J-A24040-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
RASHEDI HASSAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : METHODIST SERVICES, BRIDGE : No. 2965 EDA 2023 HOUSE FOR WOMEN, BETH ABRAMS, : SANDRA FERNANDEZ, SHAWN : BROCKENBROUGH, JOHN DOE AND : JANE DOE :
Appeal from the Order Entered October 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 200900102
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KING, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED MARCH 5, 2025
Rashedi Hassan (“Hassan”) appeals from the order marking the action
as settled and discontinued. We affirm.
In 2019, Hassan became a temporary resident at Bridge House for
Women (“Bridge House”), a transitional housing facility for women in
Philadelphia who come from homeless shelters and other insecure housing
situations. As a resident of the facility, Hassan paid no rent; however, she
was required to agree to numerous terms and conditions, and to sign and date
each of the rules set forth in a resident handbook. Accordingly, by her written
acknowledgment, Hassan agreed that the accommodation was not a tenancy
or a landlord/tenant relationship and was, therefore, not subject to the
Landlord Tenant Act. Hassan also agreed that she not allowed on the premises J-A24040-24
between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., and that her room was subject to daily
inspections and searches without notification. Further, Hassan agreed that
she would be subject to immediate termination for physical violence, abusive
language, or non-compliance with the rules.
Despite acknowledging and agreeing to the terms and conditions of
Bridge House, Hassan violated the program’s abusive language policy and was
terminated. Hassan was temporality reinstated into the program but
thereafter violated numerous other Bridge House rules by yelling at staff
members, violating the curfew, arguing with other residents, and engaging in
disorderly conduct. On January 28, 2020, employees at Bridge House handed
Hassan a discharge letter from the facility due to her violations. Hassan began
threatening residents and staff and waiving a knife. Bridge House employees
called 911 and asked the police to remove Hassan from the facility due to her
aggressive and threatening behavior. Police arrived and removed Hassan.
The following morning, however, Hassan returned to the facility by climbing
through a window and began yelling and threatening residents and staff.
Bridge House staff provided Hassan with a termination letter dated January
29, 2020, indicating that she had been discharged and was required to leave
the premises immediately due to her use of language that was offensive,
degrading, threatening or terroristic, and for threatening staff with a weapon.
Bridge House staff again called 911, reporting that Hassan had been
discharged from the program but came back by climbing through a window
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and was acting aggressively and screaming and yelling at staff. When officers
arrived, Hasssan refused to leave the premises. Police ultimately removed
Hassan and issued her a summary citation for criminal trespass. 1
Hassan thereafter filed a complaint naming as defendants the private
citizens and entities involved in summoning the police, including Methodist
Services, which provides services to vulnerable children, women, and families;
Bridge House, which is Methodist Services’ transitional housing service for
women; and three employees of Bridge House, Michelle Flowers, Beth Abrams,
and Sandra Fernandez. Hassan also sued the police officers who arrived at
the facility in response to the 911 calls, including Officer Shawn
Brockenbrough (“Officer Brockenbrough”), and two unidentified officers who
were fictitiously named in the complaint as John Doe #1 and Jane Doe #1.
Hassan asserted six counts against the officers, including: trespass/self-help
eviction; assault and battery; false imprisonment/false arrest; intentional
infliction of emotional distress; malicious prosecution; and abuse of process.
Following the filing of preliminary objections to the complaint, Hassan
filed a first amended complaint. Officer Brockenbrough filed an answer to the
first amended complaint on November 19, 2020, and attached thereto the 911
call log which identified two other officers who responded to the 911 calls:
Officer Shahein Rasoli; and Officer Thomas Ndeto. Three months later, on
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1 At some point, the summary citation was withdrawn.
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February 12, 2021, Hassan sought leave to file a second amended complaint
to add the names of the two officers in place of the Doe defendants, 2 and to
add additional claims against the private defendants. Officer Brockenbrough
did not file any opposition to the amendment. The private defendants
objected to the amendment, claiming delay and prejudice. The trial court
denied leave to amend the complaint. On October 12, 2021, Hassan filed a
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint to add the names of the
officers. Once again, the trial court denied leave to amend. The parties then
filed motions for summary judgment. In June 2022, the trial court granted
the motion for summary judgment filed by Officer Brockenbrough but denied
the remaining motions.3
Hassan eventually settled her claims against the private defendants, and
in April 2023, the parties signed and filed a settlement stipulation. However,
2 Although Hassan’s proposed new pleading added the two officers to the caption, by last name only, the body of the proposed amended pleading continued to reference the fictitious John Doe # 1 and Jane Doe #1. In fact, the only place where Officers Rasoli and Ndeto were mentioned in the proposed amended pleading was in a section entitled “Additional Defendants Added, which asserted no cause of action and instead vaguely stated that these officers were involved in Hassan’s removal from Bridge House and arrest for criminal trespass. See Motion to Amend, 2/12/21, Exhibit at ¶¶ 211-14. Thus, the proposed new pleading did not assert any cause of action against Officers Rasoli and Ndeto.
3 Hassan appealed from the order granting summary judgment in favor of Officer Brockenbrough; however, this Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory, given that claims remained pending against the other defendants. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (providing that a final order “disposes of all claims and of all parties”).
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the trial court did not sign and enter the stipulation marking the action as
settled and discontinued until October 18, 2023. Hassan filed a timely notice
of appeal from the October 18, 2023 entry, and both she and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.4
Hassan raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether an appeal is timely when filed within [thirty] days of the entry of final judgment and dismissal of parties to an action?
2. Whether a plaintiff may amend the pleadings by leave of court under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033 in order to add additional parties within the statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5524, and where opposing counsel files a praecipe of non-opposition?
3. Whether court committed err in granting summary judgment to a police officer who committed an unlawful eviction where a landlord-tenant relationship was established and a material controversy in lack of probable cause was maintained?
Hassan’s Brief at 7.
As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether this Court has
jurisdiction to address the trial court’s October 18, 2023 entry, as “the
appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked
to review the order.” Knopick v. Boyle, 189 A.3d 432, 436 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(internal citation omitted). Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only
over appeals taken from a final order. See In re Bridgeport Fire Litigation,
4 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court did not address the issues raised
in Hassan’s concise statement, instead finding that Hassan’s appeal was untimely filed and should be quashed. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/24, at unnumbered 1-2.
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51 A.3d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2012). A final order is one that disposes of all
the parties and all the claims; or is entered as a final order pursuant to the
trial court’s determination under Rule 341(c). See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1), (3).
An appeal may also be taken from “an order that is made final or appealable
by statute or general rule, even though the order does not dispose of all claims
and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8). A case may also be resolved against
the final defendant by other than an order of court, such as when a case
against the sole remaining defendant is discontinued or settled. Burkey v.
CCX, Inc., 106 A.3d 736, 739 (Pa. Super. 2014) (explaining that a docket
entry to the effect that the claim was discontinued or settled will serve to
render prior judgments final and appealable).
Additionally, because the timeliness of an appeal implicates our
jurisdiction, this Court may not address the merits of the underlying issues
raised by an appellant before determining whether the appeal was timely filed.
See Krankowski v. O'Neil, 928 A.2d 284, 285 (Pa. Super. 2007). Pertinent
to this issue, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 903(a) provides:
“[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal . . . shall
be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is
taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 105(b), this Court may not
enlarge time for filing a notice of appeal.
Here, the trial court determined that Hassan’s appeal was untimely. The
court reasoned:
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The October 18, 2023 order appealed from is a joint stipulation discontinuing the action as to certain parties- it has no relation to the issues stated in [Hassan’s] concise statement of errors. The issues raised in [Hassan’s] concise statement of errors pertain entirely to [the] order granting [Officer Brockenbrough’s] motion for summary judgment . . ..
[Hassan] already attempted an untimely appeal of [the summary judgment] order. [Hassan’s] notice of appeal . . . was filed approximately ten months after the court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment, far exceeding the thirty-day mandatory appeal period. . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/24, at unnumbered 1-2 (citations and unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
Based on our review, we conclude that the instant appeal was timely
filed from a final order. As indicated above, this Court quashed Hassan’s prior
appeal from the summary judgment order because that order was
interlocutory, as it did not dispose of all claims and of all parties. See
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Instead, it merely disposed of the claims against Officer
Brockenbrough, but left pending the various claims against Methodist
Services, Bridge House, Michelle Flowers, Beth Abrams, and Sandra
Fernandez. Those remaining claims were not disposed of until the entry of
the October 18, 2023 stipulation marking the action as settled and
discontinued as to all remaining defendants. See Burkey, 106 A.3d at 739.
Thus, the October 18, 2023 entry is the final order in this matter. See id. As
Hassan filed a timey notice of appeal from that order, her appeal is timely,
and this Court has jurisdiction over the matter.
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In her second issue, Hassan challenges the trial court’s orders denying
her requests for leave to amend the complaint to add the names of the two
additional police officers in place of the Doe defendants. Our standard of
review of an order denying leave to amend a complaint permits us to overturn
the order only if the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion.
See Pollock v. NFL, 171 A.3d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2017). The trial court
enjoys broad discretion to grant or deny a petition to amend. See id.
Although the court generally should exercise its discretion to permit
amendment, where a party will be unable to state a claim on which relief could
be granted, leave to amend should be denied. See id.
Rule 1033 governs amendments to pleadings, and provides that a party,
“by leave of court, may at any time change the form of an action, add a person
as a party, correct the name of a party, or otherwise amend the pleading.”
Pa.R.C.P. 1033(a). However, Rule 1033 imposes certain restrictions where an
amendment to add a Doe defendant “relates back” to the commencement of
the action for statute of limitations purposes:
(c) An amendment substituting the actual name of a defendant for a Doe designation as provided in Rule 2005 relates back to the date of the commencement of the action if, within the time provided by Rule 401 for service, the defendant named by the amendment has received actual or constructive notice of the commencement of the action such that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits and the defendant knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it but for lack of knowledge of the defendant’s actual name.
Pa.R.C.P. 1033.
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Additionally, Pa.R.C.P. 2005 provides a specific time limitation and an
affidavit requirement where a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint to add the
actual name of a Doe defendant:
Within 20 days after the actual name of the defendant has been identified, the plaintiff or joining party shall file a motion to amend the complaint pursuant to this rule and Rule 1033 by replacing the Doe designation with the defendant’s actual name. An affidavit shall be attached to the motion describing the nature and extent of the investigation that was made to determine the identity of the defendant, and the date upon and the manner in which the defendant’s actual name was identified.
Pa.R.C.P. 2005(c) (emphasis added). Where a trial court “finds that the party
seeking the amendment failed to exercise due diligence in identifying the
actual name of the defendant,” the trial court may deny the motion to amend.
Pa.R.C.P. 2005(d).
Hassan contends that she sought leave to amend the complaint and the
officers twice within the statute of limitations period, on February 12, 2021,
and again October 12, 2021. According to Hassan, no rational basis existed
to deprive her of the requested amendment, particularly where Officer
Brockenbrough did not oppose the requested amendment. Hassan
acknowledges that Methodist Services strongly opposed the motion to amend
based on the new claims that Hassan sought to assert against it. However,
Hassan argues that Officer Brockenbrough, lacked standing to join in this
opposition. Hassan additionally argues that Officer Brockenbrough “had
already admitted and conceded a praecipe of non-opposition to [Hassan’s]
motion to add the additional parties within the 2-year statute of limitations”
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and the “[c]ity’s law department [sic] previous filing of a praecipe of non-
objection is a waiver that should serve to act as a collateral estoppel,
preventing them from opposing [Hassan’s] arguments here on appeal and
allow the matter to continue as to the additional parties.” Hassan’s Brief at
29-30 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court in denying the motions to amend. Importantly, the motions to
amend were not timely filed within the mandatory twenty-day timeframe
required by Rule 2005(c). Pursuant to Rule 2005(c), Hassan was required to
file “[w]ithin 20 days after the actual name of the defendant has been
identified, . . . a motion to amend the complaint pursuant to [Rule 2005(c)]
and Rule 1033 by replacing the Doe designation with the defendant’s actual
name.” Pa.R.C.P. 2005(c). Officer Brockenbrough disclosed the identifies of
Officers Rasoli and Ndeto on November 19, 2020, in the 911 call log attached
to Officer Brockenbrough’s answer to the first amended complaint. Therefore,
Hassan had until December 9, 2020, in which to file a motion to amend.
Hassan failed to do so, and her motions to amend filed on February 12, 2021,
and October 12, 2021, were filed far beyond the timeframe permitted by Rule
2005(c). Moreover, Rule 2005(c) additionally requires that the motion to
amend be accompanied by an “affidavit . . . describing the nature and extent
of the investigation that was made to determine the identity of the defendant,
and the date upon and the manner in which the defendant’s actual name was
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identified.” Pa.R.C.P. 2005(c). Our review discloses that Hassan did not
attach such an affidavit to either of her motions to amend. Given that Hassan
failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Rule 2005(c), 5 we discern
no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motions. 6
In her third issue, Hassan challenges the trial court’s order granting
summary judgment to Officer Brockenbrough. In reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, an appellate court’s standard of review is de novo and
the scope of review is plenary. See Bourgeois v. Snow Time, Inc., 242
A.3d 637, 649-50 (Pa. 2020). Further, when reviewing such an order:
We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial
5 The fact that Officer Brockenbrough did not oppose the amendment is of no
consequence to our disposition, as the provisions of Rule 2005(c) are mandatory in nature and provide that the plaintiff “shall” file the motion to amend within twenty days of the discovery of the actual name of the Doe defendant and “shall” attach an affidavit detailing the date upon and the manner in which the defendant’s actual name was identified. Pa.R.C.P. 2005(c).
6 We note that the record is devoid of any indication or explanation by the trial
court as to the basis for its denial of Hassan’s motions to amend her pleadings. Nonetheless, this Court may affirm a ruling of the trial court on any legitimate basis appearing of record. See Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 961 A.2d 1229, 1244 n.17 (Pa. 2008) (holding that an appellate court may affirm the order of the court below if the result reached is correct without regard to the grounds relied upon by that court).
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court’s order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Phillips v. Lock, 86 A.3d 906, 912-13 (citation omitted).
“In response to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party
cannot rest upon the pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.; see also Pa.R.C.P.
1035.3(a). Accordingly, the “failure of a nonmoving party to adduce sufficient
evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden
of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a
matter of law.” JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258,
1262 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(2).
Thus, it is this Court’s responsibility “to determine whether the record either
established that the material facts are undisputed or contains insufficient
evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action, such that there is
no issue to be decided by the fact-finder.” Gerber v. Piergrossi, 142 A.3d
854, 858 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
Hassan summarily argues that facts of record showed that Officer
Brockenbrough committed an unlawful eviction in violation of the Landlord
Tenant Act, the Philadelphia Code, and Philadelphia Police directives. Hassan
claims that “overwhelming documentation exists that [she] was a party to a
contract for housing services with her Landlord.” Hassan’s Brief at 38. Hassan
additionally provides a conclusory argument that the facts of record establish
that Officer Brockenbrough lacked probable cause to arrest her because “she
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had a lawful right to be in her own residence.” Id. at 40. Hassan argues that
she “established that criminal proceedings were brought against her, and were
terminated in her favor.” Id. Hassan claims that the document that she
signed agreeing that her residency at Bridge House was not a tenancy and
that no landlord/tenant relationship exited is “unenforceable as against public
policy, [and Officer Brockenbrough] lacks standing to assert it because [the
officer is] not an intended beneficiary of the contract for housing services
between [Hassan] and her Landlord.” Id. at 38.
Based on our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law
by the trial court in granting Officer Brockenbrough’s motion for summary
judgment. Initially, we note that each of Hassan’s conclusory and
undeveloped arguments is premised on her unsupported belief that a landlord-
tenant relationship existed between herself and Bridge House. However, the
record is clear that there was no lease, no tenancy, no landlord/tenant
relationship, and no unlawful eviction. Indeed, the undisputed facts of record
establish just the opposite, given that Hassan signed and dated a document
in which she agreed that her “participation in The Bridge House Transitional
Housing Program for Women does not constitute a landlord/tenant
relationship and the terms and conditions under the Landlord Tenant Act do
not apply.” Bridge House Document, 11/12/19; see also Officer
Brockenbrough’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 5/3/22, at ¶ 20.
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We further conclude that no genuine issue of material fact was
presented by Hassan’s bald assertion that this document is unenforceable.
Our review of Hassan’s opposition to Officer Brockenbrough’s motion for
summary judgment reflects that Hassan asserted that this document was an
exculpatory clause that was unenforceable because such clauses “amount to
unilateral terms of adhesion, particularly in the context of landlord-tenant
relationships which are consumer contracts for housing services.” Hassan’s
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Officer Brockenbrough’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, 5/27/22, at unnumbered 6. In support of her argument,
Hassan cited three cases, two of which dealt with landlord-tenant disputes
regarding provisions in written lease agreements.7 See id. at unnumbered 6-
7. Notably, Hassan did not provide the trial court with any factual or legal
support for her argument that she entered a lease agreement with Bridge
House, or that the document she signed acknowledging that no
7 Specifically, Hassan cited: Commonwealth by Creamer v. Monumental
Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1974) (addressing whether the Consumer Protection Law extend to allegedly unfair or deceptive practices in connection with printed form leases used by landlords in connection with the leasing of housing); Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463, 464 (Pa. 1966) (considering an exculpatory clause contained in a written lease agreement between a landlord and tenant); and Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 1061, 1062 (Pa. Super. 1992) (considering an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in appellant’s action to collect on an open account from appellee, pursuant to a personal guarantee that was written on the back of a credit application).
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landlord/tenant relationship existed was a condition of such a lease agreement
that was unenforceable.
Finally, we note that Hassan has not meaningfully addressed the factual
record relating to her remaining claims against Officer Brockenbrough. As
explained above, in response to a motion for summary judgment, the
nonmoving party cannot rest upon the pleadings, but rather must set forth
specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact. Phillips, 86
A.3d at 912-13; see also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(a). Here, Hassan has not provided
this Court with any discussion of, or reference to, the specific facts she
presented to the trial court to establish that genuine issues of material fact
existed in relation to her claims for assault and battery, false
imprisonment/false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)
(providing that the argument section of an appellant’s brief shall include a
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent); see also
Connor v. Crozer Keystone Health Sys., 832 A.2d 1112, 1118 (Pa. Super.
2003) (explaining that this Court has consistently held that arguments that
are not appropriately developed are waived, noting that the appellant has the
burden of establishing its entitlement to relief by showing that the ruling of
the trial court is erroneous under the evidence or the law). Instead, Hassan
continues to rely on her unsupported assertions that a landlord-tenant
relationship existed and the document she signed to the contrary was
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unenforceable. See In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(explaining that mere issue spotting without analysis or legal citation to
support an assertion precludes our appellate review of a matter). Thus, we
conclude that Hassan failed to meet her burden of establishing that a genuine
issue of material fact existed with respect to her claims against Officer
Brockenbrough. See Murray, 63 A.3d at 1262; see also Pa.R.C.P.
1035.2(2). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of Officer Brockenbrough. 8
Order affirmed.
Date: 3/5/2025
8 We note that the record is silent as to the basis for the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Officer Brockenbrough. However, as explained above, we may affirm that ruling on any basis appearing of record. See Fitzpatrick, 961 A.2d at 1244 n.17.
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