06/24/2025
DA 24-0746 Case Number: DA 24-0746
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 134
KRIS HAWKINS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA, through its DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DV-24-145 Honorable Jennifer B. Lint, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Kris Hawkins, Self-Represented, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
David Burleigh, Senior Tax Counsel, Montana Department of Revenue, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 28, 2025
Decided: June 24, 2025
Filed: r,.6.,( __________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Kris Hawkins appeals from the October 23, 2024 order of the Twenty-First Judicial
District Court dismissing her petition for interlocutory adjudication of an appeal before the
Montana Tax Appeal Board (MTAB). We affirm.
¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:
Did the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory adjudication of a matter the Montana Tax Appeal Board had already dismissed?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 In March 2018, Aileen Davenport filed a Realty Transfer Certificate indicating the
property located at 5310 Lower Martin Lane (Property) in Florence, Ravalli County, had
been transferred to the Olson Trust (Trust). In April 2018, and again in January 2019, the
Department of Revenue (DOR) requested documentation identifying the trustee of the
Trust, which was never provided.
¶4 In July 2023, Hawkins, purporting to act as trustee of the Trust, requested informal
review of DOR’s appraised value of the Property. DOR did not adjust the appraised value,
which Hawkins appealed to the Ravalli County Tax Appeals Board. However, there was
some doubt as to whether Hawkins was the trustee of the Trust.1 After several requests to
provide documentation proving Hawkins’s status as trustee, Hawkins filed a certification
1 Among other concerns, DOR never had an official record of the trustee of the Trust, despite requesting such information several times in 2018 and 2019; had recently received a letter from Aileen Davenport, purporting to be trustee, in January of 2023; and Hawkins’s repeated refusal to provide supporting documentation, despite claiming to have it (and which apparently and “coincidentally” was lost to a fire on the exact day MTAB first sent a letter requesting the documentation). 2 of trust pursuant to § 72-38-1013, MCA, claiming she was trustee. The Ravalli County
Tax Appeals Board denied Hawkins’s request for a reduction in value. Hawkins appealed
to MTAB, which requested confirmation of Hawkins’s role as trustee of the Trust several
times—first via letter dated February 2, 2024, second via order filed March 14, and third
via order filed April 29. See § 72-38-1013(5), MCA.
¶5 On March 8, Hawkins filed a declaration in support of disqualification (Declaration)
of the MTAB members, alleging bias and violations of her rights. The Declaration did not
cite any statutes or contain any facts underscoring her belief that MTAB should be
disqualified. MTAB took no action on the Declaration until addressing it in the order of
dismissal.
¶6 On March 22, 2024, Hawkins filed a petition for interlocutory adjudication
(Petition) with the District Court, pursuant to § 15-2-304, MCA. On March 25, the court
sua sponte struck the Petition as the Trust was an entity and was not represented by an
attorney. On April 1, Hawkins filed a motion in the District Court, requesting the court
substitute her for the Trust as petitioner and to reinstate the Petition.
¶7 On April 29, MTAB issued another order to provide documentation of Hawkins’s
role as trustee within thirty days or it would dismiss the appeal. Hawkins did not provide
the documentation. Instead, on May 1, Hawkins sent an “Objection and Demand” asserting
the order was without authority following her March 8 Declaration and demanding MTAB
“IN DETAIL” set forth the facts upon which it was continuing to act. (Emphasis in
original.) Failure to do so, Hawkins asserted, would constitute admissions MTAB had no
authority in the appeal, had a significant conflict of interest precluding a fair and impartial
3 hearing, and that MTAB’s orders to provide additional documentation were made in bad
faith. On June 14, MTAB dismissed the appeal and also found Hawkins’s Declaration was
“unsupported.”
¶8 On July 5, Hawkins filed a “Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion” in the
District Court, arguing the court should grant her March 31 motion. On July 8, the District
Court granted her motion, substituting Hawkins for the Trust, and reinstated the Petition
for Interlocutory Adjudication.2 DOR filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction as the underlying MTAB case had already been dismissed. The
District Court granted the motion, holding “The record unequivocally demonstrates that
the matter before the MTAB has concluded, despite Petitioner’s desire to void the MTAB’s
dismissal via her baseless disqualification filing.” The court therefore dismissed the
Petition, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction for an interlocutory adjudication of a
matter no longer pending before MTAB. Separately, the court found Hawkins’s Petition
would require it to find facts exceeding its authority under § 15-2-305, MCA. Hawkins
appeals.
2 However, at no time before dismissing the Petition did the District Court ever assume jurisdiction over the appeal and deprive MTAB of its jurisdiction. Accord Bechtel Group v. Dep’t of Revenue, No. ADV 98-448, 1998 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 412, *3–*4 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist. Oct. 2, 1998) (denying petition for interlocutory adjudication even though court would have jurisdiction to resolve some issues presented); Roosevelt v. DOR, No. DV 98-50, 1998 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 824, *2 (Mont. 10th Judicial Dist. Aug. 25, 1998) (granting jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal under §§ 15-2-304, through -305, MCA). Compare Orcutt v. Mont. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court, No. OP 15-0516, 381 Mont. 544, 357 P.3d 337, *2 (Sept. 8, 2015) (notice of appeal automatically deprives district court of jurisdiction to hear most issues). Even if jurisdiction automatically accrued to the District Court upon filing of the Petition, it would vest again in MTAB when the District Court dismissed the Petition. Accord Labair v. Carey, 2017 MT 286, ¶ 21, 389 Mont. 366, 405 P.3d 1284. 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 We review de novo whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction.
In re Estate of Scott, 2023 MT 97, ¶ 9, 412 Mont. 303, 529 P.3d 867.
DISCUSSION
¶10 Did the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory adjudication of a matter the Montana Tax Appeal Board had already dismissed?
¶11 Hawkins argues the MTAB appeal is still pending because she filed her Declaration
on March 8, 2024, and MTAB thereafter had no authority to dismiss her case. In support
of this argument, Hawkins cites § 3-1-805, MCA, which is explicitly “limited in its
application” to situations not applicable here. Section 3-1-805, MCA, was enacted by
Supreme Court order in 1987 to govern the disqualification of judges for cause and
explicitly “limited . . . its application to judges presiding in district courts, justice of the
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06/24/2025
DA 24-0746 Case Number: DA 24-0746
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 134
KRIS HAWKINS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA, through its DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DV-24-145 Honorable Jennifer B. Lint, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Kris Hawkins, Self-Represented, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
David Burleigh, Senior Tax Counsel, Montana Department of Revenue, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 28, 2025
Decided: June 24, 2025
Filed: r,.6.,( __________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Kris Hawkins appeals from the October 23, 2024 order of the Twenty-First Judicial
District Court dismissing her petition for interlocutory adjudication of an appeal before the
Montana Tax Appeal Board (MTAB). We affirm.
¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:
Did the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory adjudication of a matter the Montana Tax Appeal Board had already dismissed?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 In March 2018, Aileen Davenport filed a Realty Transfer Certificate indicating the
property located at 5310 Lower Martin Lane (Property) in Florence, Ravalli County, had
been transferred to the Olson Trust (Trust). In April 2018, and again in January 2019, the
Department of Revenue (DOR) requested documentation identifying the trustee of the
Trust, which was never provided.
¶4 In July 2023, Hawkins, purporting to act as trustee of the Trust, requested informal
review of DOR’s appraised value of the Property. DOR did not adjust the appraised value,
which Hawkins appealed to the Ravalli County Tax Appeals Board. However, there was
some doubt as to whether Hawkins was the trustee of the Trust.1 After several requests to
provide documentation proving Hawkins’s status as trustee, Hawkins filed a certification
1 Among other concerns, DOR never had an official record of the trustee of the Trust, despite requesting such information several times in 2018 and 2019; had recently received a letter from Aileen Davenport, purporting to be trustee, in January of 2023; and Hawkins’s repeated refusal to provide supporting documentation, despite claiming to have it (and which apparently and “coincidentally” was lost to a fire on the exact day MTAB first sent a letter requesting the documentation). 2 of trust pursuant to § 72-38-1013, MCA, claiming she was trustee. The Ravalli County
Tax Appeals Board denied Hawkins’s request for a reduction in value. Hawkins appealed
to MTAB, which requested confirmation of Hawkins’s role as trustee of the Trust several
times—first via letter dated February 2, 2024, second via order filed March 14, and third
via order filed April 29. See § 72-38-1013(5), MCA.
¶5 On March 8, Hawkins filed a declaration in support of disqualification (Declaration)
of the MTAB members, alleging bias and violations of her rights. The Declaration did not
cite any statutes or contain any facts underscoring her belief that MTAB should be
disqualified. MTAB took no action on the Declaration until addressing it in the order of
dismissal.
¶6 On March 22, 2024, Hawkins filed a petition for interlocutory adjudication
(Petition) with the District Court, pursuant to § 15-2-304, MCA. On March 25, the court
sua sponte struck the Petition as the Trust was an entity and was not represented by an
attorney. On April 1, Hawkins filed a motion in the District Court, requesting the court
substitute her for the Trust as petitioner and to reinstate the Petition.
¶7 On April 29, MTAB issued another order to provide documentation of Hawkins’s
role as trustee within thirty days or it would dismiss the appeal. Hawkins did not provide
the documentation. Instead, on May 1, Hawkins sent an “Objection and Demand” asserting
the order was without authority following her March 8 Declaration and demanding MTAB
“IN DETAIL” set forth the facts upon which it was continuing to act. (Emphasis in
original.) Failure to do so, Hawkins asserted, would constitute admissions MTAB had no
authority in the appeal, had a significant conflict of interest precluding a fair and impartial
3 hearing, and that MTAB’s orders to provide additional documentation were made in bad
faith. On June 14, MTAB dismissed the appeal and also found Hawkins’s Declaration was
“unsupported.”
¶8 On July 5, Hawkins filed a “Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion” in the
District Court, arguing the court should grant her March 31 motion. On July 8, the District
Court granted her motion, substituting Hawkins for the Trust, and reinstated the Petition
for Interlocutory Adjudication.2 DOR filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction as the underlying MTAB case had already been dismissed. The
District Court granted the motion, holding “The record unequivocally demonstrates that
the matter before the MTAB has concluded, despite Petitioner’s desire to void the MTAB’s
dismissal via her baseless disqualification filing.” The court therefore dismissed the
Petition, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction for an interlocutory adjudication of a
matter no longer pending before MTAB. Separately, the court found Hawkins’s Petition
would require it to find facts exceeding its authority under § 15-2-305, MCA. Hawkins
appeals.
2 However, at no time before dismissing the Petition did the District Court ever assume jurisdiction over the appeal and deprive MTAB of its jurisdiction. Accord Bechtel Group v. Dep’t of Revenue, No. ADV 98-448, 1998 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 412, *3–*4 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist. Oct. 2, 1998) (denying petition for interlocutory adjudication even though court would have jurisdiction to resolve some issues presented); Roosevelt v. DOR, No. DV 98-50, 1998 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 824, *2 (Mont. 10th Judicial Dist. Aug. 25, 1998) (granting jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal under §§ 15-2-304, through -305, MCA). Compare Orcutt v. Mont. Seventh Judicial Dist. Court, No. OP 15-0516, 381 Mont. 544, 357 P.3d 337, *2 (Sept. 8, 2015) (notice of appeal automatically deprives district court of jurisdiction to hear most issues). Even if jurisdiction automatically accrued to the District Court upon filing of the Petition, it would vest again in MTAB when the District Court dismissed the Petition. Accord Labair v. Carey, 2017 MT 286, ¶ 21, 389 Mont. 366, 405 P.3d 1284. 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 We review de novo whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction.
In re Estate of Scott, 2023 MT 97, ¶ 9, 412 Mont. 303, 529 P.3d 867.
DISCUSSION
¶10 Did the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory adjudication of a matter the Montana Tax Appeal Board had already dismissed?
¶11 Hawkins argues the MTAB appeal is still pending because she filed her Declaration
on March 8, 2024, and MTAB thereafter had no authority to dismiss her case. In support
of this argument, Hawkins cites § 3-1-805, MCA, which is explicitly “limited in its
application” to situations not applicable here. Section 3-1-805, MCA, was enacted by
Supreme Court order in 1987 to govern the disqualification of judges for cause and
explicitly “limited . . . its application to judges presiding in district courts, justice of the
peace courts, municipal courts, small claims courts, and city courts.” This statute provides
no authority for Hawkins’s arguments. It is not a legislatively enacted statute, but a
codification of a Supreme Court rule, which has no bearing on administrative agencies
exercising their quasi-judicial functions.
¶12 Hawkins also cites the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA),
§ 2-4-611(4), MCA, to argue MTAB lost jurisdiction to the Department of Administration
immediately after she filed her Declaration. This section is the proper statute and
“establishes the manner in which a party may file an affidavit of personal bias, lack of
independence, disqualification by law, or other disqualification of a hearing examiner.”
In re Sorini, 220 Mont. 459, 461–62, 717 P.2d 7, 9 (1986); see also § 15-2-301(5), MCA
5 (MAPA applicable to appeals from county tax board decisions except where in conflict).
Subsection (4) requires a “sufficient affidavit of personal bias, lack of independence,
disqualification by law, or other disqualification” after which “the agency” shall determine
the matter as part of the record and decision in the case.
¶13 Hawkins substitutes “the agency” with “department of administration,” which is not
the correct agency for an allegation of bias before MTAB. “The [MTAB] is attached to
the department of administration for administrative purposes only as provided in
[§] 2-15-121.” Section 15-2-102(1), MCA. Instead, when MTAB receives a “sufficient
affidavit” of bias or disqualification, MTAB is the proper “agency” to determine the matter
as part of the record and decision in the case.3 Section 2-4-611(4), MCA.
¶14 As MTAB found, Hawkins’s affidavit did not sufficiently allege bias. The District
Court also found the Declaration “baseless.” We agree. The affidavit contains 12
conclusory and self-serving statements alleging bias, none of which point to record
evidence or otherwise support a showing of bias. Many of the statements also allege
appealable issues rather than issues warranting disqualification due to bias. These
conclusory statements do not constitute a “sufficient affidavit.”
¶15 MTAB did not automatically lose jurisdiction of the case after Hawkins’s
unfounded Declaration. MTAB dismissed Hawkins’s appeal after her repeated failure to
3 Admin. R. M. 2.51.201 (2023), incorporates the attorney general’s model procedural rule located at Admin. R. M. 1.3.218(4) (2008). It states “an agency may disqualify a hearing examiner if the agency determines personal bias, lack of independence, disqualification by law, or other disqualification criteria exist. A motion to disqualify filed by a party must be supported by affidavit.” Given that, MTAB properly dismissed the Declaration as unfounded. That decision is—and already has been—subject to judicial review. 6 verify her status as trustee of the Trust. As such, when the District Court reinstated the
Petition, there was no “issue pending before” MTAB and the court therefore lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Section 15-2-305, MCA. Hawkins did not appeal
MTAB’s final decision under § 15-2-303, MCA. The court properly dismissed the
Petition.
CONCLUSION
¶16 The District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory
adjudication pursuant to § 15-2-305, MCA, when the underlying matter had already been
dismissed by MTAB.
¶17 Affirmed.
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON