Hatton v. Commissioner of Social Security

S.D. Ohio

Hatton v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided September 30, 2021·No. 3:20-cv-00004·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

JENNIFER M. HATTON, : Case No. 3:20-cv-004 : Plaintiff, : Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington : (by full consent of the parties) vs. : : COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL : SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, : : Defendant. :

DECISION AND ENTRY

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Jennifer M. Hatton brings this case challenging the Social Security Administration’s most recent denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which she filed in August 2014. Her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing at Plaintiff’s request, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Eric Anschuetz concluded she was not eligible for benefits because she is not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, and she filed an action before this Court. Upon review, this Court vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. On remand, a second hearing was held before the ALJ. After the second hearing, ALJ Gregory Kenyon similarly concluded that Plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act. Plaintiff then filed the present action. She now seeks a remand for benefits, or in the alternative, for further proceedings. The Commissioner asks the Court to affirm the ALJ’s non-disability decision.

This case is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. No. 7), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. No. 11), Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. No. 14), and the administrative record (Doc. No. 6). II. Background Plaintiff asserts that she has been under a disability since January 8, 2006. At that

time, she was thirty-five years old. Accordingly, she was considered a “younger person” under Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c). She has a limited education. The evidence of record is sufficiently summarized in the ALJ’s decision (Doc. No. 6-9, PageID 818-27), Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. No. 7), the Commissioner’s

Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. No. 11), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. No. 14). Rather than repeat these summaries, the Court will focus on the pertinent evidence in the discussion below. III. Standard of Review The Social Security Administration provides Supplemental Security Income to

individuals who are under a “disability,” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470, 106 S. Ct. 2022, 90 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1986); see 42 2 U.S.C. § 1382(a). The term “disability”—as defined by the Social Security act—has specialized meaning of limited scope. It encompasses “any medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that precludes an applicant from performing a significant

paid job—i.e., “substantial gainful activity,” in Social Security lexicon. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B); see Bowen, 476 U.S. at 469-70. Judicial review of an ALJ’s non-disability decision proceeds along two lines: “whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakely v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406

(6th Cir. 2009); see Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2007). Review for substantial evidence is not driven by whether the Court agrees or disagrees with the ALJ’s factual findings or by whether the administrative record contains evidence contrary to those factual findings. Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). Instead, the

ALJ’s factual findings are upheld if the substantial-evidence standard is met—that is, “if a ‘reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Blakely, 581 F.3d at 407 (quoting Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)). Substantial evidence consists of “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance…” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); see Gentry, 741 F.3d at 722.

3 The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651

(6th Cir. 2009); see Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746. “[E]ven if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting in part Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746, and citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004)).

IV. The ALJ’s Decision As noted previously, ALJ Kenyon was tasked with evaluating the evidence related to Plaintiff’s application for benefits. In doing so, ALJ Kenyon considered each of the five sequential steps set forth in the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. He reached the following main conclusions:

Step 1: Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful employment since August 20, 2014, her application date.

Step 2: She has the severe impairments of lumbosacral degenerative disc disease, an anxiety disorder, depression, and a history of polysubstance abuse.

Step 3: She does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of one in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Step 4: Her residual functional capacity (RFC), or the most she could do despite his impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 4 235, 239 (6th Cir.

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