Hawkeye Portland Cement Co. v. Williams

239 N.W. 120, 213 Iowa 482
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedNovember 24, 1931
DocketNo. 41071.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 239 N.W. 120 (Hawkeye Portland Cement Co. v. Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hawkeye Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 239 N.W. 120, 213 Iowa 482 (iowa 1931).

Opinion

Grimm, J.

The Hawkeye Portland Cement Company, hereinafter, for brevity, called the “Cement Company” or “Company,” has since and prior to 1923 owned an extensive cement plant which lies immediately across the road from land belonging to the defendants (appellants). The cement company has extensive improvements on its property, which said improvements are immediately adjacent to the public highway and immediately across the public highway from the barns, sheds, feed lots and other farm improvements on the farm owned by the defendants. It appears that at times there are as many as 200 employees who work on the premises of the cement company. There are no buildings in the vicinity for a quarter of a mile or more, other than those of the cement company and farm buildings on defendants’ farm across the road. The cement company buildings are on the south side of an east and west public highway and the farm in question is on the north side. The particular portion of the farm in controversy is what is known as the feed lot. In it are two springs, one known as the north spring *484 and the other as the south spring. As these springs flowed naturally, the water passed down a ravine in a southwesterly direction, across the road onto the property of the cement company, in close proximity to and immediately west of its main buildings.

Prior to 1923, the cement company had constructed a dam across this outlet of the springs, thereby creating a pool out of which it procured the water for its boilers. The springs were approximately 8 or 10 rods apart, and it was about 15 rods from the point where the water of the two springs came together, to the public highway on the south.

One Spatz, who owned the farm in 1923 and prior thereto, had piped the south spring out to a tank, and he had dug a reservoir around 'the north spring, installing a cement curb. The stock in the feed lot drank out of this reservoir. The overflow of the water from each of the springs passed down the ravine across the road and onto the property of the plaintiff.

One Prohaska was at that time managing officer and agent. of the plaintiff company. Prohaska and Spatz talked about the overflow water and the use thereof by the plaintiff company. It was finally agreed between the parties, in substance, as follows : That the water from both springs should go into one tank. The farmer was to have the first use of all the water and the overflow was to be. piped down the natural ravine to the plaintiff’s property to be by them used for any and all purposes. The cement company built a tank and laid the pipe to their premises. A pump was put in the south spring by the farmer.

It also appears that the barn on the farm was west of the north spring, and there was a shed west of a point midway between the north and the south spring. The dwelling house on the farm was north and west of the north spring, but apparently water was carried from the south spring to the farmhouse for use in the farmhouse.

It seems that at the time of the installation of the tank and piping hereinbefore referred to by the plaintiff, people were in the habit'of passing from the highway into the farmer’s feed lot and taking water from the south spring. For a time the water was taken from the spring by a bucket. Later, a cover was put on the spring, and still later, the plaintiff built up a cement platform, rounding in form, two or three feet in height, *485 on the top of which was placed a pump. As the employees of the cement company passed from the buildings of the cement company across the road into the feed lot to this pump, they at first used a gate, or other passageway through the fence. After-wards, the farmer built a substantial fence, and over it he constructed steps by which persons could easily pass over the fence.

There were renewals or repairs to different parts of these tanks, pipes and other structures, made at different times, some of the renewals and repairs to the pump on the south spring having been made by the farmer, others by the cement company.

The cement company employees continued to use these steps to the south spring and to get water therefrom. There is also evidence to the effect that the public at times proceeded over these steps and down the path to the spring, where they procured water. The use thus made of the south spring, principally by the employees of the plaintiff company, created a well-defined pathway from these wooden steps over the fence to the pump at the south springs. This path was so much used and so well worn as to remove entirely all vegetation therefrom and to cause a depression, varying in depth. The steps were in plain sight and plainly visible to anyone passing along the highway. There was a slight decline from the foot of the steps north of the fence to the pump, but the well-beaten and well-marked pathway was easily discernible from the roadway.

The farmer Spatz conveyed the land to Williams about February 1, 1929. Williams, however, was cashier of the Citizens State Bank of Earlham, and the purchase was in fact made for the bank. The bank later passed into the hands of a receiver.

It appears that in March, 1929, after the purchase of the farm by Williams, 200 feet of pipe was renewed on the farm by the plaintiff. In September, 1930, the water was shut off by the defendants. The steps were torn down and the pump was taken out of the south spring. This was done on or about the 7th day of September, 1930. It appears that the bank closed on the 5th day of December, 1930.

Suit was then brought by the plaintiff to restrain the defendants from interfering with the use of the water by the plaintiff. The trial court issued a decree, restraining all of the defendants from in any manner interfering with the plaintiff’s rights under its easement to pipe away or pump and carry away *486 water from the springs. It is from this decree that the defendants appeal.

I. The appellants’ argument contains the following:

“The record shows that appelleee made the so-called improvements under an express agreement which was that appellee could have the surplus water after it was carried off of appellant’s land through overflow pipes.”

It is not contended by the appellant that the agreement hereinbefore referred to between the cement company and the then landowner in 1923 in relation to piping the surplus water not needed by the farmer to the premises of the plaintiff was not made. Apparently, the defendants concede that the plaintiff is entitled to the use of the surplus water, as the same passes through the pipes to the plaintiff’s premises. It necessarily follows that the plaintiff would be entitled to go upon the land for the purpose of repairing the tanks, pipes and other equipment used in carrying the overflow to the plaintiff’s premises.

It follows that the court correctly ruled in relation to the overflow water.

II. The appellant strenuously contends there never was any agreement made whereby the employees of the plaintiff were to be permitted to enter the premises of the farmer and carry water therefrom.

The oral agreement in reference to piping the surplus water from the farm to the premises of the cement company was made about the year 1923.

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Bluebook (online)
239 N.W. 120, 213 Iowa 482, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawkeye-portland-cement-co-v-williams-iowa-1931.