dismissal of the 10 action. Bautista v. Los Angeles Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000). A court may dismiss an 11 action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court order, or comply with local 12 rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure 13 to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 14 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 15 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to prosecute and to comply with local 16 rules). 17 “In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, the district court is 18 required to weigh several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 19 (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 20 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 21 sanctions.” Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks & 22 citation omitted). These factors guide a court in deciding what to do and are not conditions that 23 must be met in order for a court to take action. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 24 Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 25 Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows the Court to dismiss an action if 26 the petitioner fails to comply with a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “By its plain text, a Rule 27 41(b) dismissal . . . requires a court order with which an offending [petitioner] failed to comply.” 1 marks, citation, and footnote omitted). The Court must analyze five factors before dismissing a 2 case pursuant to Rule 41(b): “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) 3 the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the [respondents]; (4) the public 4 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 5 alternatives.” Id. (quoting Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)); 6 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). These factors guide a court in deciding 7 what to do and are not conditions that must be met in order for a court to take action. In re 8 Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) 9 (citation omitted). 10 Discussion 11 Here, in addition to failing to name a proper respondent (a ground upon which the Court 12 may dismiss the petition with prejudice, see Sky, 497 F. App’x at 697), Petitioner has failed to 13 comply with the Court’s order and Local Rules. Petitioner has filed no response to the Court’s 14 order to file a motion to amend to name a proper respondent, and the time to do so has expired. 15 There are no other reasonable alternatives available to address Petitioner’s failure to respond and 16 otherwise obey this Court’s orders. Thus, the first and second factors—the expeditious resolution 17 of litigation and the Court’s need to manage its docket—weigh in favor of dismissal. Carey, 856 18 F.2d at 1440. The third factor, risk of prejudice to Respondent, also weighs fairly in favor of 19 dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in 20 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). This matter 21 cannot proceed further without Petitioner’s participation to prosecute the case with a petition that 22 (1) is signed by the Petitioner; (2) identifies relevant information concerning whether Petitioner 23 has exhausted his state remedies; and (3) provides factual support for the grounds for relief. (See 24 Doc. 15 at 2-3). The presumption of injury holds given Petitioner’s unreasonable delay in 25 prosecuting this action. Thus, the third factor—a risk of prejudice to the Respondent—also 26 weighs in favor of dismissal. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440. 27 The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors 1 “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward 2 disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.” In re PPA, 460 3 F.3d at 1228. Petitioner has not moved this case forward toward disposition on the merits. 4 Rather, his failure to comply with this Court’s orders prevents the action from progressing given 5 that his failure to name a proper respondent deprives this Court of personal jurisdiction. (See 6 Doc. 9 at 2 (citing Sky v. Stolc, 497 F. App’x 696, 696 (9th Cir. 2012))).

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