Hayes, R. v. Kutty, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 28, 2017
• Docket: Hayes, R. v. Kutty, A. No. 1916 EDA 2016
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A13034-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RICHARD C. HAYES AND MALKO E. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KARKENNY PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AHMED C.K. KUTTY

Appellant No. 1916 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order May 26, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at No(s): No. 2015-002485

BEFORE: LAZARUS, OTT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JULY 28, 2017

Appellant, Ahmed C.K. Kutty, appeals from the order entered in the

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granting the petition to enforce a

settlement argument filed by Appellees, Richard C. Hayes and Malko E.

Karkenny. Appellant contends the settlement agreement was unenforceable

due to the conditional nature of the agreement and due to the application of

the statute of frauds. We affirm.

We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the trial court’s

opinions. See Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/16, at 1-4; Trial Ct. Op., 8/22/16, at 1-4.

In this timely appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:

I. The [trial] court erred in finding the oral agreement between the parties enforceable when the proposed

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A13034-17

agreement was conditioned upon and subject to Appellant’s review with his tax professional/accountant

II. The [trial] court erred in failing to apply the statute of frauds to the transfer of real estate held as real property outside the joint venture as tenants in common

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the oral settlement agreement

that the parties entered into on the record, which was transcribed by a court

reporter, was not enforceable because the parties did not intend to be bound

by the agreement until each had the opportunity to consult with their tax

professionals or accountants. Appellant contends that this condition was

agreed to via a conversation held “off the record.”

Appellant, in his second issue, avers that the settlement agreement is

unenforceable due to the application of the statute of frauds. Appellant

argues that because the agreement was not in writing, and involved the

transfer of real property, the settlement agreement cannot be enforced.

Appellant’s issues merit no relief.

Our standard and scope of review is well settled:

The enforceability of settlement agreements is determined according to principles of contract law. Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as [the appellate] court may review the entire record in making its decision. . . . With respect to factual conclusions, we may reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact are predicated on an error of law or unsupported by competent evidence in the record.

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Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 517-18 (Pa. Super.

2009) (citations omitted).

Further, it is beyond cavil that “[w]here a settlement agreement

contains all of the requisites for a valid contract, a court must enforce the

terms of the agreement.” Id. at 518. “This is true even if the terms of the

agreement are not yet formalized in writing.” Id.

Regarding the statute of frauds, we note:

The statute of frauds directs that agreements for the sale of real estate shall not be enforced unless they are in writing and signed by the seller. The purpose of the statute is to prevent perjury and fraudulent claims. The [s]tatute of frauds does not void those oral contracts relating to land which fail to comply with the [s]tatute’s formal requirements. It is to be used as a shield and not as a sword, as it was designed to prevent frauds, not to encourage them.

Empire Properties, Inc. v. Equireal, 674 A.2d 297, 302 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citations and internal quotations omitted). Moreover, it is well settled that

“[t]he statute of frauds was intended to prevent fraud; it cannot be used as

a vehicle to avoid agreements entered in open court.” Aetna

Electroplating Co., Inc. V. Jenkins, 484 A.2d 134, 136 (Pa. Super. 1984)

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable G. Michael

Green, we conclude the trial court’s opinions comprehensively discuss and

properly dispose of the issues presented. See Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/16, at 4-6;

Trial Ct. Op., 8/22/16, at 5-10 (finding that (1) the settlement agreement

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constituted an enforceable contract and any further correspondence

thereafter was only intended to memorialize the contract and (2) the statute

of frauds did not preclude enforcement of the settlement agreement where

the agreement was transcribed, on the record, by a court reporter, thereby

establishing clear proof of an offer, acceptance, and consideration 1).

Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2017

1 Due to our conclusion that the trial court properly determined that the statute of frauds was not applicable under the specific circumstances of this case, we need not address the contention that Appellant’s real property interest was not transferred via the settlement agreement but instead by the terms of the joint venture agreement already in place between the parties.

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