Hawthorne v. Walton

30 S.W.2d 397, 1930 Tex. App. LEXIS 697
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 25, 1930
DocketNo. 8459.
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 30 S.W.2d 397 (Hawthorne v. Walton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hawthorne v. Walton, 30 S.W.2d 397, 1930 Tex. App. LEXIS 697 (Tex. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

*398 ELY, O. J.

This Suit was instituted by J. G. Walton and J. O. Walton against S. O. Hawthorne, M. L. Woods, A. M. Gunnell, and Woods & Gunnell, to* recover actual damages in the sum of $15,000 and exemplary damages in the sum of $15,000. It was alleged that the plain; tiffs, appellees herein, resided in Washington county, Mo., and the defendants, appellants, also resided in Missouri, in Jackson county, but at times extended their activities as land agents and promoters to Hidalgo county, Tex., to which locality excursions were organized and potential land buyers carried. It was alleged that the partnership of Woods & Gun-nell was created as an instrumentality or agency of Hawthorne, Woods, and Gunnell, behind which partnership appellants operated “in the carrying out of the conspiracy, plan and scheme to defraud and swindle” appellees and others who were enticed into buying lands from them in Hidalgo county. That said conspiracy was put into effect by means of excursions to Texas and false representations as to the quality, quantity, and location of lands, “that various parcels of land in Hidalgo County, Texas, should and would be sold by the defendants, acting through defendants Woods & Gunnell Company, * ⅜ * for at least one-half cash, the balance of the purchase price to be represented by notes.” It was further alleged that appellees were induced by appellants to go to Hidalgo county, that they went with an excursion in charge of appellants; that*they represented to ap-pellees “that all the tracts of land in the vi-' cinity of Edinburg shown to them and especially the tract sought to be sold, and which was sold to plaintiffs by said defendants, wére and was owned in fee simple title by defendants, Wood & Gunnell Company,” and that appellees were induced to contract for the land for $530 an acre, for the south half of lot 2, block 273, which land when sold nor at any time was the property of appellants, and to which they had no right, title, or interest, and that appellees had already paid to appellants the sum of $5,150 on land which they did not own.

The cause was submitted on special issues, and the jury found, in response to the questions propounded, that a conspiracy was entered into among G. C. Hawthorne, M. L. Woods, and A. M. Gunnell to induce persons to purchase lands in Hidalgo county from Woods & Gunnell, by means of false representations as to material facts, that appellees were induced to purchase lot No. 2, in block 273, in what is known as the. Edinburg tract, by the misrepresentations of appellants as to their ownership of such land, which false representations were made in pursuance of a conspiracy theretofore made‘to defraud appel-lees ; that appellees believed such representations and were induced by them to enter into a contract to purchase said land and pay appellants $8,050 on the purchase money. Appellees discovered the fraud of appellants in March, 1920, and instituted this suit on April 20, 1928, but the jury found that the delay in bringing the action was caused by fraudulent promises of appellants that they would obtain title to the land and convey the same to appellees, and that these false promises were made with the purpose to cause ap-pellees to delay their suit. The jury fixed the exemplary damages at $10,000.

The testimony shows a case of childlike faith and confidence on the part of appellees, utterly inconsistent with the traditional desire attributed to the Missourian to be shown everything before he will accept any statement or proceed on any enterprise. Without an abstract of title, without verifying the location of the lot, appellees parted with their money for a “gold brick” not even washed or plated with the precious metal. They swallowed with avidity all statements about the land and even when it was discovered that the Missouri “realtors” had no right or title their trust did not abate, but they accepted their statements and lingered and hesitated in suing them until two years had expired. They were hypnotized and thoroughly under the bromidic influence of their unscrupulous neighbors. The jury found that they were led like bullocks tó the shambles and were deceived by the palpable fraud of the conspirators, and there is evidence that justifies such finding.

Relying upon a provision of law which permits the use of errors assigned in the motion for a new trial to be-used as the assignment of errors, appellants have copied no assignments into the record. In order to verify the twenty-six assignments of error copied in the brief it has been necessary to compare them with two motions for new trial, one for Hawthorne and one for Woods, each covering eight pages of typewritten matter.

[Í, 2] Most of the propositions are quite general and abstract in their nature. The first proposition is not sustained. The action is based upon a written contract of sale exr ecuted by the parties, and the suit was not barred on its face in two years from the alleged discovery of the fraud, because ihe supplemental petition in answer to • appellants’’ answer fully set out the fraud by which ap-pellees were prevented from instituting suit until after two years had expired. The pleadings should have been considered together.

While the petition is prolix and con-' tains much unnecessary matter, it stated a cause of, action when it alleged that appellants had induced appellees by false and fraudulent representations to buy a tract of land in which they had no right or interest, a case had been stated, and, if all the special exceptions had been sustained, enough wohld have remained to sustain the action. The *399 general demurrer and special exceptions were properly overruled. The propositions from the second to the thirteenth, inclusive, are overruled.

. [4] Conspiracies are conceived and concluded in secret, and it would be a novel case indeed where it was or could be shown that a certain agreement was made to defraud and rob their fellows. The agreement is an inference from the fraudulent acts concurred in by the parties to the conspiracy. Conspiracies are conceived in secret and put into execution in crooked, devious, and unlawful ways. Appellees could not prove the secret agreement among appellants, but the unlawful agreement would be presumed from unlawful acts committed together by the appellants acting with a common intent. The fourteenth and fifteenth propositions are overruled.

The sixteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth propositions are too general and uncertain to be considered. They are mere abstractions.

The eighteenth proposition is overruled. The court was not called upon to limit the exemplary damages, and appellants failed to ask such a charge. A failure to give the charge did not injure appellants for the reason that the jury did not allow as exemplary damages double the sum of the actual damages.. Article 4004, Revised Statutes of Texas. The jury are authorized in cases of fraud, like this, to find for exemplary damages any sum not to exceed double the amount of actual damages suffered. This statute also fully answers the contentions in the twentieth _ proposition, that when a jury has found for all actual damages they cannot assess exemplary damages.

The twenty-first proposition is overruled.

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Bluebook (online)
30 S.W.2d 397, 1930 Tex. App. LEXIS 697, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawthorne-v-walton-texapp-1930.