Hayes v. County of Yolo

Opinion

KRISTIN MADELYN HAYES, No. 2:23-cv-00640-TLN-SCR Plaintiff, v. ORDER Defendant. This matter is before the Court on Defendant County of Yolo’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff Kristin Madelyn Hayes (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 14.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. On March 3, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this employment discrimination action in Yolo County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff alleges she was wrongfully terminated from her employment at the Yolo County Sheriff’s Office in retaliation for expressing support on social media for her brother’s campaign for Sheriff. (Id. at 12–16.) Plaintiff brings state law claims under the California Labor Code and a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the First Amendment. (Id. at 16–22.) On April 6, 2023, Defendant removed the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. (Id. at 3.) Upon removal, the Court issued an Initial Pretrial Scheduling Order (the “Scheduling Order”), which set deadlines moving forward. (ECF No. 2.) In relevant part, the Scheduling Order states discovery would close no later than 240 days from the date upon which the last answer may be filed with the Court. (Id. at 2.) The Scheduling Order also set the dispositive motion deadline as no later than 180 days after the close of discovery. (Id. at 4.) On June 20, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 6.) On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application requesting the Court deny Defendant’s motion as untimely. (ECF No. 8.) Defendant filed a response. (ECF No. 10.) On July 3, 2024, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as untimely. (ECF No. 11.) The Court explained that Defendant filed its answer in state court on April 4, 2023, and removed this action on April 6, 2023. (Id.) Using the later date (the date of removal), the Court calculated the discovery deadline as December 2, 2023 (240 days from the date of removal), meaning dispositive motions were due not later than May 30, 2024 (180 days from the close of discovery). (Id.) Accordingly, the Court found Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was untimely because Defendant filed it approximately three weeks after the dispositive motion deadline. (Id.) On August 1, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 16, requesting the Court modify the dispositive motion deadline to allow Defendant to file its motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 12.) The Scheduling Order states that, pursuant to Rule 16(b), the Scheduling Order “shall not be modified except by leave of court upon a showing of good cause.” (ECF No. 209 at 7.) The “good cause” standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the modification. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and quotations omitted). “[C]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Id. “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id. “If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. Defendant fails to persuade the Court that it has been diligent. Defendant vaguely asserts “there was unanticipated confusion in regard to the last day to file a dispositive motion.” (ECF No. 12-1 at 1.) However, as Plaintiff points out, Defendant correctly calculated the December 2, 2023, discovery deadline when it objected to Plaintiff's request for a deposition in April 2024. (ECF No. 14-1 at 8-9.) Defendant completely ignores this point in its reply and makes no effort to explain why it was later unable to calculate the dispositive motion deadline correctly. Defendant instead argues its motion for summary judgment may narrow the issues for trial, which could save the parties and Court resources. (ECF No. 12-1 at 4 (citing Crane Const. Co. v. Klaus Masonry, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Kan. 1999).) In Crane, a district court found that allowing a case to proceed to trial over an untimely motion for summary judgment would be a waste of judicial resources because the plaintiff “could never survive a Rule 50 challenge” and there was “no entity against which it could enforce the judgment.” 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1143. Defendant does not provide meaningful analysis of Crane, nor does Defendant convince the Court that Plaintiffs claims are futile. In sum, the Court concludes Defendant was not diligent. As Defendant previously acknowledged, “parties must understand that they will pay a price for failure to comply strictly with scheduling and other orders.” (ECF No. 14-1 at 9 (citing Wyles v. Sussman, 445 F. Supp. 3d 751 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (citation omitted)).) Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order. (ECF No. 12.) The parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report not later than thirty (30) days from the electronic filing date of this Order indicating their readiness to proceed to trial and proposing trial dates. Date: October 14, 2024 ) / 7, 94 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE