Harvey Bldg. Corp. v. Hannon Hannon v. Harvey Bldg

191 So. 784, 140 Fla. 399, 1939 Fla. LEXIS 1119
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedOctober 31, 1939
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 191 So. 784 (Harvey Bldg. Corp. v. Hannon Hannon v. Harvey Bldg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harvey Bldg. Corp. v. Hannon Hannon v. Harvey Bldg, 191 So. 784, 140 Fla. 399, 1939 Fla. LEXIS 1119 (Fla. 1939).

Opinion

Per Curiam.- —

In this case the circuit judge filed an opinion as follows:

“This proceeding was brought by the plaintiff to have certain alleged excessive and discriminatory taxes upon the lands of the plaintiff described in the bill of complaint cancelled and set aside. The statutory provisions (Secs. 1038-40) conferring jurisdiction on the court to ‘inquire into and determine the legality, equality and validity’ of any tax assessment or toll have been complied with. Plaintiff contends (1) that the taxes on its property for the years ; 1933, 1934, and 1935 were not assessed on an equal and uniform basis, its property being discriminated against in that its lands were assessed at a valuation in excess of the actual cash value while other properties, especially residences, were assessed at one-third of the actual cash value; and (2) that the property having been assessed at a valúa *401 tion in excess of the actual cash value the excess tax should be cancelled.

“The evidence as to the first contention that plaintiff has been discriminated against is insufficient to overcome the direct and positive assertion of the tax assessor that he did not assess residences or any other properties on a basis of one-third of the actual cash value for the years in' question. The second contention because of the conflicts in the evidence and the wide variance in the testimony as to the actual cash value of the property presents a more difficult problem.

“In weighing and reconciling the conflicting evidence the presumption must be indulged that the tax assessor performed his duties in accordance with the applicable provisions of law and the burden of proof is upon him who asserts to the contrary.

“The valuations appearing upon the assessment rolls are as follows: 1933, building, $171,000, and land $14,100, making a total of $185,100; 1934, building, $140,000 and land $14,100, making a total of $154,100; 1935, building, $135,000, and land $14,100, making a total of $149,100. No complaint is made as to the valuation of the land for either of these years. Plaintiff avers that the actual cash value of the building was $100,000, $110,000 and $115,000 for the respective years, the increase in value for each year being attributed to better economic conditions. The valuation placed on the land and building by the various witnesses ranges from $90,000 to $220,000 for 1933, $90,000 to $235,000 for 1934, and $100,000 to $250,000 for 1935. My conclusion is that the valuations for two of the three years is too high.

“Plaintiff contends that the valuation placed on the building for the year 1936, is excessive; that said valuation is *402 more than double the actual cash value; and that the tax assessor used an illegal method in determining the value in that the only factors considered by him were replacement cost less depreciation and obsolescence. Much testimony was taken in an effort to show that the tax assessor did in fact consider all proper factors in arriving at the valuation which he placed thereon, but I am impressed with the conviction that sufficient consideration was not given to present market value, the earning capacity of the property, the cost of operation and upkeep, and other factors which may vitally affect the actual cash value. There was in fact no market even at the valuation of $149,100 for 1935, the lowest value fixed for either of the three years, the owner having testified he would have been willing to sell for less than that figure.

“Defendant vigorously contends that plaintiff cannot maintain this action, no allegations having been made that property of plaintiff had been discriminated against for 1936 by fixing a valuation ratably higher than other property in the city, thus violating constitutional and statutory provisions which require equality and uniformity in taxation and there being no evidence of such discriminaton, plaintiff cannot maintain this action. The case of Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503, is cited in support of this contention. There it was held that where all property was assessed at 50 per cent of its true cash value the statute requiring equality and uniformity had been complied with. From this defendant reasons that if all property is uniformly assessed in excess of its true value plaintiff cannot complain. With this, I cannot agree, for to do so would ignore that provision of the statute that ‘in no event shall such valuation exceed the actual cash value of said property.’ Courts must give effect to every statutory provision, *403 and my conclusion is that in an appropriate proceeding such excess valuation may be set aside when no other relief is sought. This is the construction I place upon the holdings in the cases of West Virginia Hotel Corp. v. Foster, 132 So. 842, and City of Tampa v. Colgan, 163 So. 577. It is not necessary to decide the point in this case but I incline to the view that the rule enunciated in the Camp Phosphate Co. case is applicable where plaintiff contends that the entire tax roll is void because of inequalities in the assessments, and not in a case where it is sought to set aside excess valuations only.

“All of the testimony in this case was taken before me and in determining the excess valuations hereinafter set out I have given careful consideratoin to all of the evidence submitted. 1 have also read practically every case cited but have based my decision largely upon the more recent decisions of our own court. Applying the principles of law as expressed in these cases to the facts of this case, my conclusion is that the assessed valuation of the building should be reduced from $171,000 to $120,000 for the year 1933, and from $140,000 to $125,000 for the year 1934. The assessed valuation of the building for 1935 is $135,000. The owner admits a value of $115,000. The assessed valuation for this year should not be reduced, as I do not believe the presumption that the tax assessor was correct in his valuation has been overcome by the evidence. The margin of difference is too small to charge him with error except upon the clearest and most convincing proof.

“For the year 1936 I am convinced that the assessment is so greatly in excess of the actual cash value as to amount to a legal fraud. I am also convinced that the assessor failed to give sufficient consideration to the more important factors entering into the valuation for assessment purposes, *404 and that too much importance was given to the factor of replacement cost less depreciation and obsolescence. That this factor is one of prime importance cannot be denied, but it should not be allowed to outweigh all others in determining the actual cash value. With all the influencing factors allowed for, I am of the opinion that the true cash value of the building for the year 1936 did not exceed $150,000 and that the owner is entitled to have the assessment reduced to that figure from $303,280 as fixed by the tax assessor.

“The testimony to the effect that the net earnings could be materially increased by eliminating certain fixed charges and operating costs, and by an increase of receipts from rentals has not been overlooked.

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229 So. 2d 629 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1969)
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Bluebook (online)
191 So. 784, 140 Fla. 399, 1939 Fla. LEXIS 1119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harvey-bldg-corp-v-hannon-hannon-v-harvey-bldg-fla-1939.