Hawes v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Hawes v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n

89 S.E.2d 739, 243 N.C. 62, 1955 N.C. LEXIS 693

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedNovember 2, 1955

Docket398

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 89 S.E.2d 739 (Hawes v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hawes v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 89 S.E.2d 739, 243 N.C. 62, 1955 N.C. LEXIS 693 (N.C. 1955).

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Opinion

PARKER, J.

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act the Industrial Commission is constituted the fact-finding body, and their findings, if supported by competent evidence, are “conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.” G.S. 97-86; Cooper v. Ice Co., 230 N.C. 43, 51 S.E. 2d 889. This is true even though there may be competent evidence which would have supported a contrary finding. Creighton v. Snipes, 227 N.C. 90, 40 S.E. 2d 612. However, this does not mean that the conclusions of the Commission based upon the facts found are in all respects unexceptionable. Perley v. Paving Co., 228 N.C. 479, 46 S.E. 2d 298; Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co., 228 N.C. 447, 46 S.E. 2d 109.

The relationship created by the facts found here by the Commission is a question of law, and the conclusion of the Commission based on those facts is reviewable. Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E. 2d 137.

After a careful analysis of the evidence and the findings of fact we arrive at the decision that the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and the conclusion of the Commission founded upon the facts found, that the relationship between Maynard Hawes, the deceased, and the defendants was not that of employee and employer, was correct. McCraw v. Mills, Inc., 233 N.C. 524, 64 S.E. 2d 658; Perley v. Paving Co., supra; Hayes v. Elon College, supra; Beach v. McLean, 219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E. 2d 515; Bryson v. Lumber Co., 204 N.C. 664, 169 S.E. 276; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State, 71 N.D. 78, 298 N.W. 773, 138 A.L.R. 1115; Income Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 168 Tenn. 471, 79 S.W. 2d 572.

It would seem that when the deceased signed the statement that he agreed not to solicit any business for the defendants or collect any premiums after 6 July 1952 at midnight, at which time his licenses were cancelled, that he had severed all relations with the companies.

The judgment of the Superior Court is

Affirmed.

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PARKER, J.

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act the Industrial Commission is constituted the fact-finding body, and their findings, if supported by competent evidence, are “conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.” G.S. 97-86; Cooper v. Ice Co., 230 N.C. 43, 51 S.E. 2d 889. This is true even though there may be competent evidence which would have supported a contrary finding. Creighton v. Snipes, 227 N.C. 90, 40 S.E. 2d 612. However, this does not mean that the conclusions of the Commission based upon the facts found are in all respects unexceptionable. Perley v. Paving Co., 228 N.C. 479, 46 S.E. 2d 298; Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co., 228 N.C. 447, 46 S.E. 2d 109.

The relationship created by the facts found here by the Commission is a question of law, and the conclusion of the Commission based on those facts is reviewable. Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E. 2d 137.

After a careful analysis of the evidence and the findings of fact we arrive at the decision that the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and the conclusion of the Commission founded upon the facts found, that the relationship between Maynard Hawes, the deceased, and the defendants was not that of employee and employer, was correct. McCraw v. Mills, Inc., 233 N.C. 524, 64 S.E. 2d 658; Perley v. Paving Co., supra; Hayes v. Elon College, supra; Beach v. McLean, 219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E. 2d 515; Bryson v. Lumber Co., 204 N.C. 664, 169 S.E. 276; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State, 71 N.D. 78, 298 N.W. 773, 138 A.L.R. 1115; Income Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 168 Tenn. 471, 79 S.W. 2d 572.

It would seem that when the deceased signed the statement that he agreed not to solicit any business for the defendants or collect any premiums after 6 July 1952 at midnight, at which time his licenses were cancelled, that he had severed all relations with the companies.

The judgment of the Superior Court is

Affirmed.

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89 S.E.2d 739, 243 N.C. 62, 1955 N.C. LEXIS 693, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawes-v-mutual-benefit-health-accident-assn-nc-1955.

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