Haydar v. Amazon Corporate, LLC

District Court, E.D. Michigan·Decided October 10, 2019·No. 2:16-cv-13662·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

ABDULLAH HAYDAR,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:16-cv-13662 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson v. Magistrate Judge Stephanie Dawkins Davis

AMAZON CORPORATE, LLC, GARRET GAW, PETER FARICY, and JOEL MOSBY,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE REPORTS AND TESTIMONY OF DONNA BLANCERO [114] In 2015, Abdullah Haydar was terminated from his position as a senior manager at Amazon Corporate, LLC. The reasons for Haydar’s termination are disputed. According to Haydar, one significant reason was because he is of Syrian descent and is Muslim. Haydar alleges that Peter Faricy, effectively the head of Amazon’s “Marketplace” division at the time, “made references to you people, to you people need to learn how to treat your wives better, those types of comments repeatedly, . . . in reference to me uniquely differently than other people. He did not [even] make such comments about [non-Syrian, non-Muslim] people . . . who went through ugly divorces and whatnot.” (R. 68, PageID.6327.) Although Haydar was two management levels below Faricy, Haydar believes that Faricy’s view of him affected how his direct supervisors (and others under Faricy) viewed him. For its part, Amazon maintains that Haydar’s national origin and religion had nothing to do with his firing. From the company’s perspective, Haydar was terminated because he did not comply with several of the company’s 14 leadership principles. In a lengthy opinion, this Court explained that the evidence is not one-sided, and so a jury must decide if Haydar’s or Amazon’s view of the facts is correct. See generally Haydar v. Amazon Corp., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-13662, 2018 WL 4282777 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2018) (denying summary judgment on Haydar’s claims of national origin and religious discrimination). At the upcoming trial, Haydar hopes that the opinions of Donna Marie Blancero, Ph.D.,

will help the jury see things from his perspective. Among other things, Blancero intends to testify about bias against Muslims, unconscious bias, the difference between diversity and inclusion in the workplace, proper procedures for investigating an employee’s complaint, and the pitfalls of using “360 feedback” to evaluate an employee. (See ECF No. 114, PageID.11538–11546.) Amazon does not think the jury should hear from Blancero. To be more specific, Amazon asks this Court to take up its gatekeeper role under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and preclude Blancero’s testimony and expert reports. Amazon argues Blancero is not qualified to give opinions on some issues, that her opinions are based on insufficient data, and that her opinions are based on a flawed methodology. (See ECF No. 114, PageID.11515.)

In large part, the Court agrees with Amazon. I. While this opinion is largely dedicated to specifics, the Court begins with two general observations that form a backdrop. The first is that nothing in this opinion should be construed as a critique of Blancero’s credentials. To the contrary, Blancero is quite accomplished. She holds a doctorate from Cornell, with a major emphasis in human-resource management and minor emphases in organizational behavior and labor relations. (ECF No. 114, PageID.11553.) Blancero is an adjunct associate professor in management at Bentley University and also serves as the interim dean of business and the interim dean of the McCallum Graduate School. (See id.) One of the courses Blancero teaches at Bentley is about managing diversity in the workplace. (ECF No. 114, PageID.11538.) She has “published over 35 papers/chapters, and [is] a national speaker on issues of diversity.” (Id.) Blancero’s credentials are not on trial here. But those credentials have led the Court to a second general observation: the two reports

Blancero prepared in this case are not the paradigm of what Rule 702 requires. In several places in her reports, Blancero makes broad generalizations based on limited data. It also appears that some of her conclusions are based on portions of the record favoring Haydar even though other, less-favorable portions of the record could have altered the conclusions. And at some points, Blancero does not bring her knowledge of the field to bear, instead relying on articles outside her expertise to make a point. Also, the overall organization of Blancero’s reports is difficult to follow. It is difficult for the Court to discern whether she is offering any opinions or simply intends to provide the jury with general principles. All of this contributes to the general concern the Court has in allowing Blancero to testify to everything in her reports.

II. Along with those two general observations, the law completes the backdrop for analyzing Blancero’s specific findings. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, this Court may permit opinion testimony only if the opinion witness is “qualified as an expert.” And even if Blancero is so qualified, any opinion she tells the jury must help the jury decide the disputed issues in the case, must be “based on sufficient facts or data,” must be “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and must be the result of reliably applying “the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Experts are permitted to educate a jury about general principles without applying those principles to the facts of the case. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. Rule 702 grants this Court considerable discretion to allow or exclude opinion testimony. See Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 781 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e will reverse a district court only where we are left with a definite and firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judgment.”). III.

Now to the specifics. The Court will walk through Blancero’s January 2018 report1 section- by-section, explaining why some parts of the report clear Rule 702’s bar to admissibility and why others do not. (The Court takes the “Introduction” section last, as Blancero testified that it was effectively a summary of her report. (ECF No. 114, PageID.11756.)) A. In the “Diversity and Inclusion” section of her report, Blancero defines stereotyping and confirmation bias. (Report at 2.) In this Court’s view, the concept of stereotypes is within the knowledge of the typical juror. So there is no reason for Blancero to offer testimony on this topic. See United States v. Rios, 830

F.3d 403, 413 (6th Cir. 2016) (“A district court may commit manifest error by admitting expert testimony where . . . the . . . testimony is not beyond the ken of the average juror.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). As for confirmation bias, Blancero states that “confirmation bias is when one searches for data to support one’s preexisting beliefs.” (Report at 2.) She further states, “These type[s] of

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