Hawkins v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Hawkins v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp.

201 A.D.2d 650, 607 N.Y.S.2d 986, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1391

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 22, 1994

StatusPublished

This text of 201 A.D.2d 650 (Hawkins v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hawkins v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 201 A.D.2d 650, 607 N.Y.S.2d 986, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1391 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994).

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Opinion

In a special proceeding pursuant to Insurance Law article 52, the petitioners appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Miller, J.), dated December 12, 1991, as, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination in an infant’s compromise order of the same court, dated June 27, 1991, which required the petitioner-child to assign her rights against the petitioner-mother as tortfeasor to the respondent.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

As the Supreme Court properly concluded, any seeming inequity in the fact that the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation will be entitled to move against the petitioner-mother after the petitioner-child has assigned her rights to it is a matter properly addressed to the Legislature, not the courts (see, MVAIC v American Sec. Ins. Co., 148 AD2d 383). Thompson, J. P., Rosenblatt, Ritter, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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In a special proceeding pursuant to Insurance Law article 52, the petitioners appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Miller, J.), dated December 12, 1991, as, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination in an infant’s compromise order of the same court, dated June 27, 1991, which required the petitioner-child to assign her rights against the petitioner-mother as tortfeasor to the respondent.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

As the Supreme Court properly concluded, any seeming inequity in the fact that the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation will be entitled to move against the petitioner-mother after the petitioner-child has assigned her rights to it is a matter properly addressed to the Legislature, not the courts (see, MVAIC v American Sec. Ins. Co., 148 AD2d 383). Thompson, J. P., Rosenblatt, Ritter, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

201 A.D.2d 650, 607 N.Y.S.2d 986, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1391, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawkins-v-motor-vehicle-accident-indemnification-corp-nyappdiv-1994.

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