Haynes v. Mick

Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 CLAY VINSON HAYNES, CASE NO. C22-5688-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 MICK, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend a judgment 16 (Dkt. No. 51). Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the 17 Court DENIES the motion for the reasons explained herein. 18 In the instant matter, Plaintiff sued several state employees, asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 19 claim based on alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 4–11.) 20 Plaintiff first filed a grievance with the Washington Department of Corrections, asserting a lack 21 of adequate medical care, specifically the failure to provide him with his CPAP machine. (Dkt. 22 No. 44 at 12.) The grievance was terminated, though, as, by Plaintiff’s own admission, the CPAP 23 machine was returned to him. (Dkt. No. 44 at 12.) Dissatisfied with this outcome, Plaintiff 24 brought the instant suit. (See generally Dkt. No. 4.) Defendants moved for summary judgment, 25 arguing that Plaintiff failed to completely exhaust his administrative remedies and thus was 26 barred from bringing the action. (See Dkt. No. 33 at 11.) Over Defendant’s objections, this Court 1 adopted the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of the Honorable Grady J. Leupold, United 2 States Magistrate Judge, and dismissed the case without prejudice. (See Dkt. No. 47.) 3 Plaintiff now asks the Court to amend its judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 4 Procedure 59(e), asserting the judgment represents plain error and constitutes “manifest 5 injustice.” (Dkt. No. 51.) A Rule 59(e) motion is appropriate if the Court committed “clear error” 6 or “is presented with newly discovered evidence,” or “if there is an intervening change in the 7 controlling law.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999). But this is an 8 “extraordinary remedy” and should be “used sparingly.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 9 (9th Cir. 2003). “A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence 10 for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id. The 11 Court addresses below Plaintiff’s misapprehensions and errors, which appear to form the basis of 12 his motion. 13 Plaintiff first argues that Defendants’ “failure to exhaust” argument is frivolous, citing an 14 instruction in the Resolution Program Manual (“manual”) that provides “[i]ndividuals are not 15 required to exhaust the resolution process prior to filing a tort claim.” (Dkt. No. 51 at 2.) 16 According to Plaintiff, Defendants knew or should have known this provision in the manual 17 absolved Plaintiff from exhausting the resolution process before filing a tort claim, so raising this 18 defense must be frivolous. (Id.) He argues amending the order is the only way to correct a clear 19 error of law. (Dkt. No. 51 at 1–2.) 20 Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. Indeed, the timing of Plaintiff’s resolution in relation 21 to his state tort claim was never at issue in this § 1983 case. (See Dkt. No. 53 at 2.) That the 22 manual does not require exhaustion prior to filing a state tort claim does not bear on whether 23 Plaintiff properly exhausted his separate § 1983 claim. As Judge Leupold explained and this 24 Court reiterated, Plaintiff’s may not count his use of the tort claim process as proper exhaustion 25 in the instant case. (See Dkt. Nos. 43 at 12, 47 at 2.) The indisputable reality is that Plaintiff, in 26 failing to appeal his resolution request, did not fully exhaust his resolution prior to filing this suit. 1 Therefore, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Court committed clear error in dismissing 2 Plaintiff’s case for failure to exhaust. 3 Plaintiff next argues Defendants submitted fraudulent documents to the Court. (Dkt. No 4 51 at 2.)1 Specifically, he claims Defendants submitted two versions of the resolution request 5 (i.e., the grievance) he filed with DOC, one of which included an altered date and signature. 6 (Dkt. Nos. 49 at 10–13, 51 at 2.) But as Defendants explain (and Plaintiff fails to dispute), the 7 submitted documents do not suggest “fraud” but instead show that Plaintiff’s resolution request 8 proceeded through both the emergency and regular resolution processes, consistent with the 9 manual. (See Dkt. No. 53 at 3.) Regardless, Plaintiff makes this argument for the first time in this 10 motion and cites no reason he could not have made it during the summary judgment phase or in 11 his objections to the R&R. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 41, 45.) “A Rule 59(e) motion may not be 12 used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have 13 been raised earlier in the litigation.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). 14 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to amend judgment (Dkt. No. 51) is 15 DENIED. 16 DATED this 20th day of October 2023. A 17 18 19 John C. Coughenour 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 1 Plaintiff’s motion is vague on this issue, but a previous, stricken motion provides additional 26 details regarding the basis for this argument. (See Dkt. No. 49.)