Harvey v. H.C. Price Co.

2008 ME 161, 957 A.2d 960, 2008 Me. LEXIS 167, 2008 WL 4683643
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedOctober 21, 2008
DocketDocket: WCB-07-612
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 2008 ME 161 (Harvey v. H.C. Price Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harvey v. H.C. Price Co., 2008 ME 161, 957 A.2d 960, 2008 Me. LEXIS 167, 2008 WL 4683643 (Me. 2008).

Opinion

LEVY, J.

[¶ 1] H.C. Price Company appeals from a decision of a Workers’ Compensation Board hearing officer (Sprague, HO) assigning a 12% permanent impairment rating to Vivian Harvey that includes 7% for the psychological sequela of a work-related physical injury. H.C. Price contends it was error to assign a percentage of impairment to the psychological component of the injury based on the American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th ed.1993), required for use when rating permanent impairment. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[¶2] Vivian Harvey is fifty-two years old and lives in Ohio. In 1999, while working as a laborer on a pipeline project in Maine for H.C. Price, she suffered an injury to her lower right leg when a log came loose from the back of a piece of equipment and struck her. She lost a substantial amount of skin, and her treatment included a skin graft. She suffers chronic pain from the injury and has been out of work since.

[¶ 3] H.C. Price paid Harvey ongoing partial incapacity benefits and, in 2003, filed a petition to determine the extent of her permanent impairment. The hearing officer (Jerome, HO) determined that Harvey suffered 5% whole person permanent impairment from the leg injury. Shortly thereafter, Harvey filed her own petition to determine the extent of permanent impairment, asserting that she suffers from depression as a result of the 1999 injury, and seeking to have the psychological component of her injury rated and added to the 5% permanent impairment already allocated to the leg. H.C. Price then filed a petition for review and to cease paying benefits because Harvey’s permanent impairment level was below the 11.8% statutory threshold and she had been paid partial benefits beyond the maximum number of weeks.

[¶ 4] Harvey was examined by Dr. Newcomb, a psychiatrist. He diagnosed *962 her as suffering from a major depressive disorder, but because she had not yet received any treatment, he determined that she had not reached maximum medical improvement for that condition as of August 2006. She began psychiatric treatment in Ohio in October 2006, and was prescribed medication. She improved somewhat, but because of side effects, her doctor changed her prescription after three months.

[¶ 5] In the course of this litigation, Harvey was examined by Dr. Lobozzo, an independent medical examiner (IME) appointed pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 312 (2007). He diagnosed her as having a major depressive disorder related to the 1999 work injury, and determined that she suffers 7% permanent impairment as a result. The hearing officer adopted this opinion, and concluded that when combined with the impairment from her leg, Harvey suffers 12% whole person permanent impairment. Because this exceeds the 11.8% threshold, the hearing officer denied the employer’s petition for review, and determined that Harvey is entitled to continue to receive benefits.

[¶ 6] H.C. Price filed a motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the hearing officer denied. It then filed a petition for appellate review, which we granted pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 322 (2007) and M.R.App. P. 23. We consolidated this case with Capella v. Clean Harbors Environmental Services, WCB-07-618, for the purposes of appeal, and oral argument was held jointly in the two cases. However, we resolve the cases in separate decisions.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶7] The Workers’ Compensation Act has long recognized the compensability of work-related mental stress injuries, as well as the psychological sequelae of physical work injuries. See 39-A M.R.S. § 201(3) (2007); Townsend v. Me. Bur. of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1016-17 (Me.1979); Cote v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 447 A.2d 75, 78 (Me.1982). The question presented in this appeal is whether the Board may give a numerical percentage rating to permanent impairment associated with the psychological component of a work injury, despite the fact that the American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th ed. 1993) (AMA Guides) does not assign numerical impairment percentages to non-neurological psychological conditions, as it does for other types of impairment.

[¶ 8] To address this question we examine, in order: (A) the Act’s definition of “permanent impairment” and its role in the determination of the duration of benefit payments; (B) the fourth edition of the AMA Guides’s treatment of permanent impairment; and (C) the independent medical examiner’s approach to evaluating permanent impairment in this case and the hearing officer’s decision adopting that approach. In the discussion that follows, we conclude that the Act’s definition of “permanent impairment” and the Board’s rules suggest that the psychological sequela of a work-related physical injury should be considered when determining permanent impairment level, which we have described as the “overall level of work-incapacity” that resulted from an injury. See Churchill v. Cent. Aroostook Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 1999 ME 192, ¶ 11, 742 A.2d 475, 478.

A. Permanent Impairment

[¶ 9] “Permanent impairment” is defined in our Workers’ Compensation Act as “any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss existing after the date of maximum medical improvement that results from the injury.” 39-A M.R.S. § 102(16) (2007). In prior versions of the Act, permanent *963 impairment benefits were awarded for loss of bodily function, pursuant to a schedule for impairment to individual body parts. See, e.g., 39 M.R.S.A. § 56 (Pamph.1986). In 1987, this approach was replaced with the “whole-body” approach, in which permanent impairment was calculated as a percentage of total body impairment, and the number of weeks of benefits to be awarded was determined according to a sliding scale based on that percentage. P.L.1987, ch. 559, Pt. B, § 33 (codified at 39 M.R.S.A. § 56-B (1989)).

[¶ 10] The enactment of title 39-A in 1992 substantially altered the provisions governing permanent impairment benefits; benefits were no longer awarded for the impairment, either measured as a percentage of whole body impairment or measured by individual body parts. P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A-7 (effective January 1, 1993). The concept of permanent impairment remains in the Act, however, “as a rough measure of an employee’s overall level of work-incapacity,” Churchill, 1999 ME 192, ¶ 11, 742 A.2d at 478, and remains relevant when determining the length of time that an employee suffering partial incapacity is entitled to receive workers’ compensation benefits. See 39-A M.R.S. § 213 (2007). 1

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Bluebook (online)
2008 ME 161, 957 A.2d 960, 2008 Me. LEXIS 167, 2008 WL 4683643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harvey-v-hc-price-co-me-2008.