Hatch v. United States Department of Labor

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedAugust 25, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-12072
StatusUnknown

This text of Hatch v. United States Department of Labor (Hatch v. United States Department of Labor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hatch v. United States Department of Labor, (D. Mass. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

BRIAN HATCH, * * Petitioner, * * v. * Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-12072-IT * UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF * LABOR, * * Respondent.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

August 25, 2021 TALWANI, D.J. Pending before the court is Petitioner Brian Hatch’s Petition for Relief from Disqualification Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act [#1]. For the following reasons, the petition is ALLOWED. I. Standard Section 504(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”) prohibits individuals convicted of certain crimes, including “violation of narcotics laws,” from serving “as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, employee, or representative in any capacity of any labor organization” for at least thirteen years after conviction of the crime or the end of the term of imprisonment, whichever is later. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a). The restriction is not absolute. First, the restriction will end earlier upon a full post- conviction restoration of citizenship rights affords relief from this disability. Id. § 504(a)(A). The rights of citizenship that must be restored for the restriction to be removed on this ground are: “(i) the right to vote; (ii) the right to hold elective office; and (iii) the right to sit on a jury.” McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Second, a district court may grant an exemption from the thirteen-year bar if the court determines that the individual’s service in the union “would not be contrary to the purposes of”

the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a). Those purposes include ensuring that “labor organizations, employers, and their officials adhere to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs of their organizations,” id. § 401(a), and preventing abuses by “representatives of a labor organization [who] occupy positions of trust,” id. § 501(a). In deciding whether to grant an exemption on this ground, the court is instructed to consider the Sentencing Guidelines and the policy statements expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). The relevant policy statement provides that: relief shall not be given to aid rehabilitation, but may be granted only following a clear demonstration by the convicted person that he or she has been rehabilitated since commission of the disqualifying crime and can therefore be trusted not to endanger the organization in the position for which he or she seeks relief from disability.

U.S.S.G. § 5J1.1 (2021). Accordingly, the burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate rehabilitation warranting an exemption.1 II. Discussion A. Petitioner is a Barred from Holding Union Office Until December 2025 Absent Relief On July 20, 2009, Hatch pleaded guilty to a felony offense for trafficking of a controlled substance and a misdemeanor drug conspiracy offense. Ex. A—Essex Superior Court Docket 3

1 The sentencing court, on the motion of the person convicted, may also set a lesser period of at least three years after the later of the conviction date or the end of imprisonment. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a). That provision is not at issue here. [#11-1]. The crimes of conviction were “violation[s] of narcotics laws,” so the LMRDA restrictions apply. Hatch was sentenced to probation for the misdemeanor and a prison term for the felony, Ex. C—Petitioner CORI 4 [#11-1], and accordingly, the later and therefore relevant period is

based on the prison term. Hatch was released from prison on parole on April 8, 2013, and he completed parole on December 6, 2018. Ex. A—Essex Superior Court Docket 6 [#11-1]; Ex. B—First Interview of Petitioner 4 [#11-1]. The “period of parole shall not be considered as part of a period of imprisonment,” 29 U.S.C. § 504(c), and the relevant disqualification period therefore began on April 8, 2013. Under Massachusetts law, Hatch’s rights to vote and to hold public office were restored upon his release from imprisonment. MASS. CONST. amend. art. III; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, § 30. His right to sit on a jury will be restored seven years after his discharge from parole and the successful completion of his sentence. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234A, § 4(7). Accordingly, absent relief, Hatch is barred from holding a position of authority in a labor union until seven years after

discharge from parole, or December 6, 2025. B. The Position Petitioner Seeks to Hold is Covered by the LMRDA Restriction Hatch, who is now an employee of Global Companies, LLC (“Global Companies”), seeks to represent his workplace as an elected union steward. Petition ¶ 1 [#1]. As such, Hatch would serve as a “representative” of the union, and accordingly, the position is covered by the LMRDA restriction. The court notes, however, that under the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Global Companies and Teamsters Local 25, the authority of stewards is limited. Stewards are permitted to investigate and present grievances to Global Companies, in accordance with the CBA (and time engaged in this function is paid by Global Companies as part of the stewards’ working hours). Ex. H—CBA between Teamsters Local 25 and Global Companies 4-5 [#11-1]. Stewards are permitted to transmit messages and information from the union or its officers, but only where such messages and information have (1) been reduced to writing by the union, or (2) if not reduced to writing, are of a routine nature and do not involve any interference

with Global Companies’ business. Id. at 5. The steward also has no authority to take any action interrupting Global Companies’ business except as authorized by official action of the union. Id. Finally, the steward may collect dues when authorized “by appropriate Local Union action,” but in the normal course, Global Companies deducts union dues directly from employees’ pay through dues checkoff and remits the funds directly to the union. Id. at 4; see also CBA, Article XV [#21]. C. Petitioner Has Demonstrated that He is Rehabilitated The court concludes that Hatch has made the necessary showing of rehabilitation. 1. Prior to and during Incarceration Prior to and during his incarceration, Hatch demonstrated remorse for his actions and undertook numerous rehabilitative activities. See Letters of Support and Certificates [#1-4]. A

counselor who witnessed Hatch telling his own children what he had done and the consequences he faced described Hatch “as a man who understands the nature of his crime and [who] is eager and willing to pursue counseling in order to better his life so he can provide an honest, healthy environment for his family.” Letter from Lawrence D. Robinson 2 [#1-4].

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Hatch v. United States Department of Labor, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hatch-v-united-states-department-of-labor-mad-2021.