Hawkins v. Coleman

376 F. Supp. 1330, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8216
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedJune 5, 1974
DocketCA-3-5774-B
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 376 F. Supp. 1330 (Hawkins v. Coleman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8216 (N.D. Tex. 1974).

Opinion

OPINION

HUGHES, District Judge.

After two years of litigation and two appeals to the Fifth Circuit, on May 7, 1974, this Court commenced hearings on plaintiffs’ plea for permanent injunctive *1331 relief. Upon a consideration of the evidence, the briefs and arguments of counsel, this Opinion has been entered.

The Original Complaint was filed on April 17, 1972, by Delbert Hawkins, by his parent and next friend Ruth Hawkins, on behalf of himself and a class of black students within the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) arising from his suspension from the DISD contesting the adoption, substance and enforcement of the D>ISD student suspension procedures on the grounds of race discrimination, the denial of equal protection, and the denial of both substantive and procedural due process. A Temporary Restraining Order was entered on April 19, 1972, ordering the immediate reinstatement of plaintiff Hawkins and restraining defendants from enforcing the DISD indefinite suspension policies and procedures. Following an evidentiary hearing, a Preliminary Injunction was entered on May 2, 1972.

On appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the Fifth Circuit ruled that portion of the preliminary injunction ordering reinstatement of plaintiff Hawkins to be moot because the school year had ended. The remaining issues were remanded to this Court for further consideration.

On remand it was determined by the Court that the “class” represented by plaintiff Hawkins is comprised of all black students who are currently enrolled or assigned to schools operated by the DISD at which white Anglo-American students outnumber black American students. (Pl.Ex. 1) 1

The DISD is the principal school district in Dallas County, Texas, operating during the 1973-1974 school year some 24 high schools, 24 junior high schools, and 141 elementary schools. (Pl.Ex. 1). Defendants in this cause are various persons of responsibility within the DISD. 2

Until the summer of 1971, the DISD continued to operate a dual school system, which segregated operations resulted in the Memorandum Opinion rendered by the Hon. William M. Taylor, Jr., in Tasby v. Estates, 342 F.Supp. 945 (N.D.Tex.1971), appeal pending.

As a result of the Tasby decision, the DISD entered into a program of student *1332 re-assignment designed to bring about an integrated school system. This program of student re-assignment resulted in a substantial number of black students being transferred from schools in which black students were in the majority to schools in which black students were in the minority.

The issues on this hearing are substantially the same as those in the original complaint and focus upon the student suspension procedures per se or upon the application of those procedures.

It is plaintiffs’ contention that (1) the suspension procedures lack due process (2) the application of the procedures amounts to a denial of equal protection and (3) the procedures are enforced in a racially discriminatory manner.

Discussing the procedures themselves, it is defendant’s contention that since the hearing on the preliminary injunction new procedures have been adopted which provide procedural due process.

As amended November 1973, the rules provide for three types of suspension discipline: (a) a 3-day suspension, (b) a 3 to 10 day suspension, and (c) a more than 10 day suspension. In case of a 3-day suspension action may be taken by the principal or the assistant principal. The parent is notified in writing of the reasons and is given a copy of the suspension policies and regulations.

If the conduct of a pupil is considered to be more serious the principal may suspend for a period of 10 days provided that the parent has been notified of the charges, given a copy of the policies and regulations and notified that he may request a hearing.

If it is considered by the principal that the conduct would materially interfere with the normal educational process the case is referred to the Associate Superintendent — School Operations for a Third Party Hearing. The parent and pupil are notified of the charge and “his right of and procedure for a hearing”. The parent is also informed “of his right to be assisted by an adult person who may present the pupil’s side and interrogate witnesses”.

In determining whether school rules provide for due process the Fifth Circuit in Boykins v. Fairfield Board of Education, 1974, 492 F.2d 697, said, “Basic fairness and integrity of the fact-finding process are the guiding stars.” Measured by the requirement of the cases 3 this Court is of the opinion that DISD rules provide for procedural due process.

However, in the case of 3 day and 3-10 day suspensions, if the facts demonstrate “that a school official’s involvement in an incident is such as to preclude his affording the student an impartial hearing” some one other than the principal should be designated to make a decision. Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 475 F.2d 1071 at 1077 (5th Cir. 1973). This direction to school officials, however, does not require an amendment of the rules as the rules cannot provide for every fact situation. Also in a 3-10 day suspension there may be situations where due process requires that there should be a hearing before the suspension, but this likewise would in the opinion of this Court be a special case requiring no amendment of the rules. Pervis v. La Marque Independent School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1972).

The greater part of plaintiffs’ evidence dealt with the application and enforcement of the discipline procedures. This testimony consisted of (1) DISD student suspension data (2) analysis of that data by an expert witness and (3) evaluation of the meaning of the analysis.

*1333 The suspensions for all schools in the DISD for the year 1972-1973 are as follows: (Pl.Ex. 3).

The statistics for the first half of the 1973-1974 school year show a similar trend.

These unrebutted statistics establish that there exists within the DISD a disproportionate suspension ratio between black students and white students.

Wih respect to corporal punishment, the DISD for the school year 1972-1973 for the first time maintained statistics on the basis of race. (Pl.Ex. 3). An examination of these statistics reveals the following corporal punishment ratios.

The computer print out of corporal punishment administered by the DISD during the first half of the 1973-1974 school year is shown to be as follows:

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Related

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
376 F. Supp. 1330, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8216, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawkins-v-coleman-txnd-1974.