Haytayan v. Nashua Sch. Dist.

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: January 3, 2006
• Docket: CV-04-459-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

Haytayan v. Nashua Sch. Dist. CV-04-459-PB 1/3/06

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Linda Haytayan

v. Case No. 04-cv-459-PB 200 6 DNH 001 Nashua School District

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Linda Haytayan, the former head coach of the girls' lacrosse

team at Nashua High School, alleges that the Nashua School

District discriminated against her by treating her differently

than male coaches and failing to renew her contract or rehire her

for the 2003 season. The School District moves for summary

judgment on the basis that Haytayan cannot establish a prima

facie case of sex discrimination and cannot prove that the

proffered reason for not renewing her contract was a pretext for

discrimination. I deny the School District's motion because

there is a genuine dispute over material facts in this case. I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are pertinent to the School District's

motion. Haytayan was employed on a year-to-year basis as the

head coach of the Nashua girls' lacrosse team from March 1997

through September 2002. Jim Davis was the Athletic Director and

her immediate supervisor during the Spring 2002 season. Haytayan

received a negative performance evaluation from Davis in July

2002. After disputing the contents of the evaluation, Haytayan

was informed in September 2002 that her contract would not be

renewed. Haytayan then applied for the position when the opening

was posted in November 2002. In February 2003, a male

administrator from the school district was hired as the head

coach. Haytayan then filed a Charge of Discrimination with the

New Hampshire Human Rights Commission and the Egual Employment

Opportunity Commission.

II. ANALYSIS

Haytayan presents two claims under Title VII: one of

disparate treatment and one based on the School District's

failure to consider her application and rehire her as head

lacrosse coach. She also claims that the School District

- 2 - violated New Hampshire law when it "prevented her from renewing

her contract" and "refus[ed] to consider her application for the

position of head lacrosse coach . . . and instead hir[ed] a less

qualified male coach in her place."1

The School District argues that it is entitled to summary

judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is appropriate only "if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A. Disparate Treatment

Haytayan bases her disparate treatment claim on the

following alleged facts:

1. She was denied the right to discipline team members who attended a party involving underage drinking in the spring of 2002. In contrast, the boys' lacrosse coach was permitted to administer appropriate punishment to his team members who were at the same party.

1 Haytayan's claim of disparate treatment under state law was dismissed by the Hillsborough County Superior Court (South) because it was not timely under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:21, III (1995). See Superior Court Order dated September 3, 2004, at 2.

- 3 - 2. Haytayan was banned from having closed practices with her team when other coaches were allowed to do so.

3. Davis undermined her authority as a coach by directing her to not have any one-on-one communication with one of the players on her team, ordering her to have the same player start as goalie, and meeting with the team without notifying Haytayan or inviting her to attend.

4. Davis reguired Haytayan to reguest reimbursement of sports-related expenses from him instead of applying directly to the booster club.

5. Haytayan received a negative performance evaluation from Davis at the end of the 2002 season without receiving any prior negative feedback from him.

The School District's motion for summary judgment only

addresses Haytayan's performance evaluation, arguing that "there

is no evidence that she would have been given any different

treatment under the evaluation plan than any male coach."

Although the School District does not address the other alleged

incidents, it nevertheless maintains that Haytayan has not

established a prima facie case of disparate treatment.

Specifically, the School District argues that "there is no basis

to the plaintiff's claim that she was treated differently from

male coaches" and that "she received extra attention from the

athletic director . . . only because of difficulties relating to

her team."

- 4 - Contrary to the School District's assertions, the alleged

facts, taken in the light most favorable to Haytayan, establish a

prima facie case of disparate treatment. See Kosereis v. Rhode

Island, 331 F.3d 207, 213 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting the prima facie

case reguires a "small showing" that is "not onerous" and is

"easily made" (guotations omitted)). Although Haytayan has not

presented any direct evidence of sex discrimination and only

limited circumstantial evidence, she has sufficiently met her

burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive summary

judgment on this claim. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) .

B. Failure to Renew/Rehire

The School District first argues that Haytayan failed to

exhaust administrative remedies on her failure to rehire claim

because it was not included in her Charge of Discrimination. The

School District maintains that the failure to rehire claim is

distinct from Haytayan's non-renewal claim, which was included in

the Charge, because the contract renewal process is different

from the coach hiring process. However, the School District's

proffered reason for not renewing or rehiring Haytayan is that

- 5 - she failed to follow the proper procedures with regard to her

performance evaluation. I conclude, as the Superior Court did,

that the non-renewal and failure to rehire claims are closely

related and arise out of the same set of facts that was

investigated by the Commission. Thus, Haytayan has fulfilled the

reguirement of exhausting her administrative remedies. See Jorge

v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 565 (1st Cir. 2005); Clockedile v. New

Hampshire Dept, of Corr., 245 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001) .

The real issue here is whether the School District's

proffered reason for not renewing Haytayan's contract and not

rehiring her is a pretext for sex discrimination. The School

District claims that Haytayan failed to comply with its policies

by refusing to meet with Davis to discuss her evaluation.

Haytayan maintains that she agreed to meet with Davis in the

presence of Patrick Corbin, former principal of the high school,

and she was waiting for Corbin to set up the meeting. Corbin's

sworn testimony is that he spoke with Haytayan about setting up a

meeting with Davis, she said something to the effect of "I'll get

back to you," and he never heard back from her. Corbin Aff. 5 4.

Because there is a genuine factual dispute over whether Haytayan

- 6 - refused to meet with Davis, I cannot conclude as a matter of law

that the School District's proffered reason for not hiring her is

not pretext. There is also a factual dispute as to whether the

School District made a bona fide offer to hire Haytayan's female

assistant as the new head coach before ultimately offering the

position to a man. Thus, the School District is not entitled to

summary judgment on this issue.

III. CONCLUSION

The School District's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.

6) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro__________ Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

January 3, 2006

cc: Ellen Purcell, Esg. James M. McNamee, Jr., Esg.

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