Harvey, Jr. v. Brookhart

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedAugust 2, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-00040
StatusUnknown

This text of Harvey, Jr. v. Brookhart (Harvey, Jr. v. Brookhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harvey, Jr. v. Brookhart, (S.D. Ill. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BRYANT H. HARVEY, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-cv-00040-SPM

DEE DEE BROOKHART, RUSSELL GOINS, TAIJA ATKINS, LORIE CUNNINGHAM, ASHLEY MCCASLIN, MATT BOSECKER, LEIF MCCARTHY, BRYAN PERDUE, THOMAS STUCK, SHEILA LEWIS, JEREMY GIVENS, ALAN CARTER, TAMMY WELTY, PAMELA WARD, and LACIE LIVINGSTON,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge: This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment on the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies filed by Defendants Tammy Welty and Pam Ward. (Doc. 51). Plaintiff Bryan Harvey filed a response in opposition, and Defendants filed a reply brief.1 (Docs. 62, 63). On July 23, 2021, the Court held an evidentiary hearing. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is granted.

1 Defendants cite misapplication of the law by Harvey in his response as exceptional circumstances warranting a reply. See SDIL-LR 7.1 BACKGROUND Plaintiff Bryant Harvey, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Graham Correctional Center, alleges his constitutional rights were violated while he was housed at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”). Harvey claims that

after repeatedly notifying Lawrence staff that his cellmate was threatening him and requesting to move cells, he was attacked by his cellmate on July 19, 2019. Following the attack, he was sent to an outside hospital for his injuries where he received ten staples in his head. Upon his return to Lawrence, while in the infirmary, Defendants Nurse Tammy Welty and Nurse Pam Ward failed to redress his bloody bandages, apply antibiotic ointment, and to provide medication for migraines, dizziness, and pain. (Doc. 23, p. 14, 17). In retaliation for filing grievances, Welty further denied Harvey adequate care by refusing to allow him to go to the healthcare unit for breathing treatments and to provide him pain medication on more than three occasions. (Id. at p. 15, 18). Following a preliminary review of the First Amended Complaint, Harvey is proceeding on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Ward and Welty for failing to change

Harvey’s bandages and provide medication for his injuries following the attack (Count 2), a First Amendment claim against Welty for retaliating against Harvey for filing grievances (Count 3), and an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Welty for denying Harvey breathing treatments and pain medication (Count 4). (See Docs. 11, 22, 23).2 LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

2 The Court addresses only the allegations brought against Defendants Ward and Welty in the First Amended Complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Any doubt about the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Lawrence v. Kenosha Cty., 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). On summary judgment, the district court’s role is generally not to weigh evidence or judge witness credibility. When deciding a motion for

summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, however, the Seventh Circuit explains that a different standard applies. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d at 739-41. The Seventh Circuit in Pavey held that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are to be determined by the judge, not a jury. Pavey, 544 at 740-41. A summary judgment motion on exhaustion grounds typically requires a hearing to decide any contested issues regarding exhaustion, and a judge may make limited findings at that time. Id. at 742. II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA states, in pertinent part, that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,

by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion of available administrative remedies must occur before the suit is filed. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to properly utilize a prison’s grievance process, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. The statutory purpose of the PLRA is to “afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). This allows the prison administration an opportunity to fix the problem or to reduce the damages and perhaps shed light

on factual disputes that may arise in litigation even if the prison administration’s solution does not fully satisfy the prisoner. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023-24. To allow otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the grievance process. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 526 (2002). III. Grievance Procedures As an inmate in the custody of IDOC, Harvey was required to follow the grievance procedure laid out in the Illinois Administrative Code (“grievance procedures”). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. The grievance procedures direct an inmate is to file a grievance first with the Counselor within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The grievance form must: [C]ontain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender's complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much descriptive information about the individual as possible.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through routine channels are then sent to a Grievance Officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.820(a). The Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). The Grievance Officer must submit his findings to the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) within two months after receiving the grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODe § 504.830(e).

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Related

Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Bobby Ford v. Donald Johnson
362 F.3d 395 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Darrick Lawrence v. Kenosha County and Louis Vena
391 F.3d 837 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Pavey v. Conley
544 F.3d 739 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)

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