IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-872
Filed 7 January 2026
Guilford County, No. 24CVD520133-400
RYAN LYNN HAYS, Plaintiff,
v.
MATTHEW THOMAS LEWIS, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 7 June 2024 by Judge Larry L. Archie
in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2025.
Beacon Legal PLLC, by Gavin J. Reardon, for defendant-appellant.
Bullock Clay & Furr, PLLC, by Jessica S. Bullock, for plaintiff-appellee.
STADING, Judge.
Matthew Thomas Lewis (“Defendant”) appeals from entry of a domestic
violence protective order (“DVPO”). Defendant contends the trial court exceeded its
authority by entering the DVPO with a statutorily impermissible expiration date.
After careful consideration, we affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Background
Ryan Lynn Hays (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant “are persons of the opposite sex
who are not married but live together” and share two minor children. The record
tends to show that the parties’ relationship ended after Defendant made “some
threats” to Plaintiff. In response, on 8 March 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint HAYS V. LEWIS
Opinion of the Court
requesting a DVPO against Defendant. That same day, the trial court granted
Plaintiff’s request for ex parte relief. The ex parte DVPO stated it “shall be effective
until” 15 March 2024—the date scheduled for a hearing after notice to Defendant and
an opportunity to be heard concerning whether the trial court should grant or deny
Plaintiff’s action “for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year” under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50B-3 (2023).
On 15 March 2024, Defendant moved for a continuance. The trial court
granted Defendant’s motion and ordered that the ex parte DVPO remain in effect
until the new hearing date of 28 March 2024. On the next hearing date, Defendant
again moved for a continuance. The trial court also granted this motion and ordered
that the ex parte DVPO remain in effect until the new hearing date of 25 April 2024.
Plaintiff thereafter moved for the disqualification of Defendant’s attorney, citing a
conflict of interest. On 25 April 2024, Plaintiff’s motion was heard, and following
admonishment to Defendant’s attorney for the conflict, Defendant requested his
attorney to withdraw and moved for a third continuance. Again, the trial court
granted Defendant’s motion for a continuance and ordered that the ex parte DVPO
remain in effect until the new hearing date of 6 June 2024.
On 30 April 2024, Defendant moved for relief under North Carolina Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) and “sanctions OR (in the alternative) . . . for attorneys fees.”
Defendant requested the trial court to set aside the ex parte DVPO and attached an
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affidavit of “a close friend to the parties.” The trial court ordered Defendant’s motion
to be heard in conjunction with the DVPO on the next court date.
The trial court conducted a hearing on 7 June 2024, and found: “On [or] about
March 24, Defendant threaten[ed] to ass[a]ult [ ] Plaintiff. Defendant has a long
history of threatening and placing the Plaintiff in fear [of] imminent serious bodily
injury. March 7[ ] the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff 84 times with threats to her
livelihood, and employment.” Thus, the trial court concluded, inter alia, that “[t]he
defendant committed an act of domestic violence against the plaintiff,” and “[t]here
is danger of serious and immediate injury to the plaintiff.” And so, effective until 6
June 2025, the trial court ordered, among other things, Defendant “shall not commit
any further acts of domestic violence or make any threats of domestic violence,” and
“shall have no contact” with Plaintiff. It also ordered Defendant to “not assault,
threaten, abuse, follow, harass . . . , or interfere with” Plaintiff, nor to “interfere with
the minor children residing with” Plaintiff. Additionally, the trial court granted
Plaintiff “possession of . . . the parties’ residence,” and “custody of the minor children,”
but granted Defendant visitation.
On 27 June 2024, Defendant filed his notice of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2) (2023)
(“[A]ppeal lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals in any of the following cases . . .
[f]rom any final judgment of a district court in a civil action.”).
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III. Analysis
Defendant asks our Court to consider whether the trial court exceeded its
authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3 in ordering the DVPO effective until 6 June
2025 since an ex parte DVPO was entered before 7 June 2024. He contends N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50B-3 prohibits the combined length of the two DVPOs since it exceeds one
year. Thus, the core of this appeal is the meaning and applicability of the time
limitations set forth in the North Carolina Domestic Violence Act, codified in Chapter
50B of the North Carolina General Statutes. We are therefore tasked with
interpreting the statute and determining its applicability to this matter.
Defendant presents a novel question of statutory construction. “Questions of
statutory interpretation are ultimately questions of law for the courts and are
reviewed de novo.” In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612, 616,
684 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2009). “Our primary goal in construing a statute is ‘to ensure
that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.’” Wynn v.
Frederick, 385 N.C. 576, 581, 895 S.E.2d 371, 377 (2023) (quoting Elec. Supply Co. v.
Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991)). To accomplish this
task, “we first look to the plain meaning of the statute.” In re Summons Issued to
Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. at 616, 684 S.E.2d at 154 (quoting Frye Reg’l Med.
Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 45, 510 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1999)). “Where the language
of a statute is clear, the courts must give the statute its plain meaning; however,
where the statute is ambiguous or unclear as to its meaning, the courts must
-4- HAYS V. LEWIS
interpret the statute to give effect to the legislative intent.” Id. Our application of
the plain meaning rule requires us to “consider the context in which the statutory
words are used because ‘[w]e do not . . . construe statutory phrases in isolation; we
read statutes as a whole.’” Ayes v. United States VA, 473 F.3d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S. Ct. 2769 (1984)). If the
text at issue is unambiguous, then our “judicial inquiry is complete.” Id. (quoting
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992)).
“Our General Assembly enacted the Domestic Violence Act, N.C.G.S. Chapter
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-872
Filed 7 January 2026
Guilford County, No. 24CVD520133-400
RYAN LYNN HAYS, Plaintiff,
v.
MATTHEW THOMAS LEWIS, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 7 June 2024 by Judge Larry L. Archie
in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2025.
Beacon Legal PLLC, by Gavin J. Reardon, for defendant-appellant.
Bullock Clay & Furr, PLLC, by Jessica S. Bullock, for plaintiff-appellee.
STADING, Judge.
Matthew Thomas Lewis (“Defendant”) appeals from entry of a domestic
violence protective order (“DVPO”). Defendant contends the trial court exceeded its
authority by entering the DVPO with a statutorily impermissible expiration date.
After careful consideration, we affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Background
Ryan Lynn Hays (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant “are persons of the opposite sex
who are not married but live together” and share two minor children. The record
tends to show that the parties’ relationship ended after Defendant made “some
threats” to Plaintiff. In response, on 8 March 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint HAYS V. LEWIS
Opinion of the Court
requesting a DVPO against Defendant. That same day, the trial court granted
Plaintiff’s request for ex parte relief. The ex parte DVPO stated it “shall be effective
until” 15 March 2024—the date scheduled for a hearing after notice to Defendant and
an opportunity to be heard concerning whether the trial court should grant or deny
Plaintiff’s action “for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year” under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50B-3 (2023).
On 15 March 2024, Defendant moved for a continuance. The trial court
granted Defendant’s motion and ordered that the ex parte DVPO remain in effect
until the new hearing date of 28 March 2024. On the next hearing date, Defendant
again moved for a continuance. The trial court also granted this motion and ordered
that the ex parte DVPO remain in effect until the new hearing date of 25 April 2024.
Plaintiff thereafter moved for the disqualification of Defendant’s attorney, citing a
conflict of interest. On 25 April 2024, Plaintiff’s motion was heard, and following
admonishment to Defendant’s attorney for the conflict, Defendant requested his
attorney to withdraw and moved for a third continuance. Again, the trial court
granted Defendant’s motion for a continuance and ordered that the ex parte DVPO
remain in effect until the new hearing date of 6 June 2024.
On 30 April 2024, Defendant moved for relief under North Carolina Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) and “sanctions OR (in the alternative) . . . for attorneys fees.”
Defendant requested the trial court to set aside the ex parte DVPO and attached an
-2- HAYS V. LEWIS
affidavit of “a close friend to the parties.” The trial court ordered Defendant’s motion
to be heard in conjunction with the DVPO on the next court date.
The trial court conducted a hearing on 7 June 2024, and found: “On [or] about
March 24, Defendant threaten[ed] to ass[a]ult [ ] Plaintiff. Defendant has a long
history of threatening and placing the Plaintiff in fear [of] imminent serious bodily
injury. March 7[ ] the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff 84 times with threats to her
livelihood, and employment.” Thus, the trial court concluded, inter alia, that “[t]he
defendant committed an act of domestic violence against the plaintiff,” and “[t]here
is danger of serious and immediate injury to the plaintiff.” And so, effective until 6
June 2025, the trial court ordered, among other things, Defendant “shall not commit
any further acts of domestic violence or make any threats of domestic violence,” and
“shall have no contact” with Plaintiff. It also ordered Defendant to “not assault,
threaten, abuse, follow, harass . . . , or interfere with” Plaintiff, nor to “interfere with
the minor children residing with” Plaintiff. Additionally, the trial court granted
Plaintiff “possession of . . . the parties’ residence,” and “custody of the minor children,”
but granted Defendant visitation.
On 27 June 2024, Defendant filed his notice of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2) (2023)
(“[A]ppeal lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals in any of the following cases . . .
[f]rom any final judgment of a district court in a civil action.”).
-3- HAYS V. LEWIS
III. Analysis
Defendant asks our Court to consider whether the trial court exceeded its
authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3 in ordering the DVPO effective until 6 June
2025 since an ex parte DVPO was entered before 7 June 2024. He contends N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50B-3 prohibits the combined length of the two DVPOs since it exceeds one
year. Thus, the core of this appeal is the meaning and applicability of the time
limitations set forth in the North Carolina Domestic Violence Act, codified in Chapter
50B of the North Carolina General Statutes. We are therefore tasked with
interpreting the statute and determining its applicability to this matter.
Defendant presents a novel question of statutory construction. “Questions of
statutory interpretation are ultimately questions of law for the courts and are
reviewed de novo.” In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612, 616,
684 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2009). “Our primary goal in construing a statute is ‘to ensure
that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.’” Wynn v.
Frederick, 385 N.C. 576, 581, 895 S.E.2d 371, 377 (2023) (quoting Elec. Supply Co. v.
Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991)). To accomplish this
task, “we first look to the plain meaning of the statute.” In re Summons Issued to
Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. at 616, 684 S.E.2d at 154 (quoting Frye Reg’l Med.
Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 45, 510 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1999)). “Where the language
of a statute is clear, the courts must give the statute its plain meaning; however,
where the statute is ambiguous or unclear as to its meaning, the courts must
-4- HAYS V. LEWIS
interpret the statute to give effect to the legislative intent.” Id. Our application of
the plain meaning rule requires us to “consider the context in which the statutory
words are used because ‘[w]e do not . . . construe statutory phrases in isolation; we
read statutes as a whole.’” Ayes v. United States VA, 473 F.3d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S. Ct. 2769 (1984)). If the
text at issue is unambiguous, then our “judicial inquiry is complete.” Id. (quoting
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992)).
“Our General Assembly enacted the Domestic Violence Act, N.C.G.S. Chapter
50B, to respond to the serious and invisible problem of domestic violence.” State v.
Elder, 368 N.C. 70, 72, 773 S.E.2d 51, 53 (2015) (citation modified) (quoting Augur v.
Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 591, 573 S.E.2d 125, 132 (2002)). The North Carolina Domestic
Violence Act proscribes the procedural framework for issuance of protective orders.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 et seq. Defendant claims the time limitations imposed
by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b) “must include any period in which there was an ex parte
order. . . .” That subsection provides:
Protective orders entered pursuant to this Chapter shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year. The court may renew a protective order for a fixed period of time not to exceed two years, including an order that previously has been renewed, upon a motion by the aggrieved party filed before the expiration of the current order; provided, however, that a temporary award of custody entered as part of a protective order may not be renewed to extend a temporary award of custody beyond the maximum one-year period.
-5- HAYS V. LEWIS
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b). We thus begin our analysis by considering the plain
meaning of the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b) to effectively apply the statute as written.
See Wynn, 385 N.C. at 581, 895 S.E.2d at 377.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Defendant contends the “start” date for “a fixed period of time not to exceed one
year” for a DVPO entered under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b) cannot be determined “by
the express terms of the Act.” Further, Defendant argues “[t]he one[-]year period in
§ 50B-3(b) should be narrowly construed to include any period in which there was an
ex parte order under G.S. § 50B-2.” First looking to the plain meaning of the statute
reveals Defendant’s argument as defective.
The provision at issue states: “Protective orders entered pursuant to this
Chapter shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50B-3(b). “When construing a statute, we first examine the plain words of the statute,
as the best indicia of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself.” Wynn,
385 N.C. at 581, 895 S.E.2d at 377 (cleaned up). “If the plain language of the statute
is unambiguous, we ‘apply the statute[ ] as written.’” Id. (quoting N.C. Dep’t of
Correction v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 202, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009)).
Although “the substantive protective provisions of any type of protective order
are addressed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3,” Rudder, 234 N.C. App. at 183, 759 S.E.2d
at 328, this Court recognizes a distinction between ex parte DVPOs and DVPOs
entered only after notice to the defendant and an opportunity to participate in a full
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adversarial hearing. See, e.g., id. at 173, 182–83, 759 S.E.2d 321, 328 (noting an ex
parte DVPO is intended to address a threat of imminent harm while “the one-year
DVPO is entered only after notice to the defendant and an opportunity to participate
in a full adversarial hearing . . . to address issues for a longer time period. . . .”); see
also, Hensey v. Hennessy, 201 N.C. App. 56, 63, 685 S.E.2d 541, 547 (2009). As
explained by this Court in Hensey, ex parte DVPOs and DVPOs entered only after
notice and an opportunity to be heard are “independent of one another. . . .” 201 N.C.
App. at 66, 685 S.E.2d at 548 (emphasis added). These orders are distinct—a DVPO
entered after notice and an opportunity to be heard is not merely an extension of an
existing ex parte DVPO; it is entered independently of the ex parte DVPO and
separately by the trial court only after an adversarial hearing, or by consent of the
parties. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(c)(5) (2023); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b1)
(2023). Therefore, the plain meaning of “[p]rotective orders entered pursuant to this
Chapter” places a limitation “of time not to exceed one year” beginning upon the of
issuance of a DVPO entered after notice and an opportunity to be heard and does not
include the time encompassed by an ex parte DVPO. Id. § 50B-3(b).
Furthermore, considering the applicability of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b) within
the context of the Domestic Violence Act illustrates why Defendant’s urged reading
of the statute is the product of viewing a particular subsection through an overly
narrow aperture. Our Court “does not read segments of a statute in isolation.” Rhyne
v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 188, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004). “Context is a primary
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determinant of meaning. A legal instrument typically contains many interrelated
parts that make up the whole. The entirety of the document thus provides the context
for each of its parts.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012).
Our analysis must therefore account for another subsection in the Domestic
Violence Act specifically addressing the time limitations imposed on ex parte DVPOs:
Upon the issuance of an ex parte order under this subsection, a hearing shall be held within 10 days from the date of issuance of the order or within seven days from the date of service of process on the other party, whichever occurs later. A continuance shall be limited to one extension of no more than 10 days unless all parties consent or good cause is shown. The hearing shall have priority on the court calendar.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(c)(5). The legislature provided particularized safeguards
within the text of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(c)(5), precisely addressing Defendant’s
concerns. That subsection demands that continuances “shall be limited to one
extension of no more than 10 days unless all parties consent or good cause is shown.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(c)(5) (emphasis added). And, “[t]he hearing shall have
priority on the court calendar.” Id.
Here, Defendant bears responsibility for the majority of the delay of which he
now complains. Save the time initially set forth in the ex parte DVPO until its
expiration—one week, the record shows each instance of the trial court’s granting a
continuance of the ex parte DVPO was due to Defendant’s request. The built-in
-8- HAYS V. LEWIS
procedural protections of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(c)(5) were designed by the
legislature to save litigants in Defendant’s position from unnecessarily prolonged ex
parte DVPOs. We do not believe it an accident, but by thoughtful design, that the
legislature included language in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(c)(5) carefully limiting the
length of ex parte DVPOs separately from the one-year limitation contained in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b).
Our adoption of Defendant’s urged reading of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b) would
ignore the limitations already provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(c)(5). Reading both
subsections together shows a statutory scheme calculated to limit the total length of
the process as a whole. We thus decline to “superimpose[ ] provisions and limitations
not contained” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b). In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244
S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1978). Considering the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-
3(b), in context, further compels us to hold that a DVPO entered after notice and an
opportunity to be heard is not merely an extension of a previously entered ex parte
DVPO entered under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2; it is an independent, separately issued
protective order entered “for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 50B-3(b).
B. Rudder
Defendant contends his position is suggested by this Court’s opinion in Rudder
v. Rudder, 234 N.C. App. 173, 759 S.E.2d 321 (2014). We first note that Rudder dealt
with whether a trial court lost jurisdiction to enter a DVPO under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
-9- HAYS V. LEWIS
50B-3, after an ex parte DVPO, entered under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2, had expired
before the hearing and more than one year had passed since its issuance. 234 N.C.
App. at 184, 759 S.E.2d at 329 (“Based upon the orders entered continuing the ex
parte DVPO and setting this matter for hearing, upon expiration of the ex parte order
after more than a year, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction . . . to enter an order
further extending the DVPO.”).
The ruling in Rudder does not suggest the time limitations of a DVPO entered
after notice and an opportunity to be heard should incorporate a previously issued ex
parte DVPO. In fact, the Rudder opinion consistently referred to a DVPO entered
after notice and an opportunity to be heard as a “one-year DVPO.” 234 N.C. App.
173, 759 S.E.2d 321. And contrary to Defendant’s contention, the Rudder opinion
contemplates that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2 “addresses the procedure and time
limitations for ex parte or temporary orders, while the substantive protective
provisions of any type of protective order are addressed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3,
and the time limitations of the one-year DVPO are addressed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-
3(b).” Id. at 183, 759 S.E.2d at 328 (emphasis added). The Rudder Court declined to
hold that ex parte DVPOs necessarily expire after one year when repeatedly
continued. Id. at 184, 759 S.E.2d at 329 (“Even if we assume, without deciding, that
an ex parte DVPO may lawfully continue for more than a year through the
mechanism of repeated continuances, in this case, the ex parte DVPO ultimately
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expired . . . when no order was entered continuing the ex parte DVPO in effect after
that date.”). Defendant’s reliance on Rudder is therefore misguided.
IV. Conclusion
The trial court did not exceed its statutory authority since the one-year time
limitation imposed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(b) does not include the time that an ex
parte DVPO, entered under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2, was in effect.
AFFIRMED.
Judges FLOOD and MURRY concur.
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