Hawkins v. Commissioner of Social Security

W.D. Texas

Hawkins v. Commissioner of Social Security

DecidedOctober 21, 2021

Docket1:20-cv-00889

StatusUnknown

This text of Hawkins v. Commissioner of Social Security (Hawkins v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

WINONA FAY HAWKINS, § Plaintiff § § A-20-CV-889-DH v. § § KILOLO KIJAKAZI, § COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL § SECURITY, 1 § Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This is an appeal of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying an application for disability benefits. Before the Court are: Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, Dkt. 14; Brief in Support of the Commissioner’s Decision, Dkt. 16; and Plaintiff’s Reply, Dkt. 17; as well as the administrative record, cited as “Tr.” I. GENERAL BACKGROUND On June 9, 2017, Plaintiff Winona Fay Hawkins filed applications for Title II Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income, alleging disability beginning May 2, 2012, due to rheumatoid arthritis, peripheral neuropathy, fibromyalgia, hearing loss, vision problems, thyroid disorder, degenerative disc disease, kidney disease, and back and neck problems. Tr. 83-84, 93- 94. Hawkins was 46 years old on the original alleged onset date and 52 years old on

1 On July 9, 2021, Kilolo Kijakazi assumed the office of Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, replacing Commissioner Andrew Saul. The Court automatically substitutes Kijakazi as Defendant pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d). the date of her application. Tr. 25, 83, 93, 275. Hawkins has completed the eighth grade, but has a GED education, completed in June 2002, and no past relevant work. Tr. 44, 314. Hawkins’ claims were initially denied on August 17, 2017, Tr. 103-04,

and again upon reconsideration on January 2, 2018. Tr. 103-04, 133, 135. During the hearing held on April 24, 2019, Hawkins amended her alleged onset date to November 23, 2015. Tr. 37-63. After the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued an unfavorable decision on November 6, 2019. Tr. 16-27. In the decision, the ALJ found Hawkins met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2016, and she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 23, 2015, the amended alleged onset date. Tr. 18. The ALJ found

Hawkins suffered from the severe impairments of obesity, rheumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asthma, tobacco abuse, and depressive disorder, none of which met or medically equaled a listed impairment of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 18-19. The ALJ determined Hawkins has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567(b) and § 416.967(b) except:

she is limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, but is precluded from climbing ropes, ladders, and scaffolds. She is able to occasionally stoop, crouch, crawl, kneel, or balance. The claimant should avoid even moderate exposure to airborne irritants including dust, fumes, gases, and poor ventilation. She should avoid hazards including unprotected heights, open flames, and driving as a job duty. The claimant retains the ability to frequently reach, handle, finger, and feel. From a mental standpoint, the claimant is able to understand, remember, and carryout detailed but noncomplex instructions. Tr. 20. The ALJ found that Hawkins was unable to perform her past relevant work, but would be able to perform other occupations in the national economy; namely routing clerk, retail marker, and counter attendant. Tr. 25-26. Thus, the ALJ

determined that Hawkins was not disabled. Tr. 27. On June 22, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Hawkins’ request for review. Tr. 1-6. Hawkins has now exhausted her administrative remedies and seeks judicial review of the administrative proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Social Security Act defines “disability” as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine if a claimant is able to engage in “substantial gainful activity” (and therefore if he is disabled) the Social Security Commissioner uses a five-step analysis: 1. a claimant who is working, engaging in a substantial gainful activity, will not be found to be disabled no matter what the medical findings are;

2. a claimant will not be found to be disabled unless he has a “severe impairment”;

3. a claimant whose impairment meets or is equivalent to an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations will be considered disabled without the need to consider vocational factors;

4. a claimant who is capable of performing work that he has done in the past must be found “not disabled”; and

5. if the claimant is unable to perform his previous work as a result of his impairment, then factors such as his age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine whether he can do other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994). A finding of disability or no disability at any step is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). The claimant has the burden of proof for the first four steps; at step five, the burden initially shifts to the Commissioner to identify other work the applicant is capable of performing. Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1990). Then, if the Commissioner “fulfills his

burden of pointing out potential alternative employment, the burden ... shifts back to the claimant to prove that he is unable to perform the alternate work.” Id. (citation omitted). Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision; and (2) whether the Commissioner correctly

applied the relevant legal standards. Kinash v. Callahan, 129 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance—in other words, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995). The Court considers four elements of proof when determining whether there is substantial evidence of a disability: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant’s subjective

evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work history. Id. at 174.

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