Hawley v. Commonwealth

75 Va. 847
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedNovember 15, 1880
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 75 Va. 847 (Hawley v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hawley v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 847 (Va. 1880).

Opinion

Anderson, J.

The prisoner, was indicted as an accessory before the fact with the principal felon, and was convicted of murder in the second degree, as charged in the indictment—that is, as an accessory. If he had been present aiding and abetting in the murder, he would have been principal in the second degree, and could not have been convicted as accessory. But the jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree, as charged in the indictment—that is, as accessory before the fact.

It was not error to indict one as principal and ‘the other as accessory in the same indictment. Ohitty gives a precedent for it, approved by Bishop, which, after proceeding against the principal in the usual form, at the foot proceeds against the accessories before the fact as in the case at bar. 2 Bishop’s Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 2 Edition, § 10. [850]*850The indictment in this case substantially adopts that form. To which is added, “And so the jurors upon their oath aforesaid, do say that said Marcus Hawley, Peter Hawley, Ac., him, the said Zachariah Hayes (the deceased), in manner and form aforesaid, feloniously, willfully and of their malice aforethought, did murder and kill, against,” Ac. This conclusion is that the principal felon, and those who are charged as accessories before the fact, willfully, Ac., did kill and murder the said Hayes. If they were accessories before the fact, they were guilty of the murder. In the ■case of every felony, every principal in the second degree, ■and every accessory before the fact, shall be punished as if he were the principal in the first degree. Virginia Cr. Digest and Procedure, p. 48, article 7. So that the conclusion is not illogical. But it is a mere conclusion of law, and if it is not warranted, the indictment is complete without it, and this clause may be stricken from it as surplus-age.

It is not necessary to charge in an indictment anything more than is necessary to accurately and adequately express the offence; and when unnecessary averments or aggravations are introduced they can be considered as surplusage, and as such disregarded. Whart. Cr. Plead, and Prac., 8 Edition, § 158. Among the illustrations he gives is the following: “ Conclusions of law, summing up the offence unnecessarily, may be regarded as surplusage, as where an indictment for taking a voluntary false oath, not amounting to perjury, concludes, And so the said A B ■did commit perjury/ ” Ac. The court is opinion, therefore, that there is no valid ground for the first assignment of ■error.

II. As to the second error assigned, it is sufficient to say, when the verdict is silent as to any of the counts in the indictment, it operates an acquittal on those counts.

[851]*851III. As to the third error assigned, the verdict finds the prisoner guilty of murder in the second degree, “ as charged in the indictment’—’that is, as an accessory before the fact. It was the province of the jury to ascertain the grade of offence, which they find to be murder in the second degree. The verdict is responsive to the fourth count of the indictment. And whilst the principal, if guilty of any offence, is guilty of murder in the first degree, the jury were warranted in lowering the grade of the accessory to murder in the second degree, if the evidence warranted it, of which they were the judges.

The offence of the instigator, or accessory before the fact, is not necessarily of the same grade of that of the perpetrator. “ An accessory before the fact (or, to adopt the terms of recent codes, an instigator), may be guilty of murder, while the principal or perpetrator may be guilty of manslaughter. Or the accessory before the fact (instigator) acting in hot blood, may be guilty of manslaughter, while the perpetrator (principal), acting with deliberate malice, may be guilty of murder.” 1 Whart. Cr. Law, sec. 237, bottom p. 264, 8th Edn. Consequently the jury were authorized to find the accessory guilty of murder in the second degree, whilst the evidence may show that the principal was guilty of murder in the first degree.

As to the objection that the prisoner had no primary examination before a justice of the peace of the offence of which he is indicted and found guilty, it was not the province of the justice to fix the grade of his crime. His inquiry was as to the fact.

The verdict is substantially the same as the petition claims it should have been. If the prisoner was accessory to the crime charged in the indictment, he was guilty of the murder by being accessory to it. And the finding is that the prisoner, Peter Hawley, is guilty of murder in the second degree, as charged in the fourth count of the indictment—that is, as accessory.

[852]*852IY. With regard to the fourth assignment of error, the declarations of Marcus Hawley could only have been evidence upon the ground of a confederacy between him and Peter to take the life of Hayes. This depends on the evidence, which we think warrants the introduction of the declarations of either party.

The fifth assignment of error is, the refusal to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and evidence, and to grant the prisoner a new trial.

The death of Zachariah Hayes was caused by a gun shot which he received on the 18th of June, 1879, between sunset and dark, as he was returning home from the field, called the “ Mountain ” or “ Knob Field,” in company with Green Bohen and Berry Yopp, where they had been plowing and doing other work during the day. There is a little knoll with an avenue trimmed out at nearly right angles from it to the road, where he was shot, on the right of the road, and about twenty-four steps from it. . At the end of this avenue a tree was fallen, which formed a screen to a person behind it, and green twigs were bent so as not to obstruct the avenue, and there was a tolerably abrupt descent from the knoll about a step or two behind the screen. The avenue is about two feet wide. Just at the road no trees were cut, but the avenue was cut just so as to make it complete between two trees on the road. Hayes was evidently shot by some one from behind this screen, through the avenue, as he passed in front of it. The field where he had been at work was claimed by the Hawleys, and was the subject of an angry controversy between them.

William Thomason testified that in the spring before the homicide was committed, at old man Hawley’s, in the yard, he heard Marcus Hawley, in the presence of Peter, talk about the difficulty between them and Hayes. Peter Hawley said, if he had been in Mark’s place, he would have killed Hayes long ago. Mark said that Hayes had been [853]*853trying to outdo Mm about that land; that he had shot at him once, and didn’t miss his head more than two or three inches, and would kill the damned rascal yet if he didn’t mind how he cut his notches. Peter said, if he had been in Mark’s place he would have killed him long ago; no man should run over him.

Malissa Yopp, who is an aunt of the Hawleys, testified that she was at Mr. Hawley’s house some time in April before the homicide, when Mark, Peter, and Cal Hawley and George Potter came in. They said they would lay up their weapons and plant potatoes; if they needed them they would be handy; that they did not mean to be outdone in the land suit, and that if Hayes outdone them, they would kill him. Peter had a gun, and Mark a pistol. They were all talking together; could not say who said it.

Zephania Staton testifies that on the Sunday before the shooting, or the Sunday before that, at Mrs.

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Bluebook (online)
75 Va. 847, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawley-v-commonwealth-va-1880.