F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 24 1998 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
AMEER LABEEB HASSAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, Governor, State of Utah; O. LANE McCOTTER, Executive Director, Utah Department of Corrections; BRUCE EGAN, Executive Deputy Director, Utah Department of Corrections; R. SPENCER ROBINSON, Administrative Law Judge, Utah Department of Corrections; J. TERRY BARTLETT, Director, Division of Institution Operations, Utah No. 97-4001 Department of Corrections; SCOTT V. (D.C. No. 95-CV-527) CARVER, Warden, South Point (D. Utah) Facility, Utah State Prison; BILLIE CASPER, Grievance Coordinator, Utah Department of Corrections; LYNN WALLER, Assistant Director, Volunteer Services, Utah Department of Corrections; DAVID WORTHINGTON, Bureau Chief, Support Services, Utah Department of Corrections; WILL CARLSON, Food Service Manager, Utah State Prison; LYNETTE FERRE, Corrections Dietician, Utah State Prison; R. RODRIGUEZ, Chaplain, Utah State Prison; VICKIE BRIDWELL, EMRS, Utah State Prison; and FRANK N. CARPENTER,
Defendants-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, EBEL and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
The appellant in this case, a Muslim adherent to the religious doctrines of
the Lost-Found Nation of Islam, sometimes referred to as the “Black Muslims,”
has challenged various practices of Utah State Prison officials that he claims
violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4). The district court
dismissed this case before the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) unconstitutional). In light of that decision, we must
affirm the district court’s decision.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
-2- Background
Ameer Labeeb Hassan filed his civil rights complaint pro se and in forma
pauperis (IFP) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of RFRA, as well as 42
U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1986. Hassan also brought constitutional claims for violations
of the First Amendment’s free exercise clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process and equal protection clauses. (See R., Doc. #3, Amended Compl., at
8-10.) Hassan sought money damages, injunctive relief, and a declaratory
judgment. (See id. at 11-12; R., Doc. #2, Compl., at 13-16.)
Hassan’s suit arises out of events that he alleges began when he returned to
the Utah State Prison after a parole violation in 1994. According to Hassan’s
complaint, prison officials confiscated Hassan’s personal collection of religious
books and materials during Hassan’s in-take processing. (See R., Doc. #2, at 9,
¶¶ 41-42.) Hassan also alleges that no prison chaplain was present during his in-
take processing, which he claims was a violation of the prison’s regulations
ensuring the protection of religious practices. (See id. at 9, ¶ 43.)
The magistrate judge recommended that Hassan’s religious free exercise
claims be dismissed because his complaint “fail[s] to assert facts which
demonstrate a ‘substantial burden’” on his religious practices, as required by
RFRA. (See R., Doc. #9, Report & Recommendation, at 9.) The magistrate also
recommended that all of Hassan’s other claims be dismissed because of the
-3- inadequacy of his pleadings. (See id. at 9-16.) Hassan filed a lengthy Notice of
Objections to the magistrate judge’s report, (see R., Doc. #10), but the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s report without revision, (see R., Doc. #12).
The court found that Hassan’s complaint “lacks an arguable basis in law or fact”
and ordered Hassan’s suit dismissed without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
(See id.)
Following the district court’s denial of Hassan’s motion to amend or vacate
its order, Hassan filed a timely notice of appeal. (See R., Doc. #13, 15, 16.)
Hassan now raises three issues: 1) Whether the state’s repeal of its various prison
regulations dealing with religious accommodations was arbitrary and capricious;
2) Whether Hassan’s complaint stated a cause of action under the RFRA; and
3) Whether “First Amendment rights are preferred.” (See Aplt. Br. at 15.)
Discussion
When a district court finds that an IFP complaint lacks an arguable basis in
fact or law, i.e., that it is frivolous, we review the district court’s dismissal for an
abuse of discretion. See Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777, 779 (10th Cir.
1997). However, in this case, we need not address the particular findings of the
district court and the magistrate judge because recent decisions have rendered
Hassan’s appeal groundless.
-4- In City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997), the Supreme
Court held that Congress exceeded its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it enacted the “substantial burden” and “compelling interest”
test of RFRA. The Court held that Congress has no power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to declare the substantive scope of the First Amendment right of the
free exercise of religion. See id. at 2164. Instead, the scope of that right is
determined by the Supreme Court’s own interpretations. See id. at 2172.
The effect of Boerne essentially was to declare RFRA invalid, at least as
far as it applied to the states, and to resuscitate the Supreme Court’s prior
doctrine for the substantive scope of the free exercise clause. See Freeman v.
Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). As a result, Hassan’s appellate
argument that his complaint stated a valid cause of action under RFRA is moot.
As for Hassan’s argument that the state of Utah acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it repealed certain prison regulations dealing with religious
accommodation, we note that this issue was not raised or decided below. As a
result, it is not properly before us, and we decline to express an opinion on this
issue. See Walker v. Mather, 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that
issues not raised below will not be considered on appeal).
Finally, as for Hassan’s claim that “First Amendment rights are preferred,”
we find this issue entirely frivolous. Innumerable cases by the Supreme Court
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 24 1998 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
AMEER LABEEB HASSAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, Governor, State of Utah; O. LANE McCOTTER, Executive Director, Utah Department of Corrections; BRUCE EGAN, Executive Deputy Director, Utah Department of Corrections; R. SPENCER ROBINSON, Administrative Law Judge, Utah Department of Corrections; J. TERRY BARTLETT, Director, Division of Institution Operations, Utah No. 97-4001 Department of Corrections; SCOTT V. (D.C. No. 95-CV-527) CARVER, Warden, South Point (D. Utah) Facility, Utah State Prison; BILLIE CASPER, Grievance Coordinator, Utah Department of Corrections; LYNN WALLER, Assistant Director, Volunteer Services, Utah Department of Corrections; DAVID WORTHINGTON, Bureau Chief, Support Services, Utah Department of Corrections; WILL CARLSON, Food Service Manager, Utah State Prison; LYNETTE FERRE, Corrections Dietician, Utah State Prison; R. RODRIGUEZ, Chaplain, Utah State Prison; VICKIE BRIDWELL, EMRS, Utah State Prison; and FRANK N. CARPENTER,
Defendants-Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, EBEL and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
The appellant in this case, a Muslim adherent to the religious doctrines of
the Lost-Found Nation of Islam, sometimes referred to as the “Black Muslims,”
has challenged various practices of Utah State Prison officials that he claims
violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4). The district court
dismissed this case before the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) unconstitutional). In light of that decision, we must
affirm the district court’s decision.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
-2- Background
Ameer Labeeb Hassan filed his civil rights complaint pro se and in forma
pauperis (IFP) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of RFRA, as well as 42
U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1986. Hassan also brought constitutional claims for violations
of the First Amendment’s free exercise clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process and equal protection clauses. (See R., Doc. #3, Amended Compl., at
8-10.) Hassan sought money damages, injunctive relief, and a declaratory
judgment. (See id. at 11-12; R., Doc. #2, Compl., at 13-16.)
Hassan’s suit arises out of events that he alleges began when he returned to
the Utah State Prison after a parole violation in 1994. According to Hassan’s
complaint, prison officials confiscated Hassan’s personal collection of religious
books and materials during Hassan’s in-take processing. (See R., Doc. #2, at 9,
¶¶ 41-42.) Hassan also alleges that no prison chaplain was present during his in-
take processing, which he claims was a violation of the prison’s regulations
ensuring the protection of religious practices. (See id. at 9, ¶ 43.)
The magistrate judge recommended that Hassan’s religious free exercise
claims be dismissed because his complaint “fail[s] to assert facts which
demonstrate a ‘substantial burden’” on his religious practices, as required by
RFRA. (See R., Doc. #9, Report & Recommendation, at 9.) The magistrate also
recommended that all of Hassan’s other claims be dismissed because of the
-3- inadequacy of his pleadings. (See id. at 9-16.) Hassan filed a lengthy Notice of
Objections to the magistrate judge’s report, (see R., Doc. #10), but the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s report without revision, (see R., Doc. #12).
The court found that Hassan’s complaint “lacks an arguable basis in law or fact”
and ordered Hassan’s suit dismissed without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
(See id.)
Following the district court’s denial of Hassan’s motion to amend or vacate
its order, Hassan filed a timely notice of appeal. (See R., Doc. #13, 15, 16.)
Hassan now raises three issues: 1) Whether the state’s repeal of its various prison
regulations dealing with religious accommodations was arbitrary and capricious;
2) Whether Hassan’s complaint stated a cause of action under the RFRA; and
3) Whether “First Amendment rights are preferred.” (See Aplt. Br. at 15.)
Discussion
When a district court finds that an IFP complaint lacks an arguable basis in
fact or law, i.e., that it is frivolous, we review the district court’s dismissal for an
abuse of discretion. See Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777, 779 (10th Cir.
1997). However, in this case, we need not address the particular findings of the
district court and the magistrate judge because recent decisions have rendered
Hassan’s appeal groundless.
-4- In City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997), the Supreme
Court held that Congress exceeded its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it enacted the “substantial burden” and “compelling interest”
test of RFRA. The Court held that Congress has no power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to declare the substantive scope of the First Amendment right of the
free exercise of religion. See id. at 2164. Instead, the scope of that right is
determined by the Supreme Court’s own interpretations. See id. at 2172.
The effect of Boerne essentially was to declare RFRA invalid, at least as
far as it applied to the states, and to resuscitate the Supreme Court’s prior
doctrine for the substantive scope of the free exercise clause. See Freeman v.
Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). As a result, Hassan’s appellate
argument that his complaint stated a valid cause of action under RFRA is moot.
As for Hassan’s argument that the state of Utah acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it repealed certain prison regulations dealing with religious
accommodation, we note that this issue was not raised or decided below. As a
result, it is not properly before us, and we decline to express an opinion on this
issue. See Walker v. Mather, 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that
issues not raised below will not be considered on appeal).
Finally, as for Hassan’s claim that “First Amendment rights are preferred,”
we find this issue entirely frivolous. Innumerable cases by the Supreme Court
-5- and lower courts have declared that protection of First Amendment rights is
fundamental to the essence of our Republic. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523 (1993) (striking down city
ordinances because they “violated the Nation’s essential commitment to religious
freedom”). Yet, Hassan has utterly failed to show how our judicial reaffirmation
of this principle would remedy any of his alleged injuries. Because the federal
courts are constitutionally prohibited from rendering advisory opinions, we
decline Hassan’s invitation to expound on the verities of the First Amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel Circuit Judge
-6-