07/07/2026
DA 25-0393 Case Number: DA 25-0393
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 149N
KRIS HAWKINS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
NORTHWESTERN CORPORATION, d/b/a NORTHWESTERN ENERGY,
Defendant & Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DV-24-0090 Honorable Howard F. Recht and Honorable Kaydee Snipes Ruiz, Presiding Judges
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Kris Hawkins, Self-Represented, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Michael L. Rausch, Christy S. McCann, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, P.C., Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 18, 2026
Decided: July 7, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Kris Hawkins, a self-represented litigant, on behalf of herself and on behalf of the
Olson Trust as a trustee (collectively Hawkins) appeals from the Montana Twenty-First
Judicial District Court’s April 24, 2025 Order denying her motion to disqualify
Northwestern Corporation’s (Northwestern) counsel, granting Northwestern’s motion to
strike the joinder of Terry Wallace as a plaintiff, and granting Northwestern’s September
2024 motion to dismiss.1 Hawkins only appeals the Order to the extent that it did not allow
Hawkins to join Wallace as a plaintiff and dismissed the case. We affirm.
¶3 In March 2024, Hawkins sued Northwestern and Rhoades & Erickson, PLLC
(Rhoades), asserting numerous causes of action, including negligence, civil conspiracy,
aiding and abetting criminal activity, actual fraud, actual malice, violations of the Montana
Consumer Protection Act, abuse and exploitation, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Hawkins supported these causes of actions by alleging that Northwestern
improperly provided utility services to two parcels of real property that the Olson Trust
purportedly owns. Hawkins named Rhoades as a defendant because the firm represented
1 Whether Hawkins, who is not a licensed attorney, can represent the Olson Trust as a trustee is an issue that Northwestern argued to the District Court and an issue we do not reach for purposes of this appeal. 2 third parties who occupied one of the parcels of property, and the firm sent a letter to
Hawkins to try to settle the dispute regarding the lawfulness of their clients’ occupancy.
¶4 In April 2024, Northwestern moved to dismiss the case pursuant to
M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and (5), which the District Court denied. Northwestern filed an
answer addressing Hawkins’s allegations and asserting affirmative defenses, including that
Hawkins failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In July 2024, the District
Court issued an order granting Rhoades’s motion to dismiss as to the claims that Hawkins
asserted against it.2 In September 2024, the District Court issued a case scheduling order
that established procedural deadlines, including that additional parties must be joined by
December 1, 2024.
¶5 On September 17, 2024, Northwestern filed a second motion to dismiss that
requested the District Court dismiss Hawkins’s case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Northwestern also asserted that Hawkins
could not represent the Olson Trust because she is not a licensed attorney. On October 3,
2024, Hawkins moved to strike Northwestern’s motion, arguing that Northwestern could
not file a second motion pursuant to Rule 12. On October 4, 2024, Hawkins moved the
District Court to grant her additional time to conduct discovery and to respond to
Northwestern’s motion to dismiss because she argued that the District Court must treat
Northwestern’s motion as a motion for summary judgment because Northwestern
presented matters outside the pleadings.
2 Hawkins clarified through briefing that the only two claims she asserted against Rhoades were aiding and abetting criminal activity and civil conspiracy. 3 ¶6 On October 15, 2024, Hawkins moved to disqualify the presiding judge, Judge
Recht, pursuant to § 3-1-805, MCA, alleging that he communicated ex parte with
Northwestern’s counsel. Judge Recht denied Hawkins’s motion because he determined
that the motion was procedurally defective under § 3-1-805, MCA. Hawkins petitioned
this Court for a writ of mandamus, asserting that Judge Recht erred by concluding her
motion was procedurally defective and requesting this Court to assign a judge to preside
over the disqualification motion and to stay all proceedings until the disqualification issue
was resolved. Judge Recht continued to preside over the case and entered a judgment
dismissing Rhoades from the case and certified the judgment as final for purposes of
appeal. On January 1, 2025, we issued an order dismissing Hawkins’s appeal of this
judgment without prejudice because we concluded that the District Court erred by
certifying the judgment as final for purposes of an appeal.
¶7 On January 6, 2025, Judge Kaydee Snipes Ruiz assumed jurisdiction of the case
upon Judge Recht’s invitation. We issued an order denying Hawkins’s petition for a writ
of mandamus because Judge Snipes Ruiz’s assumption of jurisdiction mooted Hawkins’s
petition. At a February 6, 2025 scheduling conference, Judge Snipes Ruiz, Hawkins,
Northwestern’s counsel, and Rhoades’s counsel discussed whether the September 2024
case scheduling order should be modified. Northwestern moved to vacate the September
2024 scheduling order’s remaining deadlines as of February 6, 2025, which the District
Court never ruled upon.
¶8 On February 13, 2025, Hawkins filed in the District Court a document titled
“Joinder of Party Plaintiff” that asserted she joined “Terry Wallace, the co-Trustee of the
4 Olson Trust, as a Plaintiff” pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 20. Northwestern moved to strike the
joinder, arguing that the September 2024 scheduling order’s deadline to join additional
parties had passed and that Hawkins did not substantively support joining Wallace as a
plaintiff. Hawkins responded by moving to vacate the entire September 2024 scheduling
order, arguing that the multiple pending motions and the matters involving Judge Recht’s
potential disqualification established good cause to modify the scheduling order. On
February 24, 2025, Northwestern moved to stay discovery and requested a protective order
in response to receiving discovery requests from Hawkins.
¶9 The District Court held a hearing on April 3, 2025, to address the pending motions,
including Northwestern’s motion to strike the joinder of Wallace, Northwestern’s motion
to dismiss, and Hawkins’s motion for extension of time and motion to strike
Northwestern’s motion to dismiss. Wallace and Hawkins testified to the joinder issue.3
On April 24, 2025, the District Court issued an order that was dispositive of all the pending
motions before it. The District Court dismissed the case pursuant to Montana Uniform
District Court Rule 2(c) because Hawkins failed to file a response brief to Northwestern’s
motion to dismiss. The District Court did not permit Hawkins to conduct additional
discovery because it treated Northwestern’s motion to dismiss as a motion to dismiss rather
than a motion for summary judgment. The District Court did not join Wallace as a plaintiff
because it reasoned that Hawkins’s joinder was untimely pursuant to the September 2024
3 Hawkins did not order the transcript of this hearing so the minutes from this hearing constitute the only document in the record on appeal that documents the testimony provided at the April 3, 2025 hearing. 5 scheduling order, that Hawkins failed to establish good cause to modify the scheduling
order, and that Hawkins did not provide a sufficient basis for joinder under
M. R. Civ. P. 20.
¶10 We review judicial disqualification questions de novo to determine whether the
district court’s decision was correct under the Montana Code of Judicial Conduct.
Draggin’ Y Cattle Co., Inc. v. Addink, 2016 MT 98, ¶ 10, 383 Mont. 243, 371 P.3d 970
(Draggin’ Y I) (citations omitted). “Our inquiry into disqualification requires an objective
examination of the circumstances surrounding potential judicial disqualification and an
accurate interpretation of the Montana Code of Judicial Conduct.” Draggin’ Y I, ¶ 10
(citation and internal quotations omitted).
¶11 We review a district court’s order granting or denying a motion pursuant to Montana
Uniform District Court Rule 2(c) for abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Marez &
Marshall, 2014 MT 333, ¶ 36, 377 Mont. 304, 340 P.3d 520 (citation omitted). We review
a district court’s ruling on whether to allow joinder of a party for an abuse of discretion.
In re Est. of Burns, 2023 MT 253, ¶ 9, 414 Mont. 365, 540 P.3d 1029 (citations omitted).
A district court abuses its discretion if “it acts arbitrarily, without employment of
conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in a substantial
injustice.” Est. of Burns, ¶ 9 (citation omitted).
¶12 Hawkins argues the District Court should be reversed on multiple grounds,
including (1) that Judge Snipes Ruiz lacked jurisdiction over the underlying case because
she accepted jurisdiction upon Judge Recht’s invitation, (2) that ruling upon
6 Northwestern’s second motion to dismiss was improper under the Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure, and (3) that the District Court erred by not joining Wallace as a plaintiff.
¶13 “Rule 2.12 of the Montana Code of Judicial Conduct and §§ 3-1-803, and -805,
MCA, govern[ ] judicial disqualification.” Draggin’ Y I, ¶ 18 (citations omitted).
Section 3-1-805, MCA, sets forth the procedure that governs a disqualification issue once
a party files an affidavit that contains factual allegations showing the presiding judge’s
personal bias or prejudice, including that the presiding judge will proceed no further in the
case once a party files a sufficient affidavit, that the matter shall be referred to the Montana
Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice shall assign a district judge to hear the
disqualification issue. Draggin’ Y Cattle Co., Inc. v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella,
Stevens, P.C., 2017 MT 125, ¶ 31, 387 Mont. 430, 395 P.3d 497 (Draggin’ Y II) (citation
omitted). A party waives a claim for disqualification other than for bias or prejudice “[i]f
[the] party does not raise its disqualification claim ‘within a reasonable time’ of learning
the facts underlying its claim.” Draggin’ Y I, ¶ 19 (quoting State v. Dunsmore, 2015 MT
108, ¶ 20, 378 Mont. 514, 347 P.3d 1220).
¶14 Hawkins asserts that Judge Snipes Ruiz lacked jurisdiction over the underlying
matter because she accepted jurisdiction of the underlying case upon Judge Recht’s
invitation rather than assuming jurisdiction after the procedures outlined by § 3-1-805,
MCA, were followed. Hawkins contends that allowing Judge Recht to select his successor
contravenes the principles of judicial impartiality and maintaining fair tribunals.
Northwestern argues that Hawkins waived contesting how Judge Snipes Ruiz was assigned
to the case because Hawkins did not object to Judge Snipes Ruiz’s assignment until filing
7 this appeal. Hawkins contends she did not waive objecting to Judge Snipes Ruiz’s
jurisdiction because she did not need to repeatedly argue that the presiding judge should
be disqualified once she sought to disqualify Judge Recht.
¶15 Hawkins’s argument that Judge Snipes Ruiz lacked jurisdiction because Judge
Snipes Ruiz assumed jurisdiction upon Judge Recht’s invitation rather than assuming
jurisdiction pursuant to § 3-1-805, MCA, constitutes a procedural challenge that is subject
to the timeliness requirement. Similarly, Hawkins’s argument—that Judge Recht’s
involvement in selecting his successor contravenes the principles of judicial impartiality
and maintaining fair tribunals—is also subject to the timeliness requirement because it
effectively asserts that Judge Snipes Ruiz’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned
rather than asserting that Judge Snipes Ruiz held bias or prejudice against Hawkins. See
Draggin’ Y I, ¶ 18 (litigant’s disqualification claim based on potential conflict of interest
that allegedly created reasonable questions as to judge’s impartiality was subject to
waiver).
¶16 Hawkins knew from the moment that Judge Snipes Ruiz assumed jurisdiction over
the case that she accepted jurisdiction upon Judge Recht’s invitation, yet she never objected
to Judge Snipes Ruiz’s assignment until filing this appeal. Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that Hawkins had a valid basis for objecting to Judge Snipes Ruiz’s assumption
of jurisdiction, she waived her objection by failing to raise her concerns within a reasonable
time of discovering the information because she raised her concern for the first time on
appeal.
8 ¶17 Montana Uniform District Court Rule 2(c) provides that “[f]ailure to file an answer
brief by the opposing party within the time allowed shall be deemed an admission that the
motion is well taken.” Rule 2(c) “allows a trial court discretion to either grant or deny an
unanswered motion.” Marriage of Marez & Marshall, ¶ 36 (citation omitted). Rule 2(c)
cannot “convert a motion which is incorrect as a matter of law into a motion which is well
taken as a matter of law.” State v. Pizzola, 283 Mont. 522, 525, 942 P.2d 709, 711 (1997).
¶18 Hawkins does not dispute that she failed to file a response brief opposing
Northwestern’s motion to dismiss. Hawkins’s failure to file a response brief permitted the
District Court to deem Northwestern’s motion as well taken and grant Northwestern’s
motion on this basis. Hawkins asserts numerous arguments that challenge whether it was
legally correct under the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure to grant Northwestern’s motion
to dismiss, including that Northwestern waived its opportunity to argue that Rule 12(b)(6)
required dismissal, that the District Court erred by not converting Northwestern’s motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and that dismissing the case on procedural
grounds constituted an unlawful sanction.
¶19 The consequence of failing to raise an argument in an initial Rule 12 motion depends
on the type of defense omitted. M. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) provides that “[a] party waives any
defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) by: (A) omitting it from a motion in the circumstances
described in Rule 12(g)(2).” See also Garza v. Forquest Ventures, Inc., 2015 MT 284,
¶ 48, 381 Mont. 189, 358 P.3d 189 (“this Court’s precedent makes clear that a party waives
a [Rule 12(b)(2) defense] by failing to [timely object] as prescribed by M. R. Civ. P. 12”)
(citations omitted). Rule 12(g)(2) provides that “except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or
9 (3),” a party cannot file “another motion under [Rule 12] raising a defense or objection that
was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.” Rule 12(h)(2) allows a
party to assert the Rule 12(b)(6) defense—that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted”—in ways other than a Rule 12 motion, including “(A) in any
pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or (C) at
trial.”
¶20 We construe the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure in a manner that “secure[s] the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”
M. R. Civ. P. 1.
¶21 Hawkins correctly asserts that Northwestern failed to argue that the District Court
should dismiss Hawkins’s case for failure to state a claim under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in
its initial motion to dismiss. But the untimeliness of Northwestern’s Rule 12(b)(6)
argument did not require the District Court to deny Northwestern’s motion without
addressing its merits. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by considering
Northwestern’s second motion to dismiss because addressing the merits of the motion
would have promoted judicial economy by narrowing multiple preliminary legal issues,
including whether Hawkins could sue on behalf of the Olson Trust and whether Hawkins
had pled sufficient facts to support the numerous theories of recovery she asserted in the
Complaint. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by considering Northwestern’s
second motion to dismiss filed pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) under the circumstances.
¶22 Hawkins argues in the alternative that M. R. Civ. P. 12(d) required the District Court
to convert Northwestern’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and to
10 provide her with a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery because Northwestern
attached and referenced matters outside the pleadings. Northwestern asserts the matters it
introduced are not matters outside the pleadings because they are matters of public record.
¶23 “When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, district courts have discretion
to consider matters presented outside of the pleadings.” Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., N.A.,
2017 MT 313, ¶ 24, 390 Mont. 12, 407 P.3d 692 (citing Ming Da Situ v. Smole, 2013 MT
33, ¶ 29, 369 Mont. 1, 303 P.3d 747). If the district court considers matters outside the
pleadings, it must notify the parties of its decision, treat the motion as one for summary
judgment under M. R. Civ. P. 56, and afford the parties an opportunity to make the factual
showing necessary to support or oppose the motion. Anderson, ¶ 24 (citing M. R. Civ. P.
12(d)). “Mere reference to a fact outside the pleadings having no bearing on the court’s
decision is insufficient to require conversion of a motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment.” Anderson, ¶ 24 (citation omitted). “[W]e [do] not assume that a
district court considered matters outside the pleadings absent some contrary showing or
indication.” Anderson, ¶ 24 (citation omitted).
¶24 We do not need to address whether the exhibits attached to and the factual
statements within Northwestern’s motion to dismiss introduced matters outside the
pleadings because the matters had no bearing on the District Court’s decision.
Northwestern’s factual statements and the attached exhibits were immaterial to the District
Court’s decision because the District Court granted Northwestern’s motion on Hawkins’s
failure to file a response brief. Under these circumstances, the District Court did not abuse
11 discretion by not converting Northwestern’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment.
¶25 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by considering Northwestern’s
motion to dismiss, deeming the motion as well taken, and dismissing the case because of
Hawkins’s failure to respond.4
¶26 Hawkins argues that the District Court erred in multiple respects by not allowing
her to join Wallace as a plaintiff. Hawkins argues that M. R. Civ. P. 20 permitted her to
join Wallace without leave of the court, that the September 2024 scheduling order issued
by Judge Recht became void when Judge Snipes Ruiz assumed jurisdiction, and that good
cause existed to extend the scheduling order’s deadline to join parties because of the
numerous outstanding motions and the issues concerning Judge Recht’s alleged bias.
Northwestern reiterates the District Court’s reasoning to contend that the District Court
correctly did not join Wallace as a plaintiff.
¶27 M. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A) requires the district court to set a scheduling order that
establishes a timeline for the case, including a deadline to “join other parties.” A
scheduling order may only be modified for good cause and with consent of the judge.
M. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Whether good cause exists “depend[s] upon the totality of the facts
and circumstances of a particular case.” Brookins v. Mote, 2012 MT 283, ¶ 29, 367 Mont.
193, 292 P.3d 347 (citation omitted).
4 Hawkins’s argument that the District Court imposed an unlawful sanction by granting Northwestern’s motion to dismiss has no merit. The District Court exercised its discretion to deem the unanswered motion as well taken under Montana Uniform District Court Rule 2(c) and dismiss the case rather than imposing a sanction under M. R. Civ. P. 11. 12 ¶28 Hawkins sought to join Wallace as a plaintiff pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 20. Rule
20(a)(1) allows a party to join the case as a plaintiff if “(A) they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact
common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” We have stated that the “[s]tandards for
permissive joinder under Rule 20 are to be liberally construed to promote trial convenience
and judicial economy while preserving the substantial rights of the parties.” Est. of Burns,
¶ 15 (citations omitted). “District courts have broad discretion over the joinder of proper
parties under Rule 20.” Est. of Burns, ¶ 15 (citation omitted).
¶29 The District Court did not allow Hawkins to join Wallace as a plaintiff because it
reasoned that Hawkins sought to join Wallace after the September 2024 scheduling order’s
deadline to join parties had passed, that she failed to sufficiently support joinder of Wallace
under Rule 20, and that her subsequent motion to vacate the September 2024 scheduling
order did not show good cause to extend the deadline.
¶30 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by not joining Wallace as a plaintiff.
The District Court correctly determined that Hawkins failed to join Wallace by December
1, 2024, as required by the September 2024 scheduling order. Hawkins’s argument that
the September 2024 scheduling order was void when Judge Snipes Ruiz assumed
jurisdiction is contrary to the plain language of Rule 16(b)(4). Rule 16(b)(4) provides that
“[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”
¶31 None of the judges who presided over the underlying matter issued an order that
modified the September 2024 scheduling order, and Judge Snipes Ruiz did not err by
13 concluding that good cause did not exist to modify the September 2024 scheduling order
under the circumstances. Hawkins failed to substantively establish that joining Wallace as
a plaintiff under Rule 20 was appropriate because her joinder summarily asserted that
Wallace was a co-trustee of the Olson Trust without providing any evidence to support this
assertion. Northwestern presented information that indicated that adding Wallace as a
plaintiff would hinder trial convenience and judicial economy; the information showed that
Wallace had been deemed a vexatious litigant by this Court in Wallace v. Law Offices of
Bruce M. Spencer, PLLC, 2021 MT 253, 405 Mont. 473, 495 P.3d 1047, and that Wallace
had been suspended from practicing law in Montana in 2018. The numerous pending
motions before the District Court and questions as to Judge Recht’s jurisdiction over the
matter may have stalled the case from moving beyond Northwestern’s motion to dismiss,
but the District Court did not err by determining good cause did not exist to modify the
scheduling order when Hawkins failed to offer evidence to support joinder and
Northwestern provided information that indicated that joining Wallace could impede the
timely and orderly resolution of the case.
¶32 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review. The District Court’s interpretation and application of the
law were correct to the extent the District Court interpreted or applied the law. The District
Court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion to the extent the District Court exercised its
discretion. The District Court’s April 24, 2025 Order is affirmed.
14 /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE