Hayes, Michelle Lee

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 26, 2024
DocketWR-94,423-01
StatusPublished

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Bluebook
Hayes, Michelle Lee, (Tex. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

NO. WR-94,423-01

EX PARTE MICHELLE LEE HAYES, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 17-0327(A) IN THE 71ST DISTRICT COURT FROM HARRISON COUNTY

KEEL, J. delivered the opinion of the Court in which HERVEY, RICHARDSON, WALKER, SLAUGHTER, and MCCLURE, JJ., joined. NEWELL, J., concurred. KELLER, P.J., and YEARY, J., dissented.

OPINION

Applicant pled guilty to causing serious bodily injury to a child, and the trial court

deferred finding her guilty and placed her on community supervision. She was

adjudicated guilty two months later and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Applicant raises two claims in her habeas application. First, she says her guilty

plea was involuntary because her attorney did not tell her that the victim had suffered no

serious bodily injury (“SBI”). Second, she says her attorney was ineffective at the Hayes–Page 2

adjudication stage for not offering evidence in support of a conviction for the lesser-

included offense of causing bodily injury to a child. After our second remand order for

additional findings, the trial court again recommends denying relief. Because the trial

court’s findings are faulty, we do not rely on them. See Ex parte Reed, 271 S.w.3d 698,

727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Based on our independent review of this peculiar record,

we grant relief on Applicant’s involuntary plea claim; we do not address her claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel at the adjudication hearing.

I. Background

Before Applicant pled guilty, her attorney hired a medical expert, Dr. Stephen

Nelson. Dr. Nelson wrote a report summarizing the victim’s medical records and the

injuries and conditions they documented. His report did not express an opinion about

SBI. He testified by affidavit at the habeas stage that he had offered no opinion about

SBI because he had not been asked for it or given its legal definition. After he was given

the definition by habeas counsel, he concluded that the victim had suffered no SBI. The

primary issue at habeas was whether Applicant pled guilty without knowing that Dr.

Nelson believed there was no SBI. She claimed that she did; the trial court found

otherwise. The secondary issue was whether she would have insisted on trial if she had

known about the true state of the evidence of SBI. Given its first finding, the trial court

made no finding on the record regarding the second issue.

II. Primary Issue: What Applicant Knew Pre-Plea About Evidence of SBI

After our first, generic remand order, the trial court found that defense attorney Hayes–Page 3

Kobby Warren told Applicant before her plea that Dr. Nelson did not believe the victim

had suffered SBI. The finding was unsupported; Warren testified that he discussed “Dr.

Nelson and his conclusions” with Applicant and that she “completely understood and

agreed with every strategy and method” he used to get deferred, but he did not testify that

he told Applicant that Dr. Nelson found no SBI.

Our second remand order was more specific; it asked what Warren told Applicant

about the evidence of SBI before she pled guilty. This time, Warren testified that he told

Applicant about Dr. Nelson’s no-SBI opinion, and the trial court credited Warren’s

testimony. We do not defer to that finding for two reasons.

First, Dr. Nelson’s testimony about the late formation of his no-SBI opinion is

supported by the pre-plea report he gave Warren; it did not mention SBI. It summarized

the medical records and opined, for example, that the victim “suffered a mild traumatic

brain injury that resulted in a subdural hematoma” with “no evidence of injury to the

brain” and that there were “residual neurological or physical deficits secondary to the

above injuries[,]” but it did not say whether these were SBI.

Second, Warren evaded a related question—why didn’t he ask Dr. Nelson to

include his no-SBI opinion in his report? Rather than answer, he implied that Dr. Nelson

did include it: “Dr. Nelson’s report lists out the evidence of injury he reviewed and the

severity and/or the lack thereof.” “Severity” is not synonymous with the legally defined

term “serious bodily injury.” See Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(46). The report never

mentioned SBI, and Warren’s contrary suggestion was wrong. Hayes–Page 4

Warren’s false suggestion raises other questions that further undermine the trial

court’s credibility finding in his favor. If Warren read the report to mean there was no

SBI, then why didn’t he show it to the prosecution when he supposedly asked for a

reduction to causing non-serious bodily injury? And why did he never admit the report

into evidence? His failure to use Dr. Nelson’s no-SBI opinion suggests that it did not

exist before Applicant pled guilty.

We find that Warren did not tell Applicant about Dr. Nelson’s no-SBI opinion.

III. Secondary Issue: Did That Failure Make A Difference?

The record supports Applicant’s claim that, but for her attorney’s deficiency, she

would have insisted on trial; she had a good chance of an acquittal of the SBI element,

and she would have faced much less punishment without it.

III.A. SBI Acquittal Likelihood

Our second remand order asked the trial court to identify the SBI—which it did

not do—and the evidence supporting the SBI finding. The trial court cited the plea-

hearing testimony of Dr. Jennifer Chandler, State’s Exhibit 8, and Applicant’s judicial

confession. They do not support the SBI finding. Considering Applicant’s judicial

confession to assess its voluntariness would be circular reasoning, so we set that aside.

And even if we did consider it, it would be unhelpful because it was non-specific; she did

not testify about what SBI the victim suffered. That leaves Dr. Chandler’s testimony

and State’s Exhibit 8, and they do not support the SBI finding even in general terms.

Dr. Chandler, the emergency-room physician, testified that the victim suffered a Hayes–Page 5

“moderate” subdural hematoma, an injury that prompted his transfer to a Dallas hospital

for a pediatric neuro-surgery evaluation. According to Dr. Chandler, that evaluation

yielded an overnight observation in the ICU and no surgical intervention, and the victim

was “neurologically appropriate” during his five-day hospital stay in Dallas. She did not

testify whether he suffered SBI; she was not asked about it.

As for State’s Exhibit 8, a collection of medical records, it apparently does not

address “serious bodily injury”; the trial court found that it included diagnoses of

“subdural hematoma, right frontal scalp hematoma, and moderate maxillary sinusitis” and

“extensive subdural hemorrhage located interhemispheric, left tentoria and overlying the

left frontal temporal convexity.” Assuming these are injuries, their effects are not

obvious, and we have no expert testimony establishing them as SBI. See Garcia v. State,

667 S.W.3d 756, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). On the contrary, every medical expert

who was asked about SBI testified that no such injury was shown in these records.

III.B. Harsher Punishment with SBI

Applicant pled guilty to an aggravated, first-degree felony but would have faced a

non-aggravated, third-degree felony in the absence of SBI. See Tex.

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Related

§ 1.07
Texas PE § 1.07(46)
§ 22.04
Texas PE § 22.04(a)

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Hayes, Michelle Lee, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hayes-michelle-lee-texcrimapp-2024.