Harvey v. Means
This text of Harvey v. Means (Harvey v. Means) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 DALE HARVEY, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-1712 8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S 9 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES v. ON APPEAL 10 GARANN ROSE MEANS, 11 Respondent. 12
13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Dale Harvey’s motion for 15 appellate attorneys’ fees. Dkt. No. 124. Harvey prevailed in the district court and on 16 appeal, and he now seeks $50,000 in appellate attorneys’ fees. The Hague 17 Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 18 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9011, generally require fee awards for prevailing petitioners. 19 Means has not opposed the motion or shown that fees would be inappropriate. Thus, 20 for the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED. 21
23 1 2. BACKGROUND 2 Harvey successfully petitioned this Court for the return of his children,
3 Z.H.M. and E.H.M., to Scotland under the Hague Convention. After an evidentiary 4 hearing, this Court granted Harvey’s petition on January 29, 2024, and the children 5 were immediately repatriated to Scotland. Dkt. No. 84. The Court also awarded 6 Harvey $85,472 in trial-level attorneys’ fees. Dkt. No. 120. 7 Means appealed this Court’s decision. Dkt. No. 90. Although Means 8 proceeded pro se in the district court, she retained experienced appellate counsel
9 from New York who had previously litigated Hague Convention cases before the 10 Supreme Court. Dkt. No. 124 at 3; see also Harvey v. Means, No. 24-609, 2025 WL 11 1189565, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2025). Harvey, who had been represented at trial 12 by Marguerite Smith of Flexx Law, P.S., retained new appellate counsel for the 13 appeal: Gregory M. Miller of Carney Badley Spellman, P.S., an experienced 14 appellate attorney with over forty years of practice including Ninth Circuit appeals. 15 Dkt. No. 124 at 3.
16 On April 24, 2025, the Ninth Circuit issued a memorandum decision 17 affirming this Court’s ruling in all respects. Dkt. No. 121. Harvey now seeks 18 $50,000 in appellate attorneys’ fees under 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). Dkt. No. 124 at 2. 19 The Ninth Circuit remanded the motion to this Court to consider in the first 20 instance. Dkt. No. 123. Harvey’s appellate counsel filed a notice of appearance in 21 this Court but Means’ counsel has not appeared on her behalf. Dkt. 125. Notice of
22 Harvey’s motion for appellate attorneys’ fees was sent to Means’ personal email 23 when the case was remanded on June 10, 2025. 1 3. DISCUSSION 2 3.1 Harvey is entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees under ICARA. ICARA provides that when a court orders the return of a child under the 3 Hague Convention, it “shall order the respondent to pay necessary expenses 4 incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner, including court costs, [and] legal fees 5 . . . unless the respondent establishes that such order would be clearly 6 inappropriate.” 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). This fee-shifting provision applies to 7 appellate proceedings. See Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505, 511 (9th Cir. 2010). The 8 statute’s use of “shall” creates a strong presumption in favor of fee awards. Id. 9 Because Harvey prevailed both in the district court and on appeal, and Means has 10 not demonstrated that a fee award would be “clearly inappropriate,” Harvey is 11 entitled to recover his reasonable appellate attorneys’ fees. 12 13 3.2 The reasonableness of the fees requested. 14 Having determined that Harvey is entitled to recover fees, the Court must 15 now determine the reasonableness of the fees sought. Sullivan v. Sullivan, No. CV- 16 09-545-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1651994, at *1 (D. Idaho Apr. 21, 2010) (citing Hensley v. 17 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). “A reasonable attorney fee is determined by 18 calculating the ‘lodestar,’ which is ‘the number of hours reasonably expended on the 19 litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 20 433) (determining reasonableness of fee petition following successful petition for 21 return of child under ICARA by applying lodestar method). 22 23 1 Harvey’s counsel, Gregory M. Miller, requests fees totaling $50,000, which he 2 characterizes as a reasonable reduction from the actual time expended and rates
3 charged. According to Miller’s declaration, he spent over 120 hours on the appeal at 4 his standard rate of $525 per hour, for a total exceeding $58,000, but requests only 5 $50,000 considering the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case. 6 Dkt. No. 124 ¶¶ 7–8. 7 3.2.1 Miller’s hourly rate is reasonable. 8 “The determination of a reasonable hourly rate examines the experience, 9 skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” Scalia v. Saakvitne, No. CV 10 18-00155 SOM-WRP, 2020 WL 4193118, at *11 (D. Haw. July 21, 2020) (citing Webb 11 v. Ada Cnty., 285 F.3d 829, 840 (9th Cir. 2002)). “That rate is based on the 12 prevailing market rate in the relevant community,” which in this case is Seattle. Id. 13 (citing Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010)). 14 Miller is a shareholder at Carney Badley Spellman with over forty years of 15 appellate experience, including Ninth Circuit appeals and family law matters. Id. 16 ¶ 9. He is peer-rated “AV” by Martindale-Hubbell. Id. He seeks an hourly rate of 17 $525, which is higher than the rate this Court approved for Harvey’s trial-level 18 counsel, but it is consistent with rates for experienced appellate counsel in complex 19 federal litigation in the Seattle market. Given Miller’s extensive experience and the 20 specialized nature of Hague Convention appeals, the Court finds the hourly rate 21 sought to be reasonable. 22 23 1 3.2.2 The total award requested is reasonable under the circumstances. 2 As with the hourly rate, the party seeking fees has the “burden of showing 3 the time spent and that it was reasonably necessary to the successful prosecution 4 of” the case. Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1557 5 (9th Cir. 1989). Courts may exclude hours that are “excessive, redundant, or 6 otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Although Miller’s actual time 7 exceeded 120 hours, he has voluntarily reduced his request to $50,000. This 8 reduction accounts for several factors: 9 First, Harvey faced an appeal by experienced counsel who had argued Hague 10 Convention cases before the Supreme Court, requiring a serious and thorough 11 response to preserve the district court’s well-reasoned decision. Dkt. No. 124 ¶ 3. 12 Second, the stakes in Hague Convention cases are particularly high, 13 involving fundamental questions about where young children will reside and be 14 raised. The specialized nature of international child abduction law required careful 15 analysis of evolving precedent. 16 Third, while some time was spent preparing for oral argument that was 17 ultimately cancelled, such preparation was reasonable when argument was 18 scheduled and cannot be deemed unnecessary in hindsight. 19 Fourth, Miller’s voluntary reduction of his request demonstrates appropriate 20 consideration of the parties’ circumstances while seeking reasonable compensation 21 for defending a favorable district court ruling. Dkt. No. 124 ¶ 8. 22 23 1 Miller has provided adequate records regarding time expended, which the
9 Court has reviewed. Jd. at 21-30.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Harvey v. Means, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harvey-v-means-wawd-2025.