Brogden, J.
Is the owner of a milk wagon liable for the negligence of the driver thereof, causing injury to a nine-year-old boy, employed by the driver to assist him, or permitted to ride on the wagon or get in and out of it, all in violation of the express rules duly prescribed by the owner ?
The judge charged the jury as follows: “So, if upon the testimony you find from the evidence and by its greater weight that on the occasion alleged, 30 December, 1925, the defendant, Pine State Creamery, was engaged in selling and delivering milk from a milk wagon drawn by a horse driven by the defendant’s servant, employee and driver, and that the defendant’s said driver requested or permitted and used the assistance of the plaintiff, a boy between 9 and 10 years of age in delivering bottles of milk and collecting milk bottles and putting them back in tbe wagon, and you find from the evidence and by its greater weight that on said date while so engaged and while tbe plaintiff was attempting to put an empty bottle back in the wagon, and tbe wagon was in motion, and the plaintiff fell under the wheel of the wagon and was run over and injured, and you find that the defendant’s driver was in the wagon at the time and saw, or by the exercise of due care could have seen what the plaintiff was attempting to do and failed by the exercise of due care to avoid it, and you find by tbe greater weight of tbe evidence that tbe defendant’s said driver was at tbe time acting within tbe scope of bis employment and was engaged in doing work in furtherance of defendant’s business, and that bis acts in relation to these facts were such as were incident to tbe performancé of tbe duties entrusted to bim by tbe defendant, and you find from tbe evidence and by its greater weight that tbe defendant failed to exercise due care with respect to these circumstances to avoid injury to tbe plaintiff, and that such failure on tbe defendant’s part was tbe proximate cause of tbe plaintiff’s injury, you will answer tbe first issue yes, otherwise answer it no.”
The driver of the milk wagon was employed for the performance of a simple and definite task. He was merely a hired man or a laborer and no more. The undisputed evidence on behalf of defendant is to the effect that the driver was expressly forbidden, by the rules of the company, to employ boys or to permit them to ride on the wagon. Was the driver then acting within the scope of bis employment when be permitted the plaintiff to assist bim or to ride upon the wagon? An employer has the right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to be observed by bis employees for the safe and prudent operation of bis business. So long as these rules are in force the employee, certainly, if no more than a hired man or laborer, is not acting within the scope of bis employment when he undertakes, in direct violation of such rules, to employ additional help or assistance in the performance of bis duties,
unless of course additional belp or assistance is sucb an incident of the duty to be performed as to fairly imply that the employer authorized such employment. Driving a one-horse wagon and placing a bottle of milk upon a customer’s porch and returning any empty milk bottle to the wagon is not. such a duty as to ordinarily require, as a reasonable or necessary incident thereto, the employment of additional help or assistance.
The principle of law involved is thus expressed by
Hoke, J.,
in
Butner v. Lumber Co.,
180 N. C., 612: “So far as appears, he had no authority to invite any one into the mill contrary to the rules of the company, nor did he have any right to dispose of these edgings to outsiders, and in such case our decisions are to the effect that liability may not be imputed to the owners and proprietors by reason of his speech or conduct on this occasion, the same being entirely outside of the course and scope of his employment.”
But, was the rule of the company forbidding drivers to employ or to permit boys to ride upon the wagon in force at the time of the injury ? The test for determining whether or not a rule is in force is thus declared in
Fry v. Utilities Co.,
183 N. C., 281: “It has been held generally that if a rule is made for the safety of the servant or others, but its customary violation has continued so long that the master either knew of it, or could by the exercise of ordinary care have found it out and acquiesced in it, he is presumed to have consented to its repeal or to have waived obedience to it. . . . If such orders were given, the plaintiff surely was entitled to show that it had been constantly violated for a long time, with the knowledge of the drivers and those in charge of the wagon, from which the jury could well infer that the owner of the wagon had notice of its nonobservance, and that it was an order of the company more honored in the breach than in the observance, and, in legal contemplation, it had been abrogated, or at least waived.”
The decisions are to the effect that if the rule has been openly, constantly and habitually violated for such a length of time that the employer in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence should have been apprised and informed of its nonobservance, then the rule is deemed to be waived or abrogated and no longer protects the employer from liability arising from the unauthorized acts of the employee. Whether or not the rule has been thus abrogated or waived is ordinarily a question for the jury.
The decisions from other jurisdictions present a diversity of opinion. Many of the leading authorities upon the subject are assembled in the opinion, concurring opinion and dissenting opinion in the case of
Higbee Co. v. Jackson,
128 N. E., 61. In that ease the Supreme Court of Ohio holds, as stated in the first head-note that “where an employee,
to whom the owner has committed the operation of an auto truck in the owner’s business, permits an infant to ride on the truck in violation of his instructions, and the infant is injured by the wanton and wilful conduct of the employee, while in the course and in the scope of bis employment, the owner is responsible.” Tbe theory upon which the opinion rests is that an infant who climbs upon a truck in violation of the orders or rules of the employer is a trespasser; and, although a trespasser, the employer is liable for the wilful and wanton negligence of bis servant, the driver. Tbe dissenting opinion asserts that the act of a driver in inviting a third party to ride upon a truck or wagon in violation of' the express orders of the owner is entirely outside the scope of employment of the driver, and therefore imposes no liability upon the owner, citing among other cases
Dover v. Mfg. Co.,
157 N. C., 324.
The New York Court of Appeals, in tbe case of
Goldberg v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co.,
125 N. E., p. 807, holds: “Where a„driver, acting contrary to express orders, invites a boy to ride on bis wagon, which is started so suddenly that the boy is thrown off and injured, the employer is not liable for the injuries.” The reason assigned for this bolding is that the act of the driver in inviting the boy to ride, in violation of the rules of the company, was wholly outside the scope of the employment of the driver. To the same effect is
Rolfe v. Hewitt,
125 N. E., 804. It is to be observed, however, that in the
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Brogden, J.
Is the owner of a milk wagon liable for the negligence of the driver thereof, causing injury to a nine-year-old boy, employed by the driver to assist him, or permitted to ride on the wagon or get in and out of it, all in violation of the express rules duly prescribed by the owner ?
The judge charged the jury as follows: “So, if upon the testimony you find from the evidence and by its greater weight that on the occasion alleged, 30 December, 1925, the defendant, Pine State Creamery, was engaged in selling and delivering milk from a milk wagon drawn by a horse driven by the defendant’s servant, employee and driver, and that the defendant’s said driver requested or permitted and used the assistance of the plaintiff, a boy between 9 and 10 years of age in delivering bottles of milk and collecting milk bottles and putting them back in tbe wagon, and you find from the evidence and by its greater weight that on said date while so engaged and while tbe plaintiff was attempting to put an empty bottle back in the wagon, and tbe wagon was in motion, and the plaintiff fell under the wheel of the wagon and was run over and injured, and you find that the defendant’s driver was in the wagon at the time and saw, or by the exercise of due care could have seen what the plaintiff was attempting to do and failed by the exercise of due care to avoid it, and you find by tbe greater weight of tbe evidence that tbe defendant’s said driver was at tbe time acting within tbe scope of bis employment and was engaged in doing work in furtherance of defendant’s business, and that bis acts in relation to these facts were such as were incident to tbe performancé of tbe duties entrusted to bim by tbe defendant, and you find from tbe evidence and by its greater weight that tbe defendant failed to exercise due care with respect to these circumstances to avoid injury to tbe plaintiff, and that such failure on tbe defendant’s part was tbe proximate cause of tbe plaintiff’s injury, you will answer tbe first issue yes, otherwise answer it no.”
The driver of the milk wagon was employed for the performance of a simple and definite task. He was merely a hired man or a laborer and no more. The undisputed evidence on behalf of defendant is to the effect that the driver was expressly forbidden, by the rules of the company, to employ boys or to permit them to ride on the wagon. Was the driver then acting within the scope of bis employment when be permitted the plaintiff to assist bim or to ride upon the wagon? An employer has the right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to be observed by bis employees for the safe and prudent operation of bis business. So long as these rules are in force the employee, certainly, if no more than a hired man or laborer, is not acting within the scope of bis employment when he undertakes, in direct violation of such rules, to employ additional help or assistance in the performance of bis duties,
unless of course additional belp or assistance is sucb an incident of the duty to be performed as to fairly imply that the employer authorized such employment. Driving a one-horse wagon and placing a bottle of milk upon a customer’s porch and returning any empty milk bottle to the wagon is not. such a duty as to ordinarily require, as a reasonable or necessary incident thereto, the employment of additional help or assistance.
The principle of law involved is thus expressed by
Hoke, J.,
in
Butner v. Lumber Co.,
180 N. C., 612: “So far as appears, he had no authority to invite any one into the mill contrary to the rules of the company, nor did he have any right to dispose of these edgings to outsiders, and in such case our decisions are to the effect that liability may not be imputed to the owners and proprietors by reason of his speech or conduct on this occasion, the same being entirely outside of the course and scope of his employment.”
But, was the rule of the company forbidding drivers to employ or to permit boys to ride upon the wagon in force at the time of the injury ? The test for determining whether or not a rule is in force is thus declared in
Fry v. Utilities Co.,
183 N. C., 281: “It has been held generally that if a rule is made for the safety of the servant or others, but its customary violation has continued so long that the master either knew of it, or could by the exercise of ordinary care have found it out and acquiesced in it, he is presumed to have consented to its repeal or to have waived obedience to it. . . . If such orders were given, the plaintiff surely was entitled to show that it had been constantly violated for a long time, with the knowledge of the drivers and those in charge of the wagon, from which the jury could well infer that the owner of the wagon had notice of its nonobservance, and that it was an order of the company more honored in the breach than in the observance, and, in legal contemplation, it had been abrogated, or at least waived.”
The decisions are to the effect that if the rule has been openly, constantly and habitually violated for such a length of time that the employer in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence should have been apprised and informed of its nonobservance, then the rule is deemed to be waived or abrogated and no longer protects the employer from liability arising from the unauthorized acts of the employee. Whether or not the rule has been thus abrogated or waived is ordinarily a question for the jury.
The decisions from other jurisdictions present a diversity of opinion. Many of the leading authorities upon the subject are assembled in the opinion, concurring opinion and dissenting opinion in the case of
Higbee Co. v. Jackson,
128 N. E., 61. In that ease the Supreme Court of Ohio holds, as stated in the first head-note that “where an employee,
to whom the owner has committed the operation of an auto truck in the owner’s business, permits an infant to ride on the truck in violation of his instructions, and the infant is injured by the wanton and wilful conduct of the employee, while in the course and in the scope of bis employment, the owner is responsible.” Tbe theory upon which the opinion rests is that an infant who climbs upon a truck in violation of the orders or rules of the employer is a trespasser; and, although a trespasser, the employer is liable for the wilful and wanton negligence of bis servant, the driver. Tbe dissenting opinion asserts that the act of a driver in inviting a third party to ride upon a truck or wagon in violation of' the express orders of the owner is entirely outside the scope of employment of the driver, and therefore imposes no liability upon the owner, citing among other cases
Dover v. Mfg. Co.,
157 N. C., 324.
The New York Court of Appeals, in tbe case of
Goldberg v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co.,
125 N. E., p. 807, holds: “Where a„driver, acting contrary to express orders, invites a boy to ride on bis wagon, which is started so suddenly that the boy is thrown off and injured, the employer is not liable for the injuries.” The reason assigned for this bolding is that the act of the driver in inviting the boy to ride, in violation of the rules of the company, was wholly outside the scope of the employment of the driver. To the same effect is
Rolfe v. Hewitt,
125 N. E., 804. It is to be observed, however, that in the
Goldberg case, supra,
the question of habitual violation of the rule of the company was not mentioned or discussed, if such was a fact.
The whole proposition comes to this: If the driver was a mere laborer 'or hired man, employed to perform a simple and specific task, not reasonably requiring assistance as an incident to the performance of the task, and reasonably rules or regulations bad been duly adopted by the owner and communicated to the driver, forbidding the employment of boys of tender age, and forbidding the driver to permit such boys to ride upon or get in or out of the wagon, then, if such rule was in force at the time of the injury, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, because in so doing, under such circumstances, the driver was acting wholly without the scope of bis. employment. But if such rule bad been expressly waived or abrogated, or if the rule bad been openly, constantly or habitually violated for such length of time, that the employer in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, knew or should have known of such habitual nonobservance, then the rule is deemed by law to have been waived or abrogated, and in such event the owner becomes liable for such negligence on the part of the driver.
Tbe instruction complained of was correct as an abstract proposition of law, but it permitted the jury to determine whether or not the driver was acting within the scope of bis employment without giving the defendant
the benefit of the rule wbicb it bad adopted to govern the conduct of its drivers with reference to employing the plaintiff or permitting bim to be on or about the wagon, and the exception of the defendant to sucb instruction is sustained.
Tbe defendant also excepted to tbe introduction of an ordinance of tbe city of Ealeigb witb reference to leaving any borse-drawn vehicle standing unattended. Tbe exception to tbe introduction of tbis ordinance is sustained for tbe reason tbat tbere is no evidence in tbe present record warranting tbe application of tbe ordinance.
New trial.