Hayward L. Rogers v. Dayton C. Riddle, Lexington County Solicitor; Lexington County Court

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedNovember 19, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-12444
StatusUnknown

This text of Hayward L. Rogers v. Dayton C. Riddle, Lexington County Solicitor; Lexington County Court (Hayward L. Rogers v. Dayton C. Riddle, Lexington County Solicitor; Lexington County Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hayward L. Rogers v. Dayton C. Riddle, Lexington County Solicitor; Lexington County Court, (D.S.C. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

Hayward L. Rogers, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-12444-TMC v. ) ) ORDER Dayton C. Riddle, Lexington County ) Solicitor; Lexington County Court, ) ) Defendants. ) ) Plaintiff Hayward L. Rogers, a state prisoner and frequent pro se litigant in the District of South Carolina, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the Defendants committed various constitutional and state law violations in connection with his state criminal conviction. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff claims that Defendant Riddle “unlawfully impaneled” a state grand jury in February 1999 and, therefore, that he was “never legally indicted” for the crimes of conviction. Id. at 6–7. Plaintiff seeks “injunctive relief from prosecution misconduct.” Id. at 7. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter was referred to a magistrate judge for all pretrial proceedings. On September 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2). Now before the court is the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”), recommending that the court deny Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 7). The magistrate judge found that Plaintiff is a frequent litigant and, over the years, “has accrued at least three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)1,

1 Plaintiff has filed nearly 30 § 1983 actions in this district. The court, having conducted a backward-looking inquiry as directed by Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141, 145–46 (4th Cir. 2023), is satisfied that Plaintiff has had at least three prior actions dismissed on grounds enumerated in § 1915(g). Plaintiff does not dispute or challenge this conclusion. See, e.g., Rogers noting that, in fact, Plaintiff has at least twice been denied in forma pauperis status pursuant to the three-strike rule. Id. at 2–3. Therefore, the magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff must prepay the filing fee for this action in order to proceed with his claims unless he can demonstrate he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id. at 2. The magistrate judge then found that

Plaintiff alleged “no facts showing that the ‘imminent danger’ exception should apply,” and recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for in forma pauperis status be denied and that Plaintiff be given 21 days to pay the filing fee before this action is dismissed. Id. at 3. Plaintiff filed objections to the Report. (ECF No. 17). The recommendations set forth in the Report have no presumptive weight, and this court remains responsible for making a final determination in this matter. Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 459 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976)). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which a specific objection is made, and the court may accept, reject, modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). Thus, “[t]o trigger de novo review, an objecting party ‘must object to the finding or recommendation on that issue with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.’” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460 (quoting United States v. Midgette,

v. Carrigg et al., Civ. Action No. 3:16-cv-03163-TMC at ECF No. 11 (D.S.C. Oct. 24, 2016) (adopting Report (ECF No. 8) and summarily dismissing § 1983 action on numerous grounds, including the failure to state a plausible claim in light of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)); Rogers v. Wilson et al., Civ. Action. No. 2:16-cv-00558-TMC at ECF No. 27 (D.S.C. Dec. 14, 2016) (summarily dismissing § 1983 as both time-barred and barred by Heck); Rogers v. Stirling et al., Civ. Action No. 2:15-cv-04550-TMC at ECF No. 14 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2016) (adopting Report (ECF No. 9) and summarily dismissing § 1983 action on numerous separate grounds, including the failure to state a plausible due process claim for deprivation of personal property). The court notes that a dismissal under the Heck rule constitutes a strike. See Brunson v. Stein, 116 F.4th 301, 306 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1169 (2025). 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007)). However, the court need only review for clear error “those portions which are not objected to—including those portions to which only ‘general and conclusory’ objections have been made[.]” Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, 288 F. Supp. 3d 654, 662 (D.S.C. 2017); see also Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460 (noting that “[i]f a litigant objects

only generally, the district court reviews the magistrate’s recommendation for clear error only”). Furthermore, in the absence of specific objections to the Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Greenspan v. Brothers Prop. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 3d 734, 737 (D.S.C. 2015) (citing Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199– 200 (4th Cir. 1983)). Additionally, since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this court is charged with construing his pleadings and filings liberally in order to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that “when confronted with the objection of a pro se litigant, [the court] must also be mindful of [its] responsibility to construe pro se filings liberally”). Accordingly, “when

reviewing pro se objections to a magistrate’s recommendation, district courts must review de novo any articulated grounds to which the litigant appears to take issue.” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460–61. This does not mean, however, that the court can ignore a pro se party’s failure to allege or prove facts that establish a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 521 Fed. App’x 278, 290 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “‘district judges are not mind readers,’ and the principle of liberal construction does not require them to ‘conjure up questions never presented to them or to construct full-blown claims from sentence fragments’” (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277–78 (4th Cir. 1985))). As noted, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report. (ECF No. 17). In his objections, Plaintiff mounts a collateral attack on his convictions based primarily on actual innocence grounds. Id. at 1–5. Plaintiff also appears to suggest the Report is tainted by “racial bias.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff, however, does not dispute that he has accrued “three strikes” within the meaning of § 1915(g), nor

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Related

Mathews v. Weber
423 U.S. 261 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
David E. Camby v. Larry Davis James M. Lester
718 F.2d 198 (Fourth Circuit, 1983)
United States v. Nicholas Omar Midgette
478 F.3d 616 (Fourth Circuit, 2007)
Anthony Martin v. Susan Duffy
858 F.3d 239 (Fourth Circuit, 2017)
Greenspan v. Brothers Property Corp.
103 F. Supp. 3d 734 (D. South Carolina, 2015)
Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC
288 F. Supp. 3d 654 (D. South Carolina, 2017)
Larone Elijah v. Richard Dunbar
66 F.4th 454 (Fourth Circuit, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Hayward L. Rogers v. Dayton C. Riddle, Lexington County Solicitor; Lexington County Court, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hayward-l-rogers-v-dayton-c-riddle-lexington-county-solicitor-scd-2025.