Hawkins v. Toro Company

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: March 25, 2004
• Docket: 95-60157
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 95-60157 Summary Calendar _______________________

WILLIAM HAWKINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TORO COMPANY d/b/a Lawn-Boy,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi (1:94 CV25 B D) _________________________________________________________________ August 4, 1995

Before JONES, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judges:*

William Hawkins appeals the grant of summary judgment in

favor of Toro Company d/b/a Lawn-Boy in this employment termination

case. Finding no error in the district court's judgment, we

affirm.

* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published. BACKGROUND

Hawkins was fired on October 28, 1993, for use of abusive

language towards fellow employees in a break room after nine and a

half years of employment. It is undisputed that there was no

written employment contract. In fact, during appellant's

orientation as a new employee, he was given a handbook after

signing a receipt/acknowledgment which explicitly provided that his

employment was at will and could be terminated by either party with

or without notice and with or without cause.

Later versions of the company handbook, which Hawkins

received, also contained an acknowledgment page which again served

as a receipt and express disclaimer. In pertinent part, the page

read as follows:

This handbook does not represent a contract of employment, and my employment relationship with the company is an "at will" relationship which may be terminated at any time, by either party, with or without notice and with or without cause.

This page of the handbook provided a line for the

employee's signature as well as one witness. Hawkins relies upon

the uncontested fact that he did not sign this page upon receipt of

the revised handbook.

Also of note in the handbook is a four-step progressive

disciplinary system providing corrective action guidelines,

escalating to termination, for certain misconduct. Toro did not

follow these procedures in firing Hawkins.

On appeal, appellant claims the district court erred in

granting summary judgment as the disciplinary system gave rise to

2 an employment contract which was subsequently breached when Hawkins

was fired. Alternatively, appellant claims the employment handbook

also gave rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing which was

breached as a result of the manner in which he was terminated.

DISCUSSION

Mississippi follows the common law rule that "where there

is no employment contract (or where there is a contract which does

not specify the term of the worker's employment), the

relation[ship] may be terminated at will by either party." Solomon

v. Walgreen Co., 975 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1992)(quoting Perry

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So.2d 1086, 1088 (Miss. 1987). The

at-will doctrine means that either the employer or the employee may

have a good reason, a wrong reason, or no reason for terminating

the employment contract. Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397

So.2d 874, 874-75 (Miss. 1981).

While Hawkins acknowledges the at will doctrine to be

controlling, he nonetheless attempts to escape its application by

arguing that Mississippi courts enforce handbook provisions

prescribing a progressive disciplinary system, and to such extent,

he had a contract with Toro. This argument fails as the Supreme

Court of Mississippi in Perry, held that although personnel manuals

can create contractual obligations, an express disclaimer of any

employment obligations in the agreement will preclude an action for

its alleged breach. Perry, 508 So.2d at 1088. See also Hartle v.

Packard Elec., 626 So.2d 106 (Miss. 1993)(upholding summary

judgment for employer because express disclaimer in handbook

3 negated contract claim); Shaw v. Birchfield, 481 So.2d 247 (Miss.

1985)(upholding summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's breach of

contract claim, because contract expressly stated employment was

terminable at-will). Thus, the express disclaimer in the original

receipt signed by Hawkins serves to preclude any reliance on

provisions in the handbook. Moreover, since the later versions of

the handbook in effect at discharge contained the same language

expressly disclaiming any intention to create a contract, and the

appellant was on notice of such language, his failure to sign the

later documents is not conclusive. Nichols v. City of Jackson, 848

F.Supp. 718, 724 (S.D.Miss. 1994)(employee has duty to follow

provisions of handbook that are reasonably believed to be

current).1

Hawkins next tries to defeat the disclaimer he signed by

relying upon Bobbitt v. The Orchard, Ltd., 603 So.2d 356 (Miss.

1992), to develop his theory. This argument fails, however, as the

employment handbook upheld as giving rise to an implied contract in

Bobbitt did not contain any disclaimer of the sort found in the

matter sub judice. Additionally, the court in Perry, held that

validating a contradictory implied agreement in the face of an

already existing express agreement would be "ludicrous." Perry,

508 So.2d at 1088.

We also reject Hawkins's contention that the presence of

both progressive disciplinary language and an express at-will

1 Appellant's argument that the disclaimer fails as it was not boldfaced or highlighted is contrary to the holdings of Solomon, supra, and Shaw, supra where each disclaimer precluded an action for breach despite appearing in regular font.

4 disclaimer evidenced an ambiguity in the "contract." First, there

is no contract of employment. Second, the same argument has been

rejected in other cases, e.g. Shaw, supra, and is no more valid

here.

Hawkins also asserts that Toro breached its implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a result of the manner

in which he was terminated. Mississippi courts have repeatedly

held, however, that at will relationships are not governed by such

a covenant. Hartle v. Packard Elec., 626 So.2d 106, 110 (Miss.

1993); Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Miss.

1987). This court has also observed that an implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing does not exist in Mississippi

employment termination cases. Burroughs v. FFP Operating Partners,

L.P., 28 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 1994). In light of these

authorities, Hawkins cannot prevail.

Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.