CARDINE, Justice.
Jetty Lee Harvey challenges his conviction for conspiracy to commit kidnapping. [1076]*1076His prior convictions for kidnapping, which was the objective of the conspiracy, and sexual assault were reversed due to a speedy trial violation. Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo.1989) (Harvey I). The issues Harvey presents in this appeal concern double jeopardy, speedy trial, and pretrial publicity questions, plus an issue concerning the use of Harvey’s allocution statement at the sentencing after his first trial.
We affirm.
Harvey presents the following issues:
1. —Does the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit the State from prosecuting Appellant for conspiracy to commit kidnapping by relying upon evidence of his conduct which constitutes the substantive offense and served as the basis for the prior conviction of Appellant for kidnapping?
2. —Has the Appellant’s right to a speedy trial been denied by reason of his second prosecution?
3. —Has the Appellant been deprived of his rights to a public trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by having to defend himself against conspiracy charges to a jury of persons who were all aware of his prior conviction on the underlying substantive offenses from inflammatory pretrial publicity?
4. —Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing statements made by the Appellant at the allocution portion of his sentencing hearing following his initial conviction to be used against him in the second prosecution in violation of Appellant’s constitutional rights to silence and due process?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During the evening of January 5, 1986, Harvey was the passenger in the front seat of an extended-cab pickup truck driven by Everett Phillips in Rock Springs. See Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062 (Wyo.1992) (Phillips II). David Swazo sat in the back seat of the truck. The truck passed a woman walking along Elk Street. Phillips said he wanted to grab the woman. Harvey considered this a dare. Phillips turned the truck around, and Harvey asked the woman if she wanted a ride. The woman attempted to ignore him but, after the truck stopped, Harvey exited the truck and stood in front of her. Harvey told her she was going to have a ride and grabbed her as she tried to run past him. Harvey picked her up, and she felt herself being pulled into the truck. Inside the truck she was pulled into the back seat. The truck left the scene of the abduction.
Swazo, with the help of Harvey and Phillips, removed her clothes. Swazo kissed her and licked her breasts and vagina. Swazo put his fingers into her vagina and attempted to penetrate her vagina with his penis. Harvey and Phillips laughed, jeered and made lewd comments as Swazo assaulted her. The truck stopped, Phillips turned around in his seat, and he began to remove his pants. At that time, Harvey said “Oh shit. It’s the cops.”
The police were alerted to the abduction and assault by a pizza delivery man, Ron Lacey, who was sitting in his car counting tip money when he saw the abduction. Lacey followed the truck as it left the scene of the abduction, drove onto Interstate 80, exited the interstate and entered a trailer court. From there, Lacey went to a telephone and alerted law enforcement authorities using 911.
On January 9, 1986, Harvey was charged with kidnapping and sexual assault in the first degree or aiding and abetting those crimes. Harvey I, 114 P.2d at 90. A trial on those charges began on July 21, 1987, and Harvey was found guilty on those charges following- a three-day trial. We reversed the conviction because of a speedy trial violation and directed the trial court to dismiss the indictment. 774 P.2d at 98. Our decision was issued on May 5, 1989. Id. at 87.
On July 7, 1989, a complaint charging Harvey with conspiracy to commit kidnapping and conspiracy to commit sexual assault was filed. On July 25, 1989, Harvey filed a petition for a writ of prohibition [1077]*1077with this court. We denied the petition on September 18, 1989. State ex rel. Harvey v. County Court of Sweetwater County, 779 P.2d 291 (Wyo.1989). On September 27, 1989, the State dropped the conspiracy to commit kidnapping charge, apparently pursuant to plea bargain negotiations. The State refiled conspiracy to commit kidnapping charges again on November 7, 1989. An information charging Harvey with conspiracy to commit sexual assault was filed in district court on November 3, 1989. An information charging him with conspiracy to commit kidnapping was filed on November 21, 1989. On December 18, 1989, the district court issued an order certifying questions to the Wyoming Supreme Court. These questions centered on double jeopardy, speedy trial, and vindictive prosecution issues. We remanded the matter to district court with the questions unanswered on January 2, 1990.
Harvey moved for dismissal of the charges or a change of venue due to pretrial publicity on November 14, 1989. The court reserved the question until trial in an order filed November 29,1989. On December 27, 1989, the court issued a pretrial order stating that it would attempt to seat a jury in Sweetwater County before considering moving the venue. Jury selection began on January 8, 1990, and concluded on January 11, 1990. Opening statements were given, and testimony began on January 12,1990. On January 17,1990 the jury found Harvey guilty on the conspiracy to commit kidnapping charge and not guilty on the conspiracy to commit sexual assault charge. On March 15, 1990, Harvey received a sentence of 12 to 15 years in the state penitentiary on the charge for which he was convicted.
DISCUSSION
1. Double Jeopardy
Harvey’s double jeopardy claim mirrors that of the appellant in the companion case of Phillips II. In that ease, we noted that in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that:
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.
110 S.Ct. at 2087. Phillips II, 835 P.2d at 1067. However, a difference exists between the conduct needed to prove an offense and the evidence introduced to prove the conduct. Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2093; Phillips II, 835 P.2d at 1067. Thus, in the later case of United States v. Felix, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 118 L.Ed.2d 25 (1992), which involved a second trial on conspiracy charges, the United States Supreme Court, referring to the above quotation from Grady, recognized and then resolved the uncertainty and confusion created by Grady when it stated:
Taken out of context, and read literally, this language supports the defense of double jeopardy. But we decline to read the language so expansively, because of the context in which Grady arose and because of difficulties which have already arisen in its interpretation.
Felix, 112 S.Ct. at 1383-84. Then, quoting with approval from United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947), the Court stated:
In language applicable here, we pointedly stated that “the same overt acts charged in a conspiracy count may also be charged and proved as substantive offenses, for the agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself.” [331 U.S. at 542, 67 S.Ct. at 1399]; see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1182, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946) (“[T]he commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses ... [a]nd the plea of double jeopardy is no defense to a conviction for both offenses”).
Felix, 112 S.Ct. at 1384. Conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate offenses. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). The proof of different [1078]*1078conduct is necessary to convict a person of each offense.
A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. The crime of conspiracy is complete when an agreement has been made and an overt act or acts are performed to further the unlawful design. The overt acts need not be criminal in themselves.
Phillips II, 835 P.2d at 1067 (citations omitted). See also W.S. 6-1-303.
The conduct constituting the substantive crimes of first degree sexual assault and kidnapping is defined as follows:
(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:
(i) The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible confinement.
W.S. 6-2-302; and
(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the removal * * *.
W.S. 6-2-201.
As in Phillips II, the evidence from Harvey’s kidnapping and sexual assault trial and his conspiracy trial overlapped. The overlapping evidence included testimony from the victim recounting the time she first encountered Harvey until her rescue. Notwithstanding evidence detailing the abduction and sexual assault, the evidence of the overt acts preceding this entails conduct that does not constitute the crimes of kidnapping or rape. Phillips telling Harvey to grab the woman and Harvey undertaking (agreeing) to do so, turning the truck around on the street, stopping the truck, telling the victim she was going to have a ride, approaching the woman, and stopping her are not acts that constitute elements of the crimes of first degree sexual assault or kidnapping. However, they are conduct that satisfies the elements of an agreement beforehand and an overt act necessary to prove a conspiracy. Prosecuting Harvey on conspiracy charges after his conviction for the substantive crimes does not violate his right to be protected against double jeopardy. Phillips II, 835 P.2d at 1068; see also United States v. Felix, supra, 112 S.Ct. 1377 (holding that “long antedating any of these cases [Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977)], and not questioned in any of them, is the rule that a substantive crime, and a conspiracy to commit that crime, are not the ‘same offense’ for double jeopardy purposes,” and that “a mere overlap of proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation”).
2. Speedy Trial
Harvey bases his argument of a speedy trial violation on the span between the time of the incident and the time he was brought to trial. Harvey I, 774 P.2d 87, gave us the opportunity to delineate and discuss the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution. In Harvey I, we stated that “the speedy trial clock starts to run upon arrest or when the complaint is filed.” 774 P.2d at 94. See also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 314-15, 92 S.Ct. 455, 460, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); and United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982). Thus, we do not examine this issue by calculating the passage of time from January 5, 1986, the date of incident, to January 8, 1990, the date of the trial. Instead, we look at the period of time from the filing of the first complaint, July 7, 1989, until the date of the trial, January 8, 1990.
In Phillips II, we summarized our speedy trial analysis as follows:
Our speedy trial analysis requires we balance four factors. This test requires us to look at: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of her speedy trial right; and (4) the prejudice to the defen[1079]*1079dant. [Phillips v. State ] Phillips I, 774 P.2d [118] at 121 [Wyo.1989], citing to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182 [33 L.Ed.2d 101] (1972). However, when the length of the delay is neither “presumptively prejudicial” nor significantly long, no further analysis is warranted. Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo.1991); Phillips I, 774 P.2d at 121.
Phillips II, 835 P.2d at 1068. As explained below, the time span in this ease between the date of the filing of the complaint and the date of the start of the trial is neither “presumptively prejudicial” nor significantly long. Thus, after calculating the time span, we need not analyze the speedy trial issue further.
Between the time the complaint was first filed to the time of the trial spans 185 days. The information on the conspiracy to commit sexual assault charge was filed on November 3, 1989. The information on the conspiracy to commit kidnapping charge was filed on November 21, 1989. Both sides indicate in their briefs that the interval of time from September 27, 1989, when the conspiracy to commit kidnapping charge was dropped, to November 7, 1989, when charges were refiled, was occupied by plea bargain negotiations. Harvey does not argue that this time span caused him prejudice. The time from the filing of the first information for conspiracy to commit sexual assault to the time of trial spans 66 days.
Two delays attributable to Harvey are subtracted from this computation. District Court Rule 204(c) and (d); Phillips II, 835 P.2d at 1068. Harvey filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with this court on July 25, 1989, which we denied on September 18, 1989. State ex rel. Harvey, 779 P.2d 291. This is a span of 55 days. On December 18, 1989, an order certifying questions to this court on Harvey’s motion was entered. We remanded the case to district court with the questions unanswered on January 2, 1990. This is a span of 15 days. The time from the filing of the complaint to the date of trial, with time deducted for delays attributable to Harvey, is only 115 days. The time from filing of the first information to the date of trial with time deducted for delays attributable to the defendant is only 51 days. Thus, we conclude that Harvey’s right to a speedy trial for the conspiracy charges was not violated.
3. Pretrial Publicity and Change of Venue
After Harvey moved to dismiss the charges or for change of venue due to pretrial publicity, the court reserved the question until trial in an order filed November 29, 1989. On December 27, 1989, the court issued a pretrial order stating:
The Court also indicated that if a jury could not be obtained in Sweetwater County during the week of January 8, [1990] the Court would be inclined to move the case to either Uinta or Lincoln counties for trial during the week of January 15, 1990.
Jury selection began on January 8, 1990, and concluded on January 11, 1990. Voir dire occupies over 900 pages of transcript in the record. Some 74 persons were examined for the jury in this case. Each juror was examined individually concerning his or her knowledge about the earlier trial and subsequent reversal. Of the 74 persons examined, only ten persons stated that they had no knowledge of the previous convictions. However, 43 persons stated they had formed no opinion as to Harvey’s guilt or innocence. After seating a jury, Harvey renewed his motion. The court found that the jury as seated would be fair and impartial and denied the motion.
We have summarized our procedure for determining whether the trial court correctly ruled on a motion for change of venue due to pretrial publicity as follows:
It is the burden of the defendant to show prejudice so great that a fair trial cannot be obtained, Collins v. State, [589 P.2d 1283 (Wyo.1979)], and the defendant must show actual prejudice in the minds of jurors. Wilcox v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1983). Because of this, the motion for a change of venue cannot be logically passed on until the [1080]*1080extent of prejudice, if any, is determined upon voir dire examination. Moss v. State, [492 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo.1972)]. “ * * * The ultimate test of the propriety of a change of venue is what is revealed in voir dire of the jury panel. * * * ” Shaffer v. State, Wyo., 640 P.2d 88, 103, 31 A.L.R.4th 166 (1982). The judge’s ruling on venue is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Murray v. State, Wyo., 671 P.2d 320, 326 (1983); Jackson v. State, Wyo., 522 P.2d 1356, cert. denied 419 U.S. 1055, 95 S.Ct. 637, 42 L.Ed.2d 652 (1974); Mares v. State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 530, 535 (1972).
We have adopted a two-pronged test for determining whether a change of venue should be granted because of pretrial publicity. First, the nature and extent of the publicity must be considered; second, the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which actually appears during voir dire examination. Murray v. State, supra. Each of these elements must be considered in order to determine whether the court abused its discretion in denying the change of venue.
It is to be expected that most of the jury panel will have heard about a sensational case, but there is no requirement that a juror be ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case. Wilcox v. State, supra. The totality of the circumstances must indicate the presence of improper prejudice. Weddle v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 231 (1980). The question focuses on whether a fair jury was ultimately selected. Shaffer v. State, supra.
Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202, 208 (Wyo.1986) (emphasis added).
Our application of the first-prong of this test is somewhat handicapped in that evidence in the record of the pretrial publicity is limited mainly to questioning of potential jurors on voir dire about their knowledge of the case. Outside the record from the trial court, reprints of newspaper articles concerning the case were provided by Harvey in an appendix to his brief. Normally we do not consider matters outside the record on appeal. Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Wyo.1979). However, we take judicial notice of these and the amount of publicity on the reversal of Harvey’s earlier conviction and the filing of the conspiracy charges generated in order to ensure Harvey effective assistance of appellate counsel. 37 Gambling Devices v. State, 694 P.2d 711, 716 (Wyo.1985); Stice v. State, 799 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo.1990).
This case, from announcement of the reversal of the earlier conviction to coverage culminating in the commencement of trial proceedings, received more publicity than most criminal cases receive. The newspaper accounts of the events were fair and balanced. Some letters to the editors and editorial columns indicate that these events sparked certain emotions in people. We do note the material submitted in the appendix to Harvey’s brief is not one-sided. Some material considers the rights involved in our decision in Harvey I and makes for a lively and informed debate on these issues. The amount and nature of the publicity requires us to examine the effect it had on the jury.
It is apparent that Harvey received a fair and impartial jury through a long, involved and careful jury selection. Well over half of the persons called for jury duty stated during voir dire that they had formed no opinion as to Harvey’s guilt or innocence despite whatever they knew about the case. See Murry, 713 P.2d 202. Out of this group, a jury was selected that exhibited no prejudice apparent in the record. The fact that this jury acquitted Harvey on one of the conspiracy counts is further indication that the members of the jury carefully considered the evidence without prejudice. We find no error in the court’s denial of Harvey’s motion for a change of venue or outright dismissal of the charges.
j. Use of Allocution Testimony
After conviction in the first trial, at Harvey’s sentencing for the kidnapping and sexual assault, Harvey made an allocution statement to the court. At his subse[1081]*1081quent trial on the conspiracy charges, the State read portions of his allocution statement' into evidence as follows:
MR. FLYNN: Ready, your Honor?
“MR. KINNAIRD: At this time, your Honor, I would like for Mr. Harvey to make a statement that he would like to make [to the Court].”
DETECTIVE MAXWELL: “MR. HARVEY: I meant this woman no harm. In fact, I even stopped her from being harmed at the end. I tried resisting long before she was even abducted. Everett was just insistent from two blocks past her to two blocks to her, telling me to grab her. Grab her. And I was saying, ‘No. I don’t want this.’ And even when I pulled up beside her and I rolled down my window, she walked by. I just asked her if she wanted a ride because it was cold. She never looked at me. She never answered. She just kept her head down, her hands in her coat pocket and she walked by. And I turned to Everett and I said, ‘See, she doesn’t even want a ride.’ And he says, ‘No. All you got to do is grab her.’ He throws it into reverse and backs up past the woman, slapping me, ‘Just grab her. Just grab her.’ ”
THE COURT: You read that incorrectly Officer.
THE WITNESS: I’m sorry. “‘Just grab her. Grab her.’ And that’s when I finally broke down on it there. I got out and stepped out in front of her. She walked up to me, lifted her head, looked at me and I said, ‘Hey, look. Just get in and we’ll give you a ride home.’ And she turned and walked around me. And that’s when I heard Everett say, ‘Grab her, chicken-shit.’ And that was the final straw of the dare.
“I turned and grabbed her by the coat, the shoulder, pulled her off her feet toward the pickup. Picked her up and put her in the vehicle. She was laying between the seats with her hands up like this. She was saying, ‘Don’t hurt me.’ I said, ‘No one is going to hurt you.’ She relaxed. * * * I grabbed her legs by the boots, and I said, ‘Don’t worry. No one is going to hurt you.’
“And then Everett Phillips — I don’t know where we were going. He pulls into this trailer park and starts hollering, ‘I want some. I want some.’ I says, ‘No, Everett. Let’s take the woman home.’ And he goes, ‘Well, the bitch can suck it.’ And I grabbed his arm then and I said, ‘No, Everett. We’re taking her home. Let’s go.’ And that is when I saw a cop car go by through the window. And I said, ‘Now there is a cop. Let’s just take her home.’
“And when we stopped, the cops, I didn’t even know it was cops. I could see lights in the mirror. Everett got out and went back to them. He was gone for, anyway, two minutes and there was no struggle in the back. There was no one hollering, screaming. I just looked in the mirror. And then as I’m looking in the mirror back a couple minutes or so, this woman [the victim], she got between the seats and started headed for the driver’s door. And I just stepped out of the truck. And the police officer told me to stop and put my hands on the camper. That’s just what I done until after the fight with David Swazo. They cuffed us and took us to jail. But, at the time of all of this, there was a real— there was a big factor, too of very drunk.”
MR. FLYNN: Thank you, Officer, that finishes the reading.
Harvey claims that the use of his allocution statements violated his right not to incriminate himself under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution.
The origin of a defendant’s right to allo-cution — to address the court before having sentence’pronounced — lies in English common law. Under early English criminal practice, an accused was not allowed counsel nor was he a competent witness for himself. Allocution provided a convicted defendant the only opportunity to speak for himself, and its omission would generally have required reversal. Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Question to Defendant as to Whether He Has Anything to Say Why Sentence Should Not Be Pro[1082]*1082nounced Against Him, 96 A.L.R.2d 1292, 1295 (1964). In the early days of Wyoming jurisprudence, this court did not consider it reversible error if the trial court failed to properly allow the defendant to allocute. Kinsler v. Territory of Wyoming, 1 Wyo. 112 (1873) (Convicted murderer resentenced using procedures in accordance with statutory sentencing provisions). The omission of the court to address the defendant did not require a new trial, but it did require setting aside the judgment in order to allow compliance with the requirement. Keffer v. State, 12 Wyo. 49, 73 P. 556, 560 (1903).
Under current practice of criminal procedure, a defendant’s right to address the court at his sentencing is embodied in W.R.Cr.P. 33, which states in part:
(a) Sentence.
(1) Imposition of Sentence. — Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay. Pending sentence the court may commit defendant, continue or alter the bail. Before imposing sentence the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak and shall address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of the punishment.
W.R.Cr.P. 33(a)(1). We have recognized the right to allocution as “constitutionally protected.” Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo.1987).
Harvey argues that use at a subsequent trial of his allocution statement impermissi-bly compromises his right of allocution, his right against self-incrimination, and right to due process. He relies upon Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), to advance this contention. In Simmons, one of the petitioners sought to have evidence suppressed due to an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In order to have standing to contest the admission of the evidence, the petitioner had to claim ownership of the evidence. 390 U.S. at 389, 88 S.Ct. at 974. The statements of ownership were subsequently used to incriminate him at trial. Thus, the Court noted that allowing use in trial of the petitioner’s claim of ownership at a suppression hearing would require the petitioner to choose between the exercise of two constitutional rights. The Court reversed the petitioner’s conviction because it found “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.” 390 U.S. at 394, 88 S.Ct. at 976. However, exercising a right to allocution does not require surrendering one right to preserve another. The convicted party only needs to decide whether the right to remain silent will be asserted or waived.
The right of allocution is similar to the right to testify in one’s own behalf. The United States Supreme Court recognizes the right to testify in one’s own behalf as a constitutional right embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution right to call witnesses in one’s own behalf and the Fourteenth Amendment Right of due process. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-52, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708-09, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). These rights apply as well to actions in state courts. 483 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 2708. We recognize this right in our own constitution, Art. 1, § 10, Wyo. Const., and we recognize that an accused can waive the right, take the stand, and testify as a witness in his own behalf. Only incriminating statements obtained by a “genuine compulsion of testimony” spark concerns about violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186-87, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977); Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 315, 32 S.Ct. 281, 284, 56 L.Ed. 448 (1912). Testimony given voluntarily may be used against a defendant without violating his rights. 431 U.S. at 186-87, 97 S.Ct. at 1818.
A defendant’s choice to exercise his right to allocution is entirely voluntary; he can speak to the court, but he is not required to do so. We do not prescribe limits on what the defendant can or cannot say during allocution. A defendant’s statements may be admissible against him in [1083]*1083further proceedings, provided they are voluntary. However, if the trial court were to require a defendant to confess to criminal activities in his allocution in return for a more lenient sentence, those statements would amount to “genuine compulsion of testimony” in violation of the right against self-incrimination. Washington, 431 U.S. at 187, 97 S.Ct. at 1818; United States v. Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 302, 312 (5th Cir.1974).
We examine the transcript at Harvey’s sentencing to determine if his statement was the result of compulsion. Before Harvey spoke to the court, the following took place:
COURT: Court is in session; you may be seated. These are proceedings in Criminal Docket No. 86-11, the State of Wyoming versus Jetty Lee Harvey. Will Mr. Harvey and his counsel please stand at the lectern. Let the record show the presence of Mr. Harvey with his attorney Mr. Virgil Kinnaird.
Mr. Harvey, earlier you were arraigned and tried and convicted of the crime of Kidnapping and First Degree Sexual Assault. And you’ve requested a pre-sen-tence investigation, which has been and I’ve read it.
Are you under the influence of alcohol or drugs or have any mental defect which could affect your ability to understand these proceedings?
MR. HARVEY: No, sir.
COURT: Do you or your attorney have anything to say in your behalf or wish to present information in mitigation of punishment or know of any reason why I shouldn’t sentence you now?
MR. KINNAIRD: Yes, Your Honor. We’d like to present some evidence on his behalf. We do not have any reason why sentence should not be imposed at this time.
COURT: All right. Who do you want to have speak?
MR. KINNAIRD: Well, Mr. Harvey himself would like to make a statement to the Court and then after Mr. Harvey has completed his statement, I have a young lady by the name of Miss Cory Wagonsen (Phonetic spelling) from Sheridan, Wyoming, actually from Big Horn, Wyoming, Sheridan County, who would like to make a statement to the Court. And I have a letter from an individual familiar with Mr. Harvey, and I brought the letter down pursuant to your earlier indications that you would accept a letter on his behalf that I would read into the record, sir.
COURT: All right. Will the young lady stand.
MR. KINNAIRD: This is Cory Wagon-sen, Your Honor.
COURT: All right. Raise your right hand, both of you. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you’re about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
MS. WAGONSEN: I do.
MR. HARVEY: I do.
COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Kin-naird.
MR. KINNAIRD: At this time, Your Honor, I’d like for Mr. Harvey to make a statement that he would like to make to the Court.
Harvey then made his allocution statement. Following receipt of other evidence, the court addressed Harvey as follows:
COURT: I have considered the possibility of probation and I’ve listened to Mr. Kinnaird, but feel as in the case of Mr. Phillips that the prior record, the nature of the crime, and other factors compel me to believe that probation is not warranted and should be denied.
The court proceeded to pronounce sentence. There was nothing stated by the court that would even suggest that allocution was required, and there was no evidence nor inference that Harvey was forced to relate the details of the abduction and assault at his sentencing. Harvey made these statements voluntarily.
This issue comes to us as one of first impression. We have considered whether Harvey’s statements might be analogous and subject to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), because they were obtained in a case later dismissed for a [1084]*1084speedy trial violation. 774 P.2d at 98. Had the trial court granted Harvey’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, no occasion would have existed for Harvey to allo-cute. But the same may be said for any defendant who waives his right to remain silent, testifies, and the case is later reversed on appeal. In Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2010, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968),. defendant testified to refute a statement previously made. The conviction was reversed on appeal. The defendant’s testimony was received in a subsequent trial which resulted in conviction. On appeal, the Court held the testimony inadmissible because it was necessary to refute a prior statement and, therefore, fruit of the poisonous tree. Harvey’s allocution in this case was not prompted by a desire to refute a prior statement, suppress illegally obtained evidence, or anything of a similar nature. Harrison is of no help. Simply stated, he waived his right to remain silent and made a voluntary statement which is admissible, the same as if he had testified at trial for the sole purpose of giving testimony favorable to himself.
Affirmed.
URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.
GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which URBIGKIT, C.J., joined.