Hawkins v. Wilkes Reg'l Med. Ctr.

808 S.E.2d 505
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedDecember 5, 2017
DocketCOA16-893
StatusPublished

This text of 808 S.E.2d 505 (Hawkins v. Wilkes Reg'l Med. Ctr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hawkins v. Wilkes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 808 S.E.2d 505 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

STROUD, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from an opinion and award denying her additional compensation because she failed to file a claim against her employer's insurance company. Because plaintiff timely filed her claim for her back injury against her employer, the Industrial Commission erred in denying her claim due to her failure to file a claim against a specific insurance company. Plaintiff's claim is against her employer; her employer has the statutory obligation to maintain workers'

*506 compensation insurance and is responsible for work-related compensable injuries. Any dispute plaintiff's employer may have with its insurers is not relevant to the validity of plaintiff's claim against her employer. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

Plaintiff sustained a lower back injury while working for defendant-employer as a nurse in 2007; plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim, and defendant-employer admitted plaintiff's right to compensation. In 2008, plaintiff filed Form 28B and requested additional compensation for her 2007 injury. Over the course of the next five years, plaintiff had several other incidents at work which exacerbated her back injury, with no dispute as to whether these were compensable injuries, and defendant-employer continued to provide medical compensation, until plaintiff eventually returned to full duty work. 1 During this five year period, defendant-employer's insurance company changed at least twice. In January of 2012, plaintiff again "sustained another injury" to her back at work and "was diagnosed with recurrent lumbar pain[.]" Plaintiff returned to Dr. Maxy, who had treated her starting in 2007 for her lower back injury. As the Commission found,

Dr. Maxy examined Plaintiff, and given that she had failed conservative treatment, he referred her for a new MRI. Plaintiff had been out of work, and he continued light duty work until she could be re-evaluated.
38. Plaintiff was out of work from January 14 through February 9, 2012 due to the January 12, 2012 accident and injury.
39. After Dr. Maxy referred Plaintiff for a lumbar MRI on February 3, 2012, Plaintiff requested that Synergy authorize the MRI. Upon Synergy's refusal to authorize the MRI and treatment, Plaintiff filed a Motion to compel authorization, to which Synergy responded in opposition. Synergy pointed out that Plaintiff was required to file a new claim against United Heartland considering that she had sustained an injury to her low back on January 12, 2012.
40. Plaintiff never underwent the MRI recommended by Dr. Maxy on February 3, 2012.

In September of 2014, defendants filed a Form 33 requesting that plaintiff's claim be assigned for hearing because they "dispute[d] that Plaintiff's low back condition since January 12, 2012 is causally related to the accident and injury of April 10, 2007[;]" defendants did not contest that plaintiff was injured in 2012 but rather whether the 2012 injury was related to her 2007 injury. In response, on 15 September 2014, plaintiff filed a Form 33R stating that "Plaintiff contends that her back condition since January 12, 2012 is causally related to the accident and injury of April 10, 2007."

In 2007, defendant-employer's insurance company was defendant Key Risk Insurance Company, the named defendant-insurer in this appeal. But in 2012, defendant-employer's insurance company was United Wisconsin Insurance Company/United Heartland Insurance Company ("United Heartland") which is not a party on appeal. Thus, defendants argued that United Heartland was not liable for plaintiff's 2012 injury because it was a new injury, not related to the 2007 injury, and defendant Key Risk was not the insurer at the time of the 2012 injury.

Thereafter, in November of 2014, defendant Key Risk moved to add United Heartland as a party-defendant because "Plaintiff had long ago recovered by the time the January 2012 incident occurred[,]" and therefore United Heartland was the proper named insurer for the new 2012 injury. In December of 2014, United Heartland responded to defendant *507 Key Risk's motion and requested it be denied because plaintiff had not filed for compensation against United Heartland within two years of the 2012 injury, and under North Carolina General Statute § 97-24, her "right to compensation expire[d]" for want of jurisdiction.

To be clear, United Heartland did not contest that plaintiff had filed a proper claim for her 2012 injury with defendant-employer, but rather contended that plaintiff was required to name United Heartland specifically as the insurer within the two-year period to file a valid claim. The Commission denied defendant Key Risk's motion to add United Heartland as a party. The order did not give any rationale for the denial but stated only: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Key Risk Insurance Company's Motion to Add United Wisconsin Insurance Company/United Heartland Insurance Company is DENIED at this time. NO COSTS are assessed at this time." This order is not before us on appeal.

On 31 May 2016, the Full Commission of the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered an opinion and award regarding plaintiff's workers' compensation claim, addressing only plaintiff's request for additional compensation arising from her 2007 injury. The issue to be determined, as stated in the opinion and award, was "[w]hether Plaintiff's current low back condition is causally related to the low back injury she sustained on April 10, 2007 such that Key Risk Insurance Company has ongoing liability?" The Full Commission made many findings of the history of plaintiff's injuries and treatment since 2007 and seven conclusions of law which demonstrate the Full Commission determined plaintiff sustained a work-related injury in January of 2012, but it did not determine that the 2012 injury "was caused by her" April 2007 injury. The Full Commission ultimately determined "Plaintiff's current back condition was caused by her January 12, 2012 injury, not her April 10, 2007 injury." The Commission concluded,

The preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record shows that Plaintiff's current back condition is related to the January 12, 2012 accident that materially aggravated a preexisting back condition. Defendant Key Risk was not the carrier for Employer-Defendant on this date. When an employee with a preexisting condition suffers an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment, and the injury materially accelerates or aggravates the preexisting infirmity and thus proximately contributes to the disability of the employee, the injury is compensable. Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co. , 233 N.C. 372 , 64 S.E.2d 265 (1951).

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Related

Moore v. City of Raleigh
520 S.E.2d 133 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1999)
Goforth v. K-Mart Corp.
605 S.E.2d 709 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2004)
Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co.
64 S.E.2d 265 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1951)
Collins v. Garber
325 S.E.2d 21 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
808 S.E.2d 505, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawkins-v-wilkes-regl-med-ctr-ncctapp-2017.