NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0483n.06
No. 24-3208
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 03, 2024 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk HASANUL ISLAM PARVAJ, ) Petitioner, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW ) v. FROM THE UNITED STATES ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION ) MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, APPEALS ) Respondent. ) OPINION )
Before: KETHLEDGE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Hasanul Parvaj, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, applied for
admission at the United States border in 2014 without proper entry documents. Parvaj conceded
that he was removable but sought relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Finding Parvaj not credible, the
immigration judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief. The BIA affirmed. Parvaj now petitions for
review. For the reasons stated, we DENY the petition.
I.
Hasanul Parvaj is a native and citizen of Bangladesh. In 2014, he applied for admission to
the United States at a port of entry, claiming that he feared returning to Bangladesh. An asylum
officer concluded that Parvaj’s fear of persecution upon returning to Bangladesh was credible and
sent his case to an IJ.
Parvaj conceded removability before the IJ. But he applied for relief in the form of asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT protection. He claimed fear of persecution in Bangladesh on No. 24-3208, Parvaj v. Garland
account of his political opinion due to his membership in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. He
alleged that the rival political party, the Awami League, had threatened and beaten him on several
occasions. After hearing Parvaj’s testimony, the IJ denied his applications for relief. The IJ found
that Parvaj’s testimony was not credible, noting numerous discrepancies between his statements
and testimony at the credible-fear interview, in his asylum application, and at the hearing before
the IJ. This determination was fatal to Parvaj’s request for asylum and withholding of removal.
The IJ also determined that Parvaj had failed to meet his burden of proof for CAT protection. The
IJ thus ordered Parvaj removed to Bangladesh.
Parvaj appealed to the BIA. The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision and dismissed Parvaj’s
petition. Parvaj now petitions for review.
II.
Adverse Credibility Determination. Parvaj’s primary challenge on appeal is that the IJ
erred by finding him not credible and thus denying his requests for relief. “Where, as here, the
BIA . . . issued its own separate opinion, we review the BIA’s opinion as the final agency
determination.” Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2010). “[T]o the extent the BIA
adopted the [IJ’s] reasoning, this court also reviews the [IJ’s] decision.” Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch,
808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015). We review adverse credibility determinations under the
deferential substantial evidence standard, meaning that they “are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to make a contrary conclusion.” Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d
1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 2014).
Previously, the law allowed IJs to consider only “inconsistencies that went to the heart of
an applicant’s claim when making an assessment of the applicant’s credibility.” Id. at 1072. But
Congress changed that in the Real ID Act of 2005, which applies to Parvaj’s case. Id. Now, IJs
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may “consider ‘any inaccuracies or falsehoods in [an applicant’s] statements, without regard to
whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or
any other relevant factor.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).
“There is no presumption of credibility,” and any inconsistencies must be considered as part of
“the totality of the circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
The IJ and the BIA pointed to omissions and inconsistencies in Parvaj’s statements that the
agency reasonably believed suggested that Parvaj had “embellished his testimony” regarding the
injuries and threats he suffered. First, the IJ and BIA noted inconsistencies in Parvaj’s statements
related to a July 2012 beating by the Awami League. Specifically, the IJ found that Parvaj had
shifted his description of the injuries over time. The asylum officer asked whether Parvaj was
injured at the time of the beating, and Parvaj responded, “Yes. I got hurt on my hand.” The officer
followed up by asking how Parvaj hurt his hand, to which Parvaj responded, “I got a cut and
scratch.” Before the IJ, however, Parvaj testified that he was stabbed in the hand by a knife. Yet,
he had never mentioned anything about a knife at the credible-fear interview, even though he was
given an opportunity. And when asked why he failed to bring the stabbing to the attention of the
asylum officer, Parvaj said that he had “no reason” for not mentioning the knife.
Second, the IJ and the BIA pointed to Parvaj’s varying accounts related to a July 2013
group fight with the Awami League. During his credible-fear interview, Parvaj said that he “got
hurt in my teeth and in my lip” during the July 2013 incident. At the hearing before the IJ, however,
he said that the Awami League broke two of his teeth and he needed stitches. And that because of
the incident, he went to the hospital for two days. Parvaj, however, couldn’t provide proof of his
hospital stay, nor could he explain why he didn’t provide more details about the severity of the
injuries to the asylum officer.
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Third, the agency noted the discrepancies regarding the timing and frequency of the phone
call threats from the Awami League. During his credible-fear interview, Parvaj said he received
one threatening phone call in February 2014, after an election important to the Awami League.
But he later testified that he was threatened both before and after the election in 2014, and that he
had answered several threatening calls from the Awami League.
These inconsistencies and omissions need not go to the heart of Parvaj’s claim. Slyusar,
740 F.3d at 1073. And where a petitioner seeks to add new incidents or harms, or embellish those
that already occurred, as the proceedings continue, the agency has discretion to reject those as
inconsistent with the earlier statements. See Kolov v. Garland, 78 F.4th 911, 922 (6th Cir. 2023).
In sum, the evidence presented doesn’t compel a different result on the credibility determination,
so under the substantial evidence standard, we must affirm the agency’s decision.
Parvaj counters with alleged errors in the agency’s process. First, he says that the IJ erred
by relying on the notes from the credible-fear interview at all because the notes are not complete
or a verbatim report of his statements at the interview nor is the interview process a complete
investigation of his asylum claim. Second, Parvaj argues that the IJ erred by comparing his asylum
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0483n.06
No. 24-3208
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 03, 2024 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk HASANUL ISLAM PARVAJ, ) Petitioner, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW ) v. FROM THE UNITED STATES ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION ) MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, APPEALS ) Respondent. ) OPINION )
Before: KETHLEDGE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Hasanul Parvaj, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, applied for
admission at the United States border in 2014 without proper entry documents. Parvaj conceded
that he was removable but sought relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Finding Parvaj not credible, the
immigration judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief. The BIA affirmed. Parvaj now petitions for
review. For the reasons stated, we DENY the petition.
I.
Hasanul Parvaj is a native and citizen of Bangladesh. In 2014, he applied for admission to
the United States at a port of entry, claiming that he feared returning to Bangladesh. An asylum
officer concluded that Parvaj’s fear of persecution upon returning to Bangladesh was credible and
sent his case to an IJ.
Parvaj conceded removability before the IJ. But he applied for relief in the form of asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT protection. He claimed fear of persecution in Bangladesh on No. 24-3208, Parvaj v. Garland
account of his political opinion due to his membership in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. He
alleged that the rival political party, the Awami League, had threatened and beaten him on several
occasions. After hearing Parvaj’s testimony, the IJ denied his applications for relief. The IJ found
that Parvaj’s testimony was not credible, noting numerous discrepancies between his statements
and testimony at the credible-fear interview, in his asylum application, and at the hearing before
the IJ. This determination was fatal to Parvaj’s request for asylum and withholding of removal.
The IJ also determined that Parvaj had failed to meet his burden of proof for CAT protection. The
IJ thus ordered Parvaj removed to Bangladesh.
Parvaj appealed to the BIA. The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision and dismissed Parvaj’s
petition. Parvaj now petitions for review.
II.
Adverse Credibility Determination. Parvaj’s primary challenge on appeal is that the IJ
erred by finding him not credible and thus denying his requests for relief. “Where, as here, the
BIA . . . issued its own separate opinion, we review the BIA’s opinion as the final agency
determination.” Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2010). “[T]o the extent the BIA
adopted the [IJ’s] reasoning, this court also reviews the [IJ’s] decision.” Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch,
808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015). We review adverse credibility determinations under the
deferential substantial evidence standard, meaning that they “are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to make a contrary conclusion.” Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d
1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 2014).
Previously, the law allowed IJs to consider only “inconsistencies that went to the heart of
an applicant’s claim when making an assessment of the applicant’s credibility.” Id. at 1072. But
Congress changed that in the Real ID Act of 2005, which applies to Parvaj’s case. Id. Now, IJs
-2- No. 24-3208, Parvaj v. Garland
may “consider ‘any inaccuracies or falsehoods in [an applicant’s] statements, without regard to
whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or
any other relevant factor.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).
“There is no presumption of credibility,” and any inconsistencies must be considered as part of
“the totality of the circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
The IJ and the BIA pointed to omissions and inconsistencies in Parvaj’s statements that the
agency reasonably believed suggested that Parvaj had “embellished his testimony” regarding the
injuries and threats he suffered. First, the IJ and BIA noted inconsistencies in Parvaj’s statements
related to a July 2012 beating by the Awami League. Specifically, the IJ found that Parvaj had
shifted his description of the injuries over time. The asylum officer asked whether Parvaj was
injured at the time of the beating, and Parvaj responded, “Yes. I got hurt on my hand.” The officer
followed up by asking how Parvaj hurt his hand, to which Parvaj responded, “I got a cut and
scratch.” Before the IJ, however, Parvaj testified that he was stabbed in the hand by a knife. Yet,
he had never mentioned anything about a knife at the credible-fear interview, even though he was
given an opportunity. And when asked why he failed to bring the stabbing to the attention of the
asylum officer, Parvaj said that he had “no reason” for not mentioning the knife.
Second, the IJ and the BIA pointed to Parvaj’s varying accounts related to a July 2013
group fight with the Awami League. During his credible-fear interview, Parvaj said that he “got
hurt in my teeth and in my lip” during the July 2013 incident. At the hearing before the IJ, however,
he said that the Awami League broke two of his teeth and he needed stitches. And that because of
the incident, he went to the hospital for two days. Parvaj, however, couldn’t provide proof of his
hospital stay, nor could he explain why he didn’t provide more details about the severity of the
injuries to the asylum officer.
-3- No. 24-3208, Parvaj v. Garland
Third, the agency noted the discrepancies regarding the timing and frequency of the phone
call threats from the Awami League. During his credible-fear interview, Parvaj said he received
one threatening phone call in February 2014, after an election important to the Awami League.
But he later testified that he was threatened both before and after the election in 2014, and that he
had answered several threatening calls from the Awami League.
These inconsistencies and omissions need not go to the heart of Parvaj’s claim. Slyusar,
740 F.3d at 1073. And where a petitioner seeks to add new incidents or harms, or embellish those
that already occurred, as the proceedings continue, the agency has discretion to reject those as
inconsistent with the earlier statements. See Kolov v. Garland, 78 F.4th 911, 922 (6th Cir. 2023).
In sum, the evidence presented doesn’t compel a different result on the credibility determination,
so under the substantial evidence standard, we must affirm the agency’s decision.
Parvaj counters with alleged errors in the agency’s process. First, he says that the IJ erred
by relying on the notes from the credible-fear interview at all because the notes are not complete
or a verbatim report of his statements at the interview nor is the interview process a complete
investigation of his asylum claim. Second, Parvaj argues that the IJ erred by comparing his asylum
testimony to the statements in his asylum application because “[d]ue to the small space on the
I-589 form, it is not reasonable to expect an applicant to include every detail pertaining to the
asylum claim.” Petitioner Br. at 26. Whatever the merit of these claims, Parvaj did not raise them
before the BIA, so we cannot entertain them. See Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1155 (6th Cir.
2021).
Even if the IJ could consider the notes, Parvaj argues that the IJ placed too much weight
on them; he again argues that they are not a verbatim report of his testimony and says the asylum
officer did not ask any follow-up questions, so he could not explain what he meant by his
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statements. As noted previously, however, the asylum officer did ask follow-up questions, and on
each occasion, Parvaj was asked opened-ended questions, in which he could have responded with
the level of detail provided to the IJ. He did not. Parvaj also claims that translation issues
accounted for the discrepancies. But as the BIA explained, “[T]he asylum officer read [Parvaj] a
summary of his claim using an interpreter, and [Parvaj] said he understood the interpreter during
his credible fear interview.” So as the BIA reasonably concluded, “This is not a case where there
is a strong indication that the inconsistencies resulted from translation errors or language-based
misunderstanding . . . .” Parvaj fails to point to record evidence that would compel any reasonable
adjudicator to conclude to the contrary. Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1073. Substantial evidence supports
the BIA’s adverse credibility determination.
CAT Protection. Given his presentation of the issue, Parvaj’s entitlement to CAT
protection also rises and falls on the adverse credibility determination. He asks for a remand for
reconsideration of his entitlement to CAT protection “because of the errors in the BIA’s credibility
determination.” Petitioner Br. at 32. Having found that the BIA didn’t err in upholding the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination, Parvaj’s challenge to the denial of CAT protection also fails.
Other Challenges. Finally, Parvaj raises the possibility that the then-forthcoming decision
by the Supreme Court in S.E.C. v. Jarkesy might offer some ground for a constitutional challenge.
For example, Parvaj’s briefing alludes to the possibility that a jury trial right might attach in
removal proceedings. But Parvaj fails to flesh out his constitutional arguments; instead, his
briefing merely notes that the Jarkesy case was pending. The Supreme Court has since released
Jarkesy. See S.E.C. v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117 (2024). That case concerned S.E.C. enforcement
proceedings involving allegations of fraud, and the common-law fraud analogue was important to
the Supreme Court’s decision. See id. at 2127. We see no parallel here. But, in any event, Parvaj
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made no effort either before the Supreme Court’s decision or afterwards, by way of a Rule 28(j)
letter, to explain why Jarkesy supports his position. We find this argument abandoned. See United
States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 846 (6th Cir. 2006).
***
We DENY the petition for review.
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