Hat Nguyen v. Clear Recon Corp., et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01823
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 HAT NGUYEN, CASE NO. C25-1823-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v.

10 CLEAR RECON CORP., et al.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended 13 complaint. The motion is ripe for consideration. Dkt. No. 50, 55, 60. For the reasons below, the 14 Court will grant Defendants’ motion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 This case stems from Plaintiff Hat Nguyen’s default on a mortgage loan (“Loan”) in June 17 2023, and the foreclosure sale that followed on August 15, 2025. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 28–30, id. at 55. 18 The Loan was secured by a deed of trust (“DOT”) and encumbered Nguyen’s home, real property 19 in Kent, Washington (“Property”). Id. ¶ 17. At the time of Nguyen’s default, Defendant U.S. 20 Bank owned the Loan, Defendant Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”) serviced the Loan, and 21 Defendant Clear Recon Corp. (“CRC”) served as the DOT trustee. Id. ¶ 2. 22 On April 4, 2025, CRC recorded a notice of trustee’s sale (“NOTS”). Dkt. No. 51-2 at 2. 23 The NOTS explained that a trustee foreclosure sale would take place on August 15, 2025, and 24 1 “[t]he defaults … must be cured by 8/4/2025 (11 days before the sale date) to cause a 2 discontinuance of the sale.” Id. at 4. The NOTS also stated this is “THE FINAL STEP BEFORE 3 THE FORECLOSURE SALE OF YOUR HOME” and advised Nguyen to contact an attorney or

4 housing counselor “to assess [her] situation and refer [her] to mediation” if eligible. Id. at 5. 5 In the months leading up to the August 2025 foreclosure sale, Nguyen’s daughter and agent 6 Julie Tran communicated with SPS and CRC representatives by email and by phone. In June 2025, 7 Tran applied for a loan modification “online”, which Nguyen alleges SPS denied. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 8 21–22. On July 23, 2025, Nguyen alleges that Tran emailed an SPS Relationship Manager “to 9 discuss options,” but never received a response. Id. ¶ 23. Instead, Tran was directed to contact 10 SPS’s foreclosure counsel, Aldridge Pite, LLP, and Tran left a voicemail which was never 11 returned. Id. ¶ 25. Nguyen further alleges that on August 11, 2025, SPS sent a letter stating 12 You may cure the delinquency by paying the Total Reinstatement Amount, which has been calculated for you in the table below. The Total Reinstatement Amount 13 expires at 5:00pm Eastern Time on the Reinstatement Good to Date. After that date you must contact us for a new Reinstatement Quote … Figures quoted above are 14 subject to final verification by the Note Holder. SPS reserves the right to either reject or apply funds received after the expiration of this Reinstatement quote[.] 15 Id. at 36–37. The statement provided a “Reinstatement Good to Date” of August 14, 2025, and 16 “established that the amount of $73,021.54 was required to cure the default.” Id. at 36. The letter 17 further stated: “SPS reserves the right to either reject or apply funds received after the 18 expiration of this Reinstatement Quote, and, if insufficient to fully reinstate, SPS may elect 19 to apply the funds to your account.” Id. at 37. Nguyen does not allege further attempts to 20 communicate with SPS—or any attempt to cure the default—until “the morning of the sale,” 21 August 15, 2025. Id. ¶ 26. 22 That morning, Tran made multiple phone calls and sent multiple emails to representatives 23 at both SPS and CRC. Nguyen alleges that, at the direction of a CRC representative, at 9:07 a.m., 24 1 Tran emailed a screenshot of Nguyen’s bank account, which contained funds sufficient to cure the 2 default on the Loan, as well as a request to stop the auction, which was scheduled to begin at 10:00 3 a.m. Id. ¶ 29–30. Three minutes after Tran sent that email, a CRC representative replied: “Please

4 reach out directly to SPS at Loss Mitigation hotline[.]” Id. ¶ 33. Tran called the hotline, where 5 she was placed on hold, transferred between departments, and was told that SPS “could not do 6 anything to stop the sale.” Id. ¶ 34. In a second call with SPS, an SPS ombudsman instructed Tran 7 to wire the amount to cure the default, take a picture of the wire confirmation, and email the proof 8 of the wire transfer to “ombudsman@spservicing.com.” Id. ¶ 35. In successive emails to CRC at 9 9:46 a.m. and 9:50 a.m., Tran both sought advice from CRC and told the CRC representative that 10 “SPS states only you can stop the sale.” Id. ¶¶ 36–37. At 9:52 a.m., CRC emailed Tran: “Your 11 request has been reviewed and we will be proceeding to sale.” Id. ¶ 38. At 10:22 a.m., Nguyen 12 sent a wire transfer to SPS for the amount listed in the expired Reinstatement Quote from the

13 August 11, 2025 letter. Id. ¶ 40. The sale began at 10:24 a.m. Id. ¶ 41. “At 10:29:51 a.m. on 14 August 15, 2025,” Tran received an automated email from SPS confirming receipt of her wire 15 transfer. Id. ¶ 43. Though the second amended complaint does not state the precise time at which 16 the Property was sold at auction, Nguyen alleges that at 1:35 p.m. on the day of the sale, “SPS 17 notified CRC of [the tendered] funds and that they were being returned.” Id. ¶ 59. Defendant 18 Jaspal Singh bought the Property, which was financed by Defendant Eastside Funding, LLC 19 (“Eastside Funding”). Id. ¶¶ 9, 80. Nguyen alleges that six days after the sale, SPS mailed her a 20 cashier’s check for the full amount she had wired, $73,021.54, with “Return of Funds” noted on 21 the check. Id. ¶ 53. 22 On September 11, 2025, Nguyen sued CRC, SPS, U.S. Bank, Singh, and Eastside Funding

23 in King County Superior Court. Dkt. No. 1-1. On September 19, 2025, Defendants removed the 24 1 case to federal court. Dkt. No. 1. Both Singh and Eastside Funding (“Purchaser Defendants”) are 2 named “because they are the purported grantees” of the foreclosure sale. Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 80. 3 On September 24, 2025, Nguyen filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)

4 asking the Court to enjoin the Purchaser Defendants from either seeking to evict Nguyen from the 5 Property, including by initiating an unlawful detainer action, or by selling, transferring, conveying, 6 or otherwise encumbering the Property. Dkt. No. 13. On October 6, 2025, the Court denied the 7 motion, finding that Nguyen was unlikely to prevail on the merits of her claims and that 8 Washington’s Deed of Trust Act (“DTA”) precluded post-sale injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 45. 9 On October 1, 2025, Nguyen filed her second amended complaint. Dkt. No. 43. Nguyen 10 asserts the following claims: (1) violations of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) by 11 SPS and CRC; (2) declaratory relief under Washington’s Declaratory Judgment Act and quiet title 12 statute to set aside the sale and quiet title to the Property against all Defendants; (3) violations of

13 the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and its implementing regulations by SPS; 14 and (4) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by CRC. Id. 15 II. ANALYSIS 16 A. Legal Standard 17 In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court examines the complaint to 18 determine whether, assuming the facts alleged are true, the plaintiff has stated “a claim to relief 19 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 20 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content 21 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 22 alleged.” Id. In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court may “consider certain materials—documents

23 attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of 24 1 judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 2 U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).1 3 B. The Court Declines to Strike CRC’s Notice of Joinder. 4 The Court first considers Nguyen’s surreply, which asks the Court to strike CRC’s notice 5 of joinder in SPS and U.S. Bank N.A.’s motion to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 58, 64. Nguyen objects 6 that the notice was filed after she filed her opposition, but cites no authority directly on point in 7 support of her request. And the Local Rules of this district do not appear to set a deadline for filing 8 a notice of joinder. While Nguyen argues the late-filed joinder prejudiced her ability to fully 9 oppose Defendants’ motion, the Court observes that the arguments lodged in the motion to dismiss 10 expressly pertain to CRC, and Nguyen had a full opportunity to address them in her opposition. 11 Moreover, in her motion to strike, Nguyen neither identified issues pertaining to CRC that she was 12 unable to address, nor requested an opportunity to submit additional briefing. The Court agrees

13 with Nguyen that it is a better practice to file a notice of joinder before the motion has been 14 opposed. But given that Nguyen had notice of the argument made as to CRC, the Court will 15 nonetheless exercise its discretion to permit the filing and deny Nguyen’s motion to strike. Dkt. 16 No. 64. 17 C. Nguyen Fails to State a RESPA Claim Against SPS. 18 Nguyen alleges that SPS violated its duties under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 19 Act (“RESPA”) and RESPA’s implementing regulations (“Regulation X”) “by failing to maintain 20 reasonable policies to identify and communicate with a successor in interest” and “by failing to 21 properly respond to a notice of error that was confirmed and validated by its own Ombudsman 22 department.” Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 89–107 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(C) and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35).

1 As Nguyen does not oppose Defendants’ request for judicial notice, the Court judicially notices the publicly 24 recorded documents Defendants attach to their motion to dismiss. 1 RESPA imposes a duty on loan servicers to respond to borrower inquiries. 12 U.S.C. § 2 2605(e). Namely, “[i]f any servicer of a federally related mortgage loan receives a qualified 3 written request from the borrower (or an agent of the borrower) for information relating to the

4 servicing of such loan, the servicer shall provide a written response within 5 days[.]” Id. § 5 2605(e)(1)(A). A “qualified written request shall be a written correspondence” which “includes a 6 statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower … that the account is in error or provides 7 sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower.” Id. § 8 2605(e)(1)(B). RESPA prohibits servicers of mortgage loans from “fail[ing] to take timely action 9 to respond to a borrower’s requests to correct errors relating to allocation of payments, final 10 balances for purposes of paying off the loan, or avoiding foreclosure.” Id. § 2605(k)(1)(C). 11 Regulation X, in turn, establishes error resolution procedures which require a servicer to “respond 12 to a notice of error” either by “[c]orrecting the error” or “[c]onducting a reasonable investigation”

13 into the error. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(e). A “qualified written request that asserts an error relating 14 to the servicing of a mortgage loan is a notice of error[.]” Id. § 1024.35(a). As part of those error 15 resolution procedures, Regulation X allows servicers to “establish an address that a borrower must 16 use to submit a notice of error in accordance with the [error resolution] procedures[.]” Id. § 17 1024.35(c) (emphasis added). 18 Nguyen alleges that Tran’s email and oral communications with SPS on the morning of the 19 foreclosure sale “constituted a ‘notice of error’ under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35,” triggering the 20 regulation’s error resolution procedures. Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 92. In Nguyen’s view, having received 21 Tran’s communications, SPS’s subsequent “failure to halt [the] sale” thus violated RESPA and 22 Regulation X. Id. ¶¶ 93, 98; Dkt. No. 55 at 18–19.

23 24 1 Given RESPA’s and Regulation X’s clear requirements that notices of error be written and 2 sent to an address established by the servicer, Nguyen’s RESPA claim fails.2 Nguyen attached as 3 an exhibit to her complaint a statement from SPS dated August 15, 2025. Dkt. No. 43 at 55–57. 4 That statement provides: 5 NOTICE OF ERROR OR INFORMATION REQUEST OR QUALIFIED WRITTEN REQUEST[:] If you believe there has been an error with the account 6 or you require additional information, you may send a written Notice of Error or Information Request. All Notices of Error or Information Requests must be sent to 7 the address listed above in the important mailing addresses section, as this is our exclusive address under Federal Law for these matters. If you send your 8 correspondence to any other address, it may not be processed in accordance with Federal Law. 9 Dkt. No. 43 at 56. The address SPS provided for notices of error was: 10 Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. 11 P.O. Box 65277 Salt Lake City, UT 84165 12 Fax: (801) 270-7856

13 Crucially, Nguyen does not allege that Tran either mailed or faxed a notice of error to the 14 pertinent address or fax number. Instead, according to the second amended complaint, Tran 15 attempted to communicate with SPS exclusively by phone and email. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 23–26 16 (describing Tran’s emails and phone calls made prior to the foreclosure sale date), ¶¶ 34–36 17 18 2 Regulation X enumerates eleven types of “covered errors,” including two foreclosure-related error types. See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(b)(1)–(11). Under Regulation X, servicers are “not required to comply with” the error resolution 19 procedures for the two foreclosure-related error types where they receive the notice “seven or fewer days before a foreclosure sale.” 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(f)(2). In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued that because Nguyen’s 20 alleged notices of error pertained to a foreclosure, SPS had no obligation to respond to Tran’s morning-of-the-sale emails and phone calls under RESPA or its implementing regulations. In response, Nguyen appears to concede that 21 the foreclosure safe harbor applies, but nonetheless argues that SPS’s errors on the day of the foreclosure sale could be considered as covered errors under 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35(b)(1) or (b)(11). Dkt. No. 55 at 18. These covered errors include a servicer’s “[f]ailure to accept a payment that conforms to the servicer’s written requirements for the 22 borrower to follow in making payments,” as well as a catch-all covered error, “[a]ny other error relating to the servicing of a borrower’s mortgage loan[.]” Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35(b)(1), (11)). The Court disagrees. On 23 these facts, construing 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35(b)(1) or (b)(11) as Nguyen requests would obviate the foreclosure safe harbor altogether. Moreover, as explained above, and fatal to her claim, Nguyen never submitted a qualified written request to trigger RESPA in the first place. 24 1 (describing Tran’s emails and phone calls made on the date of the foreclosure sale). As the Ninth 2 Circuit has explained, RESPA’s “statutory duty to respond does not arise with respect to all 3 inquiries or complaints from borrowers to servicers.” Medrano v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 704 F.3d

4 661, 666 (9th Cir. 2012). “If a servicer establishes a RESPA address and notifies a borrower of it, 5 a borrower has a [qualified written request] claim only if she sent the [qualified written request] to 6 that address.” Choudhuri v. Specialised Loan Servicing, 3:19-CV-04198-JD, 2022 WL 1188865, 7 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2022) (holding borrower’s failure to send her written request to the 8 designated address was “fatal to her [RESPA] claim”). A borrower’s “email, by virtue of being a 9 digital communication, was necessarily not sent to [the loan servicer’s] designated mailing 10 address.” Loewy v. CMG Mortgage, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1087 n. 1 (S.D. Cal. 2019) 11 (emphasis in original). Here, neither Tran nor Nguyen ever made a qualified written request, and 12 Nguyen does not allege that she sent any written communications to the designated address or fax

13 number. Thus, Tran’s communications—emails and phone calls—never triggered the statutory 14 and regulatory procedures that form the basis of Nguyen’s RESPA claim. 15 In sum, Nguyen’s RESPA claim fails, and her third cause of action is dismissed. Dkt. No. 16 43 ¶¶ 89–107. 17 D. Nguyen’s CPA Claim Against CRC and SPS Fails. 18 Nguyen alleges that “CRC and SPS committed unfair acts by engaging in a coordinated, 19 bad-faith obstruction of [her] right to reinstate her loan.” Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 65. Nguyen points to 20 CRC’s request that Tran submit proof of funds on the morning of the sale and SPS’s Reinstatement 21 Quote as unfair practices. Id. As detailed below, because Nguyen had no “right” to reinstate her 22 loan when she endeavored to do so, her CPA claim fails.

23 Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) prohibits “[u]nfair methods of 24 competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce[.]” 1 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020. A CPA claim has five elements: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act 2 or practice (2) in trade or commerce (3) that affects the public interest, (4) injury to plaintiff’s 3 business or property, and (5) causation.” Wright v. Lyft, Inc., 406 P.3d 1149, 1153 (Wash. 2017)

4 (citing Hangman Ridge Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1986)). If 5 one element fails, the CPA claim as a whole fails. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Whiteman 6 Tire, Inc., 935 P.2d 628, 635 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (“All elements must be present; a finding that 7 any element is missing is fatal to [a CPA] claim.”). “[A] claim under the Washington CPA may 8 be predicated upon a per se violation of statute, an act or practice that has the capacity to deceive 9 substantial portions of the public, or an unfair or deceptive act or practice not regulated by statute 10 but in violation of public interest.” Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 1179, 1187 (Wash. 2013). 11 As noted above, the Court previously denied Nguyen’s motion for a TRO, finding that 12 Nguyen did not show likelihood of success on the merits of her claims because her wire transfer

13 to SPS took place both after the deadline to cure contemplated by the DTA, as well as the deadline 14 prescribed by the August 11, 2025 Reinstatement Quote. See Dkt. No. 45 at 7–11. In her 15 opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Nguyen raises the same waiver arguments that the 16 Court previously rejected in the context of her motion for a TRO. See Dkt. No. 55 at 8–10. In its 17 prior order, the Court explained that under the DTA, a borrower may discontinue a trustee’s 18 foreclosure sale through cure “[a]t any time prior to the eleventh day before the date set by the 19 trustee for the sale[.]” Dkt. No. 45 at 7–11 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.090 (DTA section 20 titled, in part, “Curing defaults before sale”)). Here, the April 4, 2025 NOTS recorded the trustee 21 sale date as August 15, 2025. Dkt. No. 51-2 at 2–5. Thus, under the DTA, Nguyen’s statutory 22 deadline to cure the default was August 4, 2025. This deadline was expressly provided to Nguyen

23 in the NOTS, and Nguyen does not allege that she tendered a cure of the default by this date. Id. 24 And even assuming the Reinstatement Quote extended the time in which Nguyen could attempt to 1 cure the default,3 the quote set a cure deadline of August 14, 2025 at 5 p.m. Eastern Time. Nguyen 2 does not allege that she tendered funds by that deadline. Id. at 10. 3 Nguyen was undoubtedly frustrated by the conflicting information provided by CRC and 4 SPS representatives on the morning of the sale, and the false hope created by the SPS ombudsman 5 directing her to wire funds. The Court is sympathetic to Nguyen’s predicament, but the fact 6 remains that Nguyen did not exercise her statutory right to cure by the August 4, 2025 deadline, 7 or timely seek to invoke the option to cure provided in the Reinstatement Quote before it expired. 8 Nor did Nguyen seek an injunction until over a month after the sale. Dkt. No. 13. Accordingly, 9 for the same reasons set forth in the Court’s prior order on Nguyen’s motion for a TRO, the Court 10 concludes that Nguyen had no right to stop the sale on August 15, 2025, and as such, none of 11 Defendants’ alleged actions on the morning of the sale violated the DTA or caused Nguyen’s 12 injuries asserted here. See Dkt. No. 45 at 10 (“Nguyen’s waiver argument asks the Court to either

13 construe Defendants’ communications as enlarging the termination right afforded to her by the 14 DTA, or not give effect to the time limits set by the DTA, which it cannot do.”). “[B]ecause no 15 Deed of Trust Act claim can survive, no CPA claim based on a Deed of Trust Act violation may 16 survive either.” Batson v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Americas, 2:15-CV-00193-SAB, 2017 WL 3754827, 17 at *3 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2017). Thus, Nguyen’s CPA claim—which is predicated on her 18 untimely offer to cure and the resulting sale of the Property—fails. 19 E. Nguyen’s Declaratory Judgment and Quiet Title Claim Fails. 20 Nguyen seeks declaratory relief to set aside and deem void the foreclosure sale under 21 Washington’s Declaratory Judgment Act and Quiet Title statute. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 78–88. This 22 cause of action is predicated upon the same waiver argument the Court has already rejected. See

3 As noted in the Court’s prior order on the motion for TRO, the Reinstatement Quote made clear that SPS reserved 24 the right to refuse funds tendered after the August 14, 2025 deadline. Dkt. No. 43 at 36–37. 1 supra at Part II.D.; Dkt. No. 45 at 7–11. As the Court has explained, while the DTA allows 2 borrowers to enjoin a foreclosure sale, that relief is unavailable once the sale has taken place. See 3 WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.130(b)(2) (“No court may grant a restraining order or injunction to

4 restrain a trustee’s sale unless the person seeking the restraint gives five days notice to the trustee 5 of the time when, place where, and the judge before whom the application for the restraining order 6 or injunction is to be made.”); see also Dkt. No. 45 at 7. Here, as noted above, Nguyen sought to 7 enjoin the sale as invalid over a month after the sale had taken place. Thus, the DTA forecloses 8 her claim for declaratory judgment. 9 Washington’s quiet title statute “requires that a person seeking to quiet title establish a 10 valid subsisting interest in property and a right to possession thereof.” Wash. Sec. & Inv. Corp. v. 11 Horse Heaven Heights, Inc., 130 P.3d 880, 884 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (citing WASH. REV. CODE 12 § 7.28.010). “A ‘plaintiff in an action to quiet title must prevail, if he prevails at all, on the strength

13 of his own title, and not on the weakness of the title of his adversary.’” Wash. State Grange v. 14 Brandt, 148 P.3d 1069, 1077 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting City of Centralia v. Miller, 197 P.2d 15 244, 247 (Wash. 1948)). Thus, to “maintain a quiet title action against a mortgagee, a plaintiff 16 must first pay the outstanding debt on which the subject mortgage is based.” Kwai Ling Chan v. 17 Chase Home Loans Inc., C12-0273-JLR, 2012 WL 1252649, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2012); 18 see also Evans v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. C10-0656-RSM, 2010 WL 5138394, at *3 19 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 2010) (“Plaintiffs cannot assert an action to quiet title against a purported 20 lender without demonstrating they have satisfied their obligations under the Deed of Trust.”). 21 Here, because the Court has already rejected Nguyen’s assertion that her post-deadline 22 tender cured her default, Nguyen cannot assert that she has satisfied her obligations under the

23 DOT. Thus, Nguyen’s quiet title claim fails as a matter of law. 24 1 F. Nguyen’s FDCPA Claim Against CRC Fails. 2 Nguyen asserts that CRC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by 3 proceeding with the foreclosure sale, thus “taking nonjudicial action to effect the dispossession of

4 property when there was no present right to do so.” Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 111–114. 5 The FDCPA in relevant part prohibits a debt collector such as CRC from “[t]aking or 6 threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if [] 7 there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable 8 security interest[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). As Defendants note, because Nguyen did not cure 9 the default by August 4, 2025, SPS was entitled to proceed with the sale under Washington’s DTA. 10 Nguyen’s FDCPA claim thus fails for the same reasons as her other claims: the sale was lawful. 11 G. The Court Will Not Grant Leave to Amend. 12 “If a motion to dismiss is granted, a court should normally grant leave to amend unless it

13 determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegations of other facts.” Chinatown 14 Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Cook, Perkiss 15 & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990)). Here, permitting 16 Nguyen to amend her complaint a third time would be futile. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 17 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend when any 18 proposed amendment would be futile.”). Nguyen’s CPA claim fails because there was no 19 underlying DTA violation. Her RESPA claim fails because the communications she alleges give 20 rise to that claim do not trigger the statutory protections on which the claim is predicated. 21 Nguyen’s claims for declaratory relief and quiet title fail because she did not timely seek to enjoin 22 the trustee’s sale, and she cannot show that she timely fulfilled her obligations as a borrower under

23 the DOT. And Nguyen’s FDCPA claim fails because CRC was entitled to conduct the foreclosure 24 sale when she did not cure her default by August 4, 2025. Since there are no facts that Nguyen 1 could plead consistent with her prior pleadings to cure these shortcomings, the Court will dismiss 2 this action with prejudice. 3 III. CONCLUSION

4 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 50. 5 The Clerk is directed to close this case. 6 Dated this 30th day of June, 2026. 7 A 8 Kymberly K. Evanson 9 United States District Judge

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24