Hash v. Montana Silversmith

810 P.2d 1174, 248 Mont. 155, 48 State Rptr. 364, 1991 Mont. LEXIS 99
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedApril 22, 1991
Docket90-462
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 810 P.2d 1174 (Hash v. Montana Silversmith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hash v. Montana Silversmith, 810 P.2d 1174, 248 Mont. 155, 48 State Rptr. 364, 1991 Mont. LEXIS 99 (Mo. 1991).

Opinion

JUSTICE McDONOUGH

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Carol Hash appeals from a judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Court, which held she failed to establish that she suffered a compensable back injury. The insurer, State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund, has cross appealed the Workers’ Compensation Court’s judgment which held that Mrs. Hash suffered a compensable injury to her hands. We affirm.

The only issues we find necessary for review are:

1. Whether the Workers’ Compensation Court’s decision that Carol Hash failed to prove she suffered a compensable back injury is supported by substantial evidence;
2. Whether the Workers’ Compensation Court’s decision that Carol Hash suffered a compensable hand injury is supported by substantial evidence.

At the time of trial, Carol Hash (claimant) was fifty years old. She had worked for Montana Silversmith since 1981. Apparently she worked in the “buckle department” on a full time basis until she terminated her employment on April 24, 1987.

In 1985, claimant began having problems with her hands. In response to these problems, she sought medical attention from Dr. Phillip Griffin, a Billings rheumatologist. Dr. Griffin noted the *157 formation of Heberden nodes in the claimant’s fingers and concluded that the pain in her hands was caused by degenerative or primary osteoarthritis. According to Dr. Griffin, osteoarthritis is a disease of unknown cause or origin. During his deposition, he testified that the claimant’s work activities could aggravate her condition. However, this aggravation would be temporary in character. Once the work activity ceased, the aggravation would cease as well. In his opinion, no permanent damage would result from claimant’s job related activities.

In December 1986 claimant saw Dr. Dernbach and complained about back pain, which was hurting to the point that she had numbness in her right leg. Eventually, she was referred to Dr. James Johnson who diagnosed her back condition as spondylolisthesis or spondylolysis. He prescribed physical therapy for her back. Dr. Johnson did not recall making any inquiry as to the nature of claimant’s work and consequently did not have an opinion as to whether her condition was related to her employment. However, he did state his belief that her back condition was a congenital problem.

In early 1987, claimant informed her immediate supervisor that her job was aggravating her back and hands. On April 15, 1987, claimant informed her employer that she was going to file a claim for compensation on her back. Eventually the claimant terminated her employment due to ongoing problems with her back and hands.

As a result of claimant’s filing for benefits, respondent, the State Fund, sent her to Dr. Susan English. Dr. English diagnosed osteoarthritis of the hands and spondylolisthesis of her back. In Dr. English’s opinion the hand and back problems were not related. Based upon her examination of the claimant, Dr. English concluded that the claimant’s job duties did not cause the osteoarthritis. She believed that claimant’s work would, at the most, temporarily aggravate claimant’s hand condition and that the work would not produce any permanent effect. During her deposition, Dr. English testified that the claimant would have the same osteoarthritis problems regardless of her employment. It is “medically possible” however that micro trauma, associated with claimant’s job could aggravate her osteoarthritis.

Initially, the State Fund agreed to accept liability for Mrs. Hash’s claim as an occupational disease. The State Fund agreed to pay disability benefits until an occupational disease panel evaluation could be performed to determine what percentage of claimant’s osteoarthritis was caused or contributed to by her employment. The *158 panel evaluation was performed by Dr. William Shaw on June 19, 1989. Based upon this evaluation, Dr. Shaw concluded that claimant’s disability was unrelated to occupational causes. As a result, claimant’s benefits were terminated on September 11, 1989.

Claimant then filed a petition for a hearing before the Workers’ Compensation Court. Following trial, before hearings examiner Robert J. Campbell, the Workers’ Compensation Court found that claimant suffered a compensable injury to her hands. However, it found that she did not suffer a compensable injury to her back. The court could not determine, from the evidence presented, the nature and extent of her permanent disability. It therefore ordered her to file a new petition “with evidence of maximum healing and an election of permanent partial entitlement supported by appropriate evidence.” This appeal followed.

Our function in reviewing a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court is to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions of that court. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court as to the weight of evidence or questions of fact. Steffes v. 93 Leasing Co. Inc. (1978), 177 Mont. 83, 580 P.2d 450. However, decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Court must be based upon substantial credible evidence. O’Brien v. Guaranty Fund Services (1990), 241 Mont. 267, 786 P.2d 1169. If the conclusions of law are not supported by the court’s findings of fact, those conclusions must be reversed. Hume v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1980), 187 Mont. 53, 608 P.2d 1063.

In accordance with this standard of review, the claimant argues that she established that she suffered a compensable injury to her back and that this Court should reverse the conclusions of the Workers’ Compensation Court. Claimant correctly points out that an employer takes an employee the way he finds him. An employee who suffers from a preexisting condition is entitled to compensation if the condition was aggravated or accelerated by an industrial injury. Shepherd v. Midland Foods Inc. (1983), 205 Mont. 146, 666 P.2d 758.

However, before a worker is entitled to Workers’ Compensation benefits, she must establish by a preponderance of evidence that an “injury” in fact occurred. Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Const. Co. (1979), 183 Mont. 190, 598 P.2d 1099. For the purposes of this case, injury is defined as

“a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain resulting in either external or internal harm *159 and such physical condition as a result therefrom and excluding disease not traceable to injury ...” Section 39-71-119, MCA (1985).

The claimant argues that she suffered an injury to her back, as defined by the above statute. She maintains that her back problems were a preexisting condition which was exacerbated by her employment. Eventually, her back condition became so bad she was forced to quit.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
810 P.2d 1174, 248 Mont. 155, 48 State Rptr. 364, 1991 Mont. LEXIS 99, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hash-v-montana-silversmith-mont-1991.