Hawley v. Evans

716 F. Supp. 601, 1989 WL 73918
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedJuly 5, 1989
Docket1:88-CV-2185-CAM
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 716 F. Supp. 601 (Hawley v. Evans) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hawley v. Evans, 716 F. Supp. 601, 1989 WL 73918 (N.D. Ga. 1989).

Opinion

ORDER

MOYE, Senior District Judge.

The above-styled action is brought by three prisoners in the Georgia Corrective System who have tested positive for antibodies to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (hereafter “HIV”) which is the precursor to the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (hereafter “AIDS”). Said action is before this court on cross motions for summary judgment, the plaintiffs’ motion for clarification, the plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery, the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of this court’s order dated April 25, 1989, and the defendants’ motion to transfer plaintiffs Hawley and Mitchell from the Augusta Correctional and Medical Institution. For the reasons stated below, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, the defendants’ motion to transfer plaintiffs Hawley and Mitchell is GRANTED, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED, the plaintiffs’ motion for clarification is DENIED, the plaintiffs’ motion to compel is DENIED *602 and the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 1

FACTS

The plaintiffs in this action are prisoners in the Georgia Prison System. All three have tested HIV positive. However, plaintiff Mitchell is in a more advanced degree of sickness. The main thrust of the plaintiffs’ complaint is a prayer for injunctive relief. They are requesting adequate and up-to-date treatment from the Georgia Department of Corrections, or, in the alternative, the right to be seen by a private physician of their own selection. They are also requesting damages, alleging that the defendants have committed acts and omissions amounting to that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs constituting cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

The plaintiffs are requesting a wide variety of drugs and medical treatments, many of which are experimental and have not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (hereafter “FDA”), claiming they have the constitutional right to such treatment either through the prison medical facilities or under the care of private physicians of their own selection. The plaintiffs claim they are financially able to employ such private physicians.

One drug that the plaintiffs are requesting, which was initially denied them by the prison authorities, is Zidovudine, more commonly known as “AZT”. AZT has been approved by the FDA and is the only antiviral agent that has been clearly shown to improve immune function in AIDS patients (see attachment “E”). Its availability to the plaintiffs is therefore of central importance to this law suit.

The attitude in the scientific community towards AZT is one of uncertainty. Experts disagree about who should receive the drug, at what stage patients should be treated with it, and proper doseage. This court has received materials that delineate the policies of the Center for Disease Control (hereafter “CDC”), the Georgia Department of Human Resources (hereafter “GDHR”), and the FDA (see attachments “A” through “G”, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and the defendants’ supplement to cross motion for summary judgment). There are two things that one can safely conclude about the literature received: 1) the policy for administering AZT and other treatment for HIV and AIDS patients changes frequently and as yet no one in the medical community is sure of what is protocol; and 2) AZT can be highly toxic to some patients and should be used conservatively, if at all.

The Georgia Department of Corrections has a uniform policy under which it currently administers AZT to patients that have symptomatic HIV infection and have an absolute CD4 lymphocyte count of less than 200/mm3 in the peripheral blood, and to patients with a history of cytologically confirmed pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and an absolute CD4 lymphocyte count of less than 200/mm3 in the peripheral blood. The plaintiffs have not disputed that the above is indeed the uniform policy of the Georgia Department of Corrections. At the court’s request, not order, the plaintiffs were transferred to Augusta Correctional Medical Institution for testing and were offered treatment with AZT, even though the patients had not met the state standard mentioned above. Two of the patients refused such treatment, one accepted.

The Georgia Department of Correction’s AZT policy is not significantly dissimilar to the standards of the FDA, the CDC and the GDHR. There are some differences, for instance, in the interpretation of the word “symptomatic” (compare attachments “F” and “G”). However, such differences are to be expected because, as already mentioned, what is acceptable with AZT treatment is not immutable, but rather some *603 thing that is indeterminate and ever-changing.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

1. The Georgia Department of Correction’s medical policy for HIV patients

To state a claim of constitutional magnitude for the denial of medical care and treatment, the plaintiffs must show that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251, 260 (1976). In light of the facts of the instant case, it can hardly be said that the Georgia Department of Corrections has been “deliberately indifferent” to the serious medical needs of the plaintiffs. Its policy for treatment of HIV positive patients is similar to that of other reputable national and local agencies. Although its policy differs in some ways from the standards of other reputable agencies, the court in this case is not empowered to delve into the particulars and intricacies of modern medicine or to make narrow distinctions on debatable interpretations of what should be acceptable in the medical community. This court’s powers are not enlarged by reason of the growing public awareness of the impact of AIDS on the national community. What this court can and must decide is whether the Department of Correction’s medical policy is constitutionally acceptable. In the judgment of this court the applicable medical policy substantially conforms to currently acceptable medical practice. Therefore the plaintiffs do not state a claim of constitutional magnitude.

Far from their actions being “repugnant to the conscience of mankind” pursuant to the Estelle v. Gamble standard, the defendants have demonstrated they are willing to pursue the modern medical practice relating to the treatment of HIV patients consistent with their roles as custodians of unwilling prisoners. The medical care provided a prisoner is not required to be “perfect, the best obtainable, or even very good.” Brown v. Beck, 481 F.Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.Ga.1980). The Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble specifically states that not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment”. 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291. Clearly, negligence is not enough. 2 Negligence, without deliberately indifferent or wanton conduct, is not cruel and unusual punishment. Negligence by a prison medical officer may constitute actionable medical malpractice. 429 U.S. at 108, 97 S.Ct. at 293.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
716 F. Supp. 601, 1989 WL 73918, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawley-v-evans-gand-1989.