Hays County, Texas, Ruben Becerra, Debbie Ingalsbe, Michelle Cohen, Morgan Hammer, and Walt Smith, in Their Official Capacities v. Leslie Carnes, Jim Camp, Cathy Ramsey, Gabrielle Moore, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas
Opinion
ACCEPTED
15-25-00121-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/21/2025 12:48 PM
NO. 15-25-00121-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, 15TH DISTRICT15th OF TEXAS
COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS, RUBEN BECERRA, DEBBIE INGALSBE, MICHELLE COHEN, MORGAN HAMMER, AND WALT SMITH, APPELLANTS
V.
LESLIE CARNES, JIM CAMP, CATHY RAMSEY, AND GABRIELLE MOORE, APPELLEES
ON APPEAL FROM THE 419TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-25-002049 THE HON. CATHERINE A. MAUZY, PRESIDING
APPELLEES’ RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSED DENIAL OF TRANSFER
BILL ALESHIRE SAVE OUR SPRINGS ALLIANCE BAR NO. 24031810 WILLIAM G. BUNCH ALESHIRELAW, P.C. STATE BAR NO. 03342520 3605 SHADY VALLEY DR. BILL@SOSALLIANCE.ORG AUSTIN, TEXAS 78739 ROBERT “BOBBY” LEVINSKI TELEPHONE: (512) 320-9155 STATE BAR NO. 24097993 CELL: (512) 750-5854 BOBBY@SOSALLIANCE.ORG FACSIMILE: (512) 320-9156 4701 WESTGATE BLVD., D-401 BILL@ALESHIRELAW.COM AUSTIN, TX 78745 TEL: 512-477-2320
FAX: 512-477-6410
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Appellees submit this response to the Court’s letter of November 14, 2025, regarding the Court’s majority proposed denial of the transfer of this case to the 3rd Court of Appeals. Appellees contend the Court lacks exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction because the Appellants’ bond validation lawsuit was not “against” the Texas Attorney General.
INTRODUCTION
The sole issue on the merits in this appeal is whether Hays County Commissioners Court violated the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA, Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 551) and the trial court correctly reversed and voided the Order calling the bond election and granted Appellees’ election contest. The jurisdictional issue for this Court is whether the case is “against” the Texas Attorney General.
The Attorney General was tangentially involved in the proceeding below because Hays County responded to Appellees/Plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleging the TOMA violation with a bond-validation lawsuit under Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 1205. As opposed to being a party litigant, the Attorney
Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
General’s role in the bond-validation case was to provide information and legal analysis to the trial court focused on the validity of the bonds. This is demonstrated by the Prayer in the Attorney General’s pleading, asking only that the Court “enter such order as may be proper.” The Attorney General has filed a waiver of submitting a brief in this appeal.
This Court’s preliminary decision (Justice Field dissenting) that it has jurisdiction displaces the 3rd Court of Appeals, the appellate court with jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a district court’s judgment under TOMA against a local governmental body within the 3rd Court’s appellate district—which is what this appeal actually is.
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
THE STATUTE AT ISSUE AND THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO NOT DEMONSTRATE JURISDICTION FOR THE 15TH COURT OF APPEALS.
In this Court’s letter of November 14, 2025 at page 2, the Court said, “Whether a suit falls within this exclusive jurisdiction provision depends on the terms of any governing statute and the facts in each case.” (emphasis added). Appellees do not disagree with that statement. The governing statute involved is the Texas Open Meetings Act—over which this Court would have jurisdiction only if a state governmental body was
Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer accused of violating the Act. The facts of this case all revolve around compliance with TOMA and do not involve any claim against any state official or office. Therefore, even if this Court believes that EDJA lawsuits are generally within its jurisdiction, it may well decide that given the law and facts at issue now in this appeal, the Court lacks jurisdiction.
THIS CASE IS NOT “AGAINST” THE TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL
This Court—instead of the 3rd Court of Appeals—has exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction in this case only if the bond- validation lawsuit was brought “against” the Texas Attorney General under the Expedited Declaratory Judgment Act (EDJA). See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.220(d)(1). In construing the EDJA use of the word “against,” there are several principles that guide the Court. “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011. As the Supreme Court said:
Generally, we will accept the words used according to their ordinary meaning, unless given a specific statutory definition;
we will not give them an exaggerated, forced, or constrained meaning. Also, we will presume that the Legislature used every word of a statute for a purpose. Finally, we will try to
Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer avoid construing a statutory provision in isolation from the rest of the statute; we should consider the act as a whole, and not just single phrases, clauses, or sentences.
Cities of Austin, Dallas, Ft. Worth & Hereford v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 92
S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex. 2002).
“Against” is not a term defined in the statute, so the Court applies its common meaning. “The word ‘against’ means ‘in opposition or hostility to[.]’ Note Inv. Group, Inc. v. Associates First Capital Corp., 476 S.W.3d 463, 477 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2015, no pet.)(citing, Against, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988); see also Indem. Ins. Co. v. City of Garland, 258 S.W.3d 262, 269 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)(citing The New Oxford American Dictionary 29 (1st ed. 2001) as defining “against” as “in opposition to.”); see https://thelawdictionary.org/against/ defining “against” as “adverse to; contrary; opposed to; without the consent of; in contact with.”
If the Legislature had intended to give this Court even broader jurisdiction, it could have used words in the jurisdictional statute, Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.220(d) to do so. For example, instead of giving this Court jurisdiction solely over matters brought “against” state personnel, the
Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
Legislature could have also included any matter in which state personnel “participate”; or where it would be “bound by the judgment”; or any case in which the Attorney General “must be served notice” with the petition. Or the Legislature could easily have provided this Court with jurisdiction over all appeals of EDJA lawsuits. But that is not the choice the Legislature made.
The Court’s jurisdictional statute does not contain language giving the Court broad jurisdiction, such as over cases considered “critical to the State’s interests.” See Court’s 11/14/25 Letter, page 4. For example, challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes are certainly critical to the State’s interests, but Tex. Gov’t Code §22.220(d)(2) does not even give this Court jurisdiction over all cases challenging the constitutionality or validity of a state statute or rule; only those where “the attorney general is a party to the case.” See e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §37.006(b); the statute requires that the Attorney General be served with a “copy of the proceedings” and that the Attorney General is entitled to be heard. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.006; Nabelek v. Bradford, No. 01-02-00359-CR, 2003 WL 1937200, at *2 (Tex.
Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 24, 2003, no pet.)(noting that in such cases, the Attorney General is entitled to be heard but does not require that the Attorney General be made a party defendant.). Thus, this Court does not have jurisdiction unless the Attorney General intervenes in the lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of state laws or rules.
This Court should not assert jurisdiction beyond the plain language in its jurisdictional statute. The Legislature restricted this Court’s jurisdiction to suits “brought [ ] against” the state, and the EDJA is not such a case.
EDJA lawsuits are not brought “in opposition to” or in “hostility to”
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Hays County, Texas, Ruben Becerra, Debbie Ingalsbe, Michelle Cohen, Morgan Hammer, and Walt Smith, in Their Official Capacities v. Leslie Carnes, Jim Camp, Cathy Ramsey, Gabrielle Moore, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas (Hays County, Texas, Ruben Becerra, Debbie Ingalsbe, Michelle Cohen, Morgan Hammer, and Walt Smith, in Their Official Capacities v. Leslie Carnes, Jim Camp, Cathy Ramsey, Gabrielle Moore, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.