Sheran, Justice.
The appeal is from a judgment of the district court entered pursuant to its order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The determinative facts are derived from the pleadings. On July 31, 1955, Jean Haskin sustained severe personal injury as a result of the crash of an airplane owned by defendant, Northeast Airways, Inc., and operated at the time, with its permission and authority, by Wayne Haskin. It is alleged that Haskin “flew said aircraft and did so in a negligent, careless, and reckless manner, thereby causing it to fall to the ground, injuring the plaintiff.” It is not alleged or asserted that Wayne Haskin was the agent or servant of Northeast Airways, Inc., at the time. and place of the accident. There are no claims of fact to support a finding of negligence in authorizing the use of a chattel which the owner knew or should have known to be defective. It was not pleaded that
Wayne Haskin was a reckless or incompetent operator to the actual or constructive knowledge of defendant.
The limited question for decision, therefore, is whether a passenger in an airplane who sustains injury as a result of a crash caused by the negligence of the aeronaut has by reason of that fact alone a cause of action for the damages sustained against the owner who consented to and authorized the use of the plane.
In 1929 Minnesota adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act. Section 5
of this enactment makes an owner of “aircraft absolutely liable for injury or damage to persons or property on the land or water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom, * * * unless the injury or damage is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured, or of, the owner or bailee of the property damaged.” Liability of the owner in other cases, such as the one here, is governed by § 6
of the act, which provides:
“The liability of the owner of * * * aircraft * * * [to] passengers * * * for damages caused by collision on land or in the air shall be de-. termined by the rules of law applicable to torts occurring on land.”
According to the applicable rules of law governing torts occurring on land, the bailor of a chattel is not liable for damages caused by the negligence of his bailee
in the absence of particular circumstances, such as, a defect in the chattel proximately causing the accident of which the owner had actual or constructive knowledge at the inception of the bailment; or the entrustment of the chattel to a bailee whose reckless or incompetent propensities were within the actual or constructive knowl
edge of the bailor.
The rule is otherwise where agency in fact appears.
From this analysis it follows that under the Uniform Aeronautics Act there is no liability as against the owner in this case.
Plaintiff contends, however, that the law with respect to the liability of an owner of an airplane was changed by the legislature in 1943 and that now an owner is vicariously liable for the negligence of the bailee in all cases. L. 1943, c. 653 (hereafter called the Minnesota Aeronautics Act),
to which plaintiff refers, was an apparent attempt by the legislature to consolidate and expand the statutory regulation of aviation. It is entitled:
“An act relating to aeronautics and defining words, terms and phrases; creating an aeronautics department and office of aeronautics commissioner and setting forth powers and duties thereof; providing for the acquisition, construction, operation and regulation of airports; providing for zoning for airport purposes; prescribing penalties;
* * * .” Section 1
of this act is captioned “Definitions” and consists of 29 subdivisions defining terms used in the statute, one of which will be considered in detail hereafter. Sections 2 to 19 of this law served to create
the Department of Aeronautics; fix the duties of the Commissioner of Aeronautics; provide for the licensing of aircraft and of phots; and establish the basis for regulation of airports and approaches. Section 19
of the act made violation of its provisions or of regulations made pursuant to it, unless otherwise specified, a misdemeanor. In § 19, subds. 3 to 6,
aircraft tampering, stunt flying without a parachute, trick and low level flying in the vicinity of crowds, and similar conduct are forbidden.
L. 1943, c. 653, § 20, is a reenactment of the Uniform Aeronautics Act first adopted, as stated, in this state in 1929.
The reenactment of § 6 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act (now Minn. St. 360.012, subd. 5) indicated, at the outset, that the legislature did not intend' to change the law then in force relating to the liability of plane owners to passengers for personal injury. Plaintiff contends, however, that an intent to alter the law can be found in the definition in Minn. St. 360.013, subd. 10, which provides:
“ ‘Operation of aircraft’ or ‘operate aircraft’ means the use of aircraft for the purpose of air navigation and includes the navigation or piloting of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the meaning of the statutes of this state.”
It is difficult to determine what was intended to be clarified by this section of the definitions. L. 1943, c. 653, § 5, made it “unlawful for any person to operate or navigate, or cause or authorize to be operated or navigated, any civil aircraft within the state unless such aircraft be licensed annually by the commissioner” or by some other specified government agency. Section 6 made it unlawful for any person to operate or to cause to be operated any aircraft in this state unless licensed annually
by the commissioner or otherwise certified in lieu of such license.
It seems reasonably clear that the legislature intended by the above-quoted § 360.013, subd. 10, to make any person authorizing the use of a plane responsible for the procurement of the required plane license and for determining that the person authorized to use the plane possessed a pilot’s license as required by the act.
Were it not for three decisions cited by plaintiff construing language such as that used in § 360.013, subd. 10, appearing also in the Laws of Iowa,
New Hampshire,
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Sheran, Justice.
The appeal is from a judgment of the district court entered pursuant to its order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The determinative facts are derived from the pleadings. On July 31, 1955, Jean Haskin sustained severe personal injury as a result of the crash of an airplane owned by defendant, Northeast Airways, Inc., and operated at the time, with its permission and authority, by Wayne Haskin. It is alleged that Haskin “flew said aircraft and did so in a negligent, careless, and reckless manner, thereby causing it to fall to the ground, injuring the plaintiff.” It is not alleged or asserted that Wayne Haskin was the agent or servant of Northeast Airways, Inc., at the time. and place of the accident. There are no claims of fact to support a finding of negligence in authorizing the use of a chattel which the owner knew or should have known to be defective. It was not pleaded that
Wayne Haskin was a reckless or incompetent operator to the actual or constructive knowledge of defendant.
The limited question for decision, therefore, is whether a passenger in an airplane who sustains injury as a result of a crash caused by the negligence of the aeronaut has by reason of that fact alone a cause of action for the damages sustained against the owner who consented to and authorized the use of the plane.
In 1929 Minnesota adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act. Section 5
of this enactment makes an owner of “aircraft absolutely liable for injury or damage to persons or property on the land or water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom, * * * unless the injury or damage is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured, or of, the owner or bailee of the property damaged.” Liability of the owner in other cases, such as the one here, is governed by § 6
of the act, which provides:
“The liability of the owner of * * * aircraft * * * [to] passengers * * * for damages caused by collision on land or in the air shall be de-. termined by the rules of law applicable to torts occurring on land.”
According to the applicable rules of law governing torts occurring on land, the bailor of a chattel is not liable for damages caused by the negligence of his bailee
in the absence of particular circumstances, such as, a defect in the chattel proximately causing the accident of which the owner had actual or constructive knowledge at the inception of the bailment; or the entrustment of the chattel to a bailee whose reckless or incompetent propensities were within the actual or constructive knowl
edge of the bailor.
The rule is otherwise where agency in fact appears.
From this analysis it follows that under the Uniform Aeronautics Act there is no liability as against the owner in this case.
Plaintiff contends, however, that the law with respect to the liability of an owner of an airplane was changed by the legislature in 1943 and that now an owner is vicariously liable for the negligence of the bailee in all cases. L. 1943, c. 653 (hereafter called the Minnesota Aeronautics Act),
to which plaintiff refers, was an apparent attempt by the legislature to consolidate and expand the statutory regulation of aviation. It is entitled:
“An act relating to aeronautics and defining words, terms and phrases; creating an aeronautics department and office of aeronautics commissioner and setting forth powers and duties thereof; providing for the acquisition, construction, operation and regulation of airports; providing for zoning for airport purposes; prescribing penalties;
* * * .” Section 1
of this act is captioned “Definitions” and consists of 29 subdivisions defining terms used in the statute, one of which will be considered in detail hereafter. Sections 2 to 19 of this law served to create
the Department of Aeronautics; fix the duties of the Commissioner of Aeronautics; provide for the licensing of aircraft and of phots; and establish the basis for regulation of airports and approaches. Section 19
of the act made violation of its provisions or of regulations made pursuant to it, unless otherwise specified, a misdemeanor. In § 19, subds. 3 to 6,
aircraft tampering, stunt flying without a parachute, trick and low level flying in the vicinity of crowds, and similar conduct are forbidden.
L. 1943, c. 653, § 20, is a reenactment of the Uniform Aeronautics Act first adopted, as stated, in this state in 1929.
The reenactment of § 6 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act (now Minn. St. 360.012, subd. 5) indicated, at the outset, that the legislature did not intend' to change the law then in force relating to the liability of plane owners to passengers for personal injury. Plaintiff contends, however, that an intent to alter the law can be found in the definition in Minn. St. 360.013, subd. 10, which provides:
“ ‘Operation of aircraft’ or ‘operate aircraft’ means the use of aircraft for the purpose of air navigation and includes the navigation or piloting of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the meaning of the statutes of this state.”
It is difficult to determine what was intended to be clarified by this section of the definitions. L. 1943, c. 653, § 5, made it “unlawful for any person to operate or navigate, or cause or authorize to be operated or navigated, any civil aircraft within the state unless such aircraft be licensed annually by the commissioner” or by some other specified government agency. Section 6 made it unlawful for any person to operate or to cause to be operated any aircraft in this state unless licensed annually
by the commissioner or otherwise certified in lieu of such license.
It seems reasonably clear that the legislature intended by the above-quoted § 360.013, subd. 10, to make any person authorizing the use of a plane responsible for the procurement of the required plane license and for determining that the person authorized to use the plane possessed a pilot’s license as required by the act.
Were it not for three decisions cited by plaintiff construing language such as that used in § 360.013, subd. 10, appearing also in the Laws of Iowa,
New Hampshire,
and Mississippi,
we would have no difficulty in accepting the trial court’s interpretation of the Minnesota act. In the cited cases, however, it was held that this language created a statutory vicarious liability on the part of plane owners for the negligence of the bailee of the plane. These courts were not confronted as we are with a conflict between the language of § 360.013, subd. 10, and the language of § 360.012, subd. 5. Iowa, New Hampshire, and Mississippi were among the states not adopting the Uniform Aeronautics Act, and our examination of the statutes of these states indicates that at the time of the decisions cited by plaintiff, their statutory law did not include any enactment providing that the liability of an owner of an airplane in a case such as this should be determined by the rule of law applicable to torts occurring on land. Since the conflict mentioned did not exist in these jurisdictions, the authors of the opinions above cited were not compelled, as we are, to make a choice between acceptance of § 360.013, subd. 10, and § 360.012, subd. 5. For this reason the authorities cited are not controlling or definitive.
The trial court noted that the construction for which the plaintiff contends “would render the civil liability section of our statute a nullity, a result which should be avoided if at all possible.” •
In our opinion the fact that the legislature reenacted the language of § 360.012, subd. 5, after it had been in force in this state for some
14
years, indicates a specific intent that the liability of owners of airplanes in cases such as this should continue to be determined by the rules of law applicable to torts occurring on land. If § 360.013, subd. 10, casts doubt on this construction, the language of § 360.013, subd. 1, dictates that the doubt be resolved in favor of restricting the scope of § 360.012, subd. 5, because it provides that the words defined in the act should have the meaning given therein “unless another intention clearly appears, or the context otherwise requires.” This quoted language, we believe, prevents superimposing the definition on the otherwise clear language of the act.
Our conclusion that the trial court correctly construed the statute as written is confirmed when we consider the decisive manner in which vicarious liability was imposed on automobile owners by the legislature in enacting Minn. St. 170.54
and the detailed legislative treatment given to the problem of vicarious liability of airplane owners elsewhere.
The strong considerations of public policy which would justify a change in the law in this regard are for the legislature and not this court to evaluate.
Affirmed.