Hazen v. Banking Board of the State

476 P.2d 323
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedOctober 27, 1970
DocketNos. 43464, 43465
StatusPublished

This text of 476 P.2d 323 (Hazen v. Banking Board of the State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hazen v. Banking Board of the State, 476 P.2d 323 (Okla. 1970).

Opinion

BLACKBIRD, Justice:

Plaintiffs in error, as the proposed directors and incorporators of a bank to be known as “Treasury Bank”, signed an application for authority to engage in the banking business under that name. The application, with attached exhibits, was filed with this State’s Bank Commissioner in November, 1968. The same day, the same parties, hereinafter referred to as “Applicants”, filed with said Commissioner another application, by which they applied for permission to organize a trust company and for authority to engage in a trust company business, under the name of “Treasury Trust Company”.

[324]*324The proposed bank was to be located in a building formerly occupied by a drive-in eating establishment called “Johnny Reb’s Pizza”, at 5655 West Skelly Drive on Interstate Highway 44, adjacent to the unincorporated community of Oakhurst in southwestern Tulsa County, across the Arkansas River, west of the Tulsa city limits. The proposed trust company was to be located initially in the same building, though its articles of incorporation (as then drafted) contemplated that its Board of Directors might later move it to some other location in Tulsa or Creek Counties, with the approval of the Bank Commissioner, hereinafter referred to merely as the “Commissioner”.

After the Commissioner’s investigation, prescribed by Section 306 of the Oklahoma Banking Code of 1965 (Chap. 161, S.L. 1965, Title 6, O.S.196S, Supp., § 101 ff.), extensive hearings on said application were held before the State Banking Board, as contemplated in said section. At the close of these hearings, said Banking Board (hereinafter referred to merely as the “Board”) entered its separate orders denying both applications.

In the order (entered in January, 1969) as to the application for authority to organize the Bank, the Board found that there were “conditions and factors” that did not afford the proposed Bank “a reasonable promise of successful operation”, and mentioned at least some of such conditions and factors:

In its order, entered eight days later, denying the application for authority to organize a trust company and to engage in such business, as proposed, the Board gave, as its reasons for such denial, the lack of “real need shown”, and referred to conditions in the area not conducive to supporting such a business.

Thereafter, when the proceedings before the Board were reviewed by the Court of Bank Review (upon Applicants’ petition therefor), said court entered its brief orders affirming (in general terms) the Board’s previous orders denying the applications. Upon consideration of the motions for new trial subsequently filed by Applicants, that court thereafter overruled said motions by orders ostensibly contemplated to allow Applicants, in their present appeal from that court to this one, to “re-urge their position” as to what constitutes “substantial evidence” (under 6 O.S.1965 Supp., § 207, sub-section C) and “how far this court (the Court of Bank Review) should go in reviewing such evidence.”

The two appeals have been consolidated by order of this Court; and this opinion is contemplated to determine the decisive issues in both.

Though extensive portions of Applicants’ briefs pertain to the question of what character of evidence constitutes “substantial evidence” within the meaning of that term as used in the authorization conferred upon the Court of Bank Review by Section 207, subd. C supra, to reverse or modify the Board’s order “if the court finds” the order “is not supported by substantial evidence”, we find it unnecessary to deal with that question because the record made before the Board contains no proof that it erred in denying the applications, under the statutory mandate contained in Section 306, subd. F, supra, which provides in material part:

⅝ iji * ⅝ ⅝ ⅝
The Board shall not approve the application unless it ascertains to its satisfaction :
* * * * *
(2) that conditions in the community in which the bank or trust company would transact business afford reasonable promise of successful operation;
⅝ ⅜ ⅜ ‡ ⅝ ⅝ >>

In attempting to ascertain, “to its satisfaction”, whether the conditions, under which the proposed Treasury Bank would transact business, affords it a reasonable promise of success, it is indicated in the Board’s order that it carefully analyzed (among other things) the data and figures contained in the Applicants’ estimates, or prospectus, of income and expenses of the proposed Bank. According to the “PRO[325]*325JECTION” of the proposed Treasury Bank’s earnings and expenses for its first three years of operation (which Applicants presented to the Board), said Bank would suffer net losses of $42,050.00, $18,950.00, and $21,050.00, respectively, during those years while earning gross incomes of $182,-500.00, $279,500.00, and $322,500.00, respectively. Included in these income sums were items of $60,000.00, $120,000.00, and $150,000.00, respectively, which were labeled “other income — service charges, etc.” in Applicants’ “PROJECTION”, and added to other sums of estimated income to be derived from “Commercial loans”, “Real Estate loans”, and “Installment loans”, and “Interest on investments”, to make the above mentioned estimated total gross income sums. Of the total of 2,000 checking accounts, Applicants’ “PROJECTION OF DEPOSITS” estimated the proposed Bank would have during its first year, it calculated that 900 would have average balances of less than $1,000.00, and listed 1,800 and 2,250, respectively, of such accounts in said Bank’s second and third years of operation.

In its order, the Board prefaced its aforementioned finding (that conditions and factors do not afford the proposed Bank a reasonable promise of successful operation) with the following:

“The area at this time is not sufficiently developed to support another bank in this community. The Board is of the further opinion that the projection of earnings and expenses furnished to the board is unrealistic. We feel that the earnings will not be in accord with the projections, and we further feel that the expenses as projected are far too high for success in a newly organized bank of this size. To support our contention, we call attention to the fact that the employees’ salaries the first year will run over $100,000.00 and under the proposed Bank’s projection, the income will only be $182,000.00. In this connection, we believe the income from service charges is far out of line for a bank this size, and the losses will run much greater than projected.
“We also believe that the second year in operation under the projected figures will show a substantial loss, as well as the third year.
⅜ * * * ⅜ ‡ ft

We have carefully examined the evidence in this case and have concluded that, in some critical respects, it is very similar to that presented to the Board in Oklahoma State Banking Board v. Hicks, Okl., 412 P.2d 129, decided under our previous law (6 O.S.1961, § 55), wherein the factor, we are now dealing with, was described as “the future earning possibilities of said proposed institution at the place of business designated in the application.” There we held, among other things, that the Bank Commissioner and the Board cannot approve such an application if their determination, as to that factor, is unfavorable.

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Related

Oklahoma State Banking Board v. Hicks
1966 OK 18 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1966)

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476 P.2d 323, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hazen-v-banking-board-of-the-state-okla-1970.