Haskew v. United States of America

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 28, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1017
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN MICHAEL HASKEW, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01017 (UNA) v. ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and his application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2.

The court grants the in forma pauperis application and, for the reasons discussed below, dismisses

this matter without prejudice.

“A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in

law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and a “complaint plainly

abusive of the judicial process is properly typed malicious,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305,

1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Here, plaintiff, a resident of Lakeland, Florida, sues the United States and the Coca-Cola

Company. See Compl. at 1. He contends that, on January 20, 2024, he purchased a coin on eBay

“that shows ‘MCMXV WHAT WE SHALL DRINK COCA COLA 5’ and ‘IN GOD WE

TRUST UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FIFTY DOLLARS.’” Id. at 1; see Compl. Exhibit A

(photograph of coin). Although defendant acknowledges “that the coin gives no right to have and

drink Coca-Cola and the coin is not legal tender,” see Compl. at 1, he nonetheless asks the court to “declare that the coin entitles plaintiff to one thousand bottles of Coca-Cola from the year 1915

for five cents each,” see id. at 2. The remainder is comprised of plaintiff’s theorizations about

Canada’s sovereignty, the Royal Canadian Mint, the Panama-Pacific Exposition Coin Act, and the

Constitutional Convention of 1787. See id. at 1–2.

Applicable here, the court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a frivolous

complaint. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court has

repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their

jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”)

(quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v.

Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent

insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of

surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins.”). A court may dismiss a complaint

as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), or “postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly

fanciful kind,” Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1307–08. The instant complaint falls squarely into this

category. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

For these reasons, the complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are dismissed without

prejudice. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: April 28, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge